Analyzing and Mitigating Security Threats in P2P Systems by Ismail, Hatem
Analyzing and Mitigating Security
Threats in P2P Systems
Vom Fachbereich Informatik der Technischen Universität Darmstadt
genehmigte
Dissertation
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades eines Doktor-Ingenieur (Dr.-Ing.)
vorgelegt von
M.Sc. Hatem Ismail
aus Kairo, Ägypten
Referenten:
Prof. Neeraj Suri, Ph.D.
Prof. Dr. Abdelmajid Khelil
Datum der Einreichung: 2. Juli 2018
Datum der mündlichen Prüfung: 13. September 2018
Darmstadt 2018
D17
Ismail, Hatem: Analyzing and Mitigating Security Threats in P2P Systems
Darmstadt, Technische Universität Darmstadt,
Jahr der Veröffentlichung der Dissertation auf TUprints: 2018
URN: urn:nbn:de:tuda-tuprints-78124
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 13.09.2018
Verffentlicht unter CC BY 4.0 International
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/

Erklärung zur Dissertation
Hiermit versichere ich, Hatem Ismail, die vorliegende Dissertation ohne Hilfe
Dritter und nur mit den angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmitteln angefertigt zu
haben. Alle Stellen, die Quellen entnommen wurden, sind als solche kenntlich
gemacht worden. Diese Arbeit hat in gleicher oder ähnlicher Form noch keiner
Prüfungsbehörde vorgelegen.
Darmstadt, den 5. Oktober 2018

Abstract
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) protocols increasingly underlie a growing diversity of net-
worked applications (e.g., file sharing, streaming multimedia, storage, VoIP)
especially as the decentralized P2P paradigm inherently fosters scalability and
robustness. The growing application-oriented services also result in the evoluti-
on of P2P systems spanning diverse data dissemination techniques, peer roles
and topological structures.
On the flip side, while decentralization and scalability are attractive, and
common for all P2P systems, these design features also increase the P2P net-
work’s exposure to a variety of security threats that can result in the degradation
of services. In this thesis, we illustrate a set of important P2P attack types and
subsequently develop approaches to secure P2P networks from these progressive
and evolving attacks.
Covering a comprehensive progression of P2P systems of increasing complexi-
ty (i.e., structured, unstructured and streaming), we evaluate the corresponding
feasibility of conducting attacks and the resultant impact onto them.
Subsequently, we investigate the progressive steps of detection, mitigation
and sanitization potential to restore the requisite P2P functionality. Depending
on the targeted P2P network model, we propose countermeasures that (a) are
effective against a specific attack type and its possible variants, (b) are light-
weight in execution, (c) are fully decentralized, i.e., do not depend on central
entities, and (d) allow for both reactive and proactive mitigation.
Our theoretical analysis and simulations demonstrate that our proposed at-
tack detection/mitigation mechanisms can reach up to 90-100% detection accu-
racy while inducing low overhead of 5-10% even when operating under severe
attack scenarios.

Kurzfassung
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Netzwerke unterliegen zunehmend einer sich steigernden
Diversität vernetzter Anwendungen (z.B. File Sharing, Streaming, Multimedia,
Datenspeicherung, VoIP), insbesondere infolge der durch das dezentralisierte
P2P-Paradigma begünstigten Skalierbarkeit und Robustheit. Die zunehmende
Zahl anwendungsorientierter Dienste führt auch zu einer Evolution von P2P-
Modellen, die verschiedenartige Techniken der Datenverbreitung, sowie verschie-
dene Rollen der Peers und topologische Strukturen, umfasst.
Dezentralisierung und Skalierbarkeit sind attraktive Eigenschaften von allen
P2P-Systemen, führen aber auch zu einer Anfälligkeit dieser Systeme gegen-
über verschiedener Sicherheitsschwachstellen, die wiederum zu einer Minderung
der Dienstgüte führen können. Die vorliegende Arbeit zeigt einen Satz wichti-
ger P2P-Angriffsarten auf und entwickelt Ansätze zum Schutz vor diesen sich
abzeichnenden progressiven Angriffen.
Wir evaluieren die Durchführbarkeit und Auswirkungen dieser Angriffe für
P2P-Modelle steigender Komplexität (Structured, Unstructured und Streaming).
Anschließend untersuchen wir aufeinander aufbauend Schritte der Angriffs-
detektion und der Wirkungsminderung zur Wiederherstellung grundlegender
P2P-Funktionalität. In Abhängigkeit vom betrachteten P2P-Modell schlagen
wir Gegenmaßnahmen vor, die (a) wirksam gegen eine bestimmte Angriffsart
einschließlich möglicher Varianten sind, (b) leichtgewichtig in der Ausführung
sind, (c) vollständig dezentralisiert, also unabhängig von zentralen Entitäten,
sind und (d) reaktive und proaktive Ansätze der Wirkungsminderung ermögli-
chen.
Unsere theoretische Analyse und Simulationen zeigen, dass die vorgestellten
Mechanismen zur Detektion und Wirkungsminderung eine Detektionsgenauig-
keit von 90-100% erzielen können und dabei selbst in massiven Angriffsszenarien
einen niedrigen Mehraufwand von 5-10% erfordern.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) computing is an established paradigm used across a variety
of data dissemination and data discovery applications. P2P networks gained
a wide popularity due to utilizing the decentralized coordination to provide
scalability, reliability and fault tolerance, which naturally leads to its wide ap-
plicability nowadays. In fact, P2P protocols increasingly constitute the founda-
tions for many large-scale applications due to the inherited distributed nature of
P2P systems. Originally applied for file sharing applications, it is increasingly
utilized for diverse large-scale networked applications resulting in conquering
a vast share of the current internet traffic with diverse data dissemination and
data discovery applications such as file sharing, multimedia streaming, VoIP, on-
line gaming, machine-to-machine communication, IoT and many others [GK03;
RPI12; FTT10; AAM+15; GE12; WK13].
In order to support such fundamentally distinctive applications in terms of
scalability, QoS and low overheads, P2P systems1 correspondingly differ accord-
ing to the application platform, i.e., a file sharing application requires a different
overlay functionalities and data dissemination techniques than a video streaming
application. However, the main common aspect between different P2P systems
is that peers have only a partial view of the network as obtained from their
neighboring peers, i.e., there is no large-scale P2P overlay where all peers are
aware, or directly connected to, each other due to the CPU resources and storage
space limitations. Other than the aforementioned characteristic, P2P overlay
models differ remarkably in various aspects. Therefore, it is important to start
by highlighting the fact that:
P2P overlays are different; they can not be addressed as a single
entity. When security aspects of a P2P overlay are investigated,
the specifics of the targeted overlay are critically important as the
attackers always seek for a tiny vulnerability in the system to exploit.
In that context, to present the flow of the work discussed in this thesis on a
high-level, we start by emphasizing the main aspects that define the uniqueness
of P2P overlays.
1Throughout the thesis, the terms system, network and overlay denote the same meaning
and are used interchangeably
1.1 P2P Overlays
In
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Figure 1.1: P2P overlays addressed in this thesis
1.1 P2P Overlays
The aim of this section is to discuss the main differences between various P2P
overlays which highlight the need to address security threats differently de-
pending on the targeted overlay model. As depicted in Figure 1.1, we target
the three major existing P2P overlays: structured, unstructured and streaming
overlays, as these overlays constitute the basic concepts behind the most widely
distributed applications [RPI12; AAM+15; KB+05; STF+13; WSR11]. To that
end, we now highlight the main factors that differ in each P2P overlay.
Differences on a high-level
Each P2P overlay model constitutes an independent system model that defines
how peers:
1. are assigned IDS.
2. contact each other.
3. disseminate data across the designated overlay.
4. share responsibilities and priorities according to the overlay protocol, i.e.,
peers might acquire different responsibilities and criticality due to (i) pos-
sessing a trending content, (ii) being positioned near the data source, (iii)
being responsible to distribute data to a certain fraction of peers (for ex-
ample, in super-unstructured systems), or (iv) being more trusted to other
peers, i.e., in a trust-based system, which is a common approach in various
P2P overlays.
In the following, we briefly discuss the aforementioned aspects with respect
to the different overlay topologies considered in the thesis.
Structured overlays:
Structured overlays are distinguished by the fact that peers can infer the close-
ness of other peers by their IDs. Peers are assigned IDs such that the distance
between peers are calculated through the fraction of shared prefix in their unique
identifier, i.e., peers can calculate how close they are to each other. Hence, peers
usually make use of convergent forwarding approach of messages to contact each
other which provides a very efficient searching mechanism for either peers or
content. However, despite the attractiveness and efficiency of such a feature,
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the susceptibility of structured overlays to attacks increases as the attacker is
capable of (a) revealing the location of other peers, (b) revealing the distance
to other peers, and (c) tracing the forwarding path of a specific message.
Unstructured overlays:
Unlike structured overlays, peers in unstructured overlays are randomly posi-
tioned in the overlay, i.e., no protocol that arranges how peers are close or far
from each other. This denotes that in an unstructured overlay, peers either
flood their neighbors with requests searching for a specific peer, or a super-
unstructured topology is applied, i.e., some peers are promoted to super peers
and thus, become responsible for forwarding messages to a certain group at-
tached to this peer to allow for more organization of the overlay and less flooding
of requests. Accordingly, compared to structured overlays, unstructured over-
lays are easier to maintain, however, on a large-scale overlay, looking up a peer
becomes very costly in terms of time, resources and overhead.
For this reason, most large-scale unstructured overlays are coupled with a
super-P2P topology to enhance the system’s performance in terms of connecting
peers and forwarding messages in a more efficient manner, which is referred to as
super-unstructured overlays. Thus, the set of super peers in the system acquire
higher priorities and responsibilities in the overlay. In turn, grab the attackers’
attention given their critical role in the overlay.
Streaming overlays:
Streaming overlays are mainly characterized by the existence of a source peer,
i.e., the peer that owns the stream and is responsible for disseminating the
stream chunks to the rest of the overlay. Other peers who join the stream are
assigned random IDs and contact each other mainly in either tree or mesh-based
fashion.
Peers disseminate data via advertising for the existing data in their buffer
and thus, other peers can request certain data elements. Notably, as a frac-
tion of peers starts to receive the stream chunks from the source, they in turn
participate in the data dissemination process via relaying the received content
which highly reduces load on the source peer and increases the system’s relia-
bility. Specifically, peers disseminate data via advertising for the existing data
in their buffer and thus, other peers can request certain data elements. Al-
though the efficiency and reliability provided by the existing data dissemination
techniques, various attacks focus on abusing those techniques mainly through
aiming at cheating other peers when advertising about the availability of the
stream chunks in their buffer or through the actual transmission of the stream
chunks.
Interpretation
As discussed above, we emphasize how P2P overlays do not operate in the same
fashion. In fact, despite sharing the features of distributiveness and scalability,
each P2P overlay notably differs in how peers behave within the overlay and
how the overlay itself is organized. To that end, investigating the core question
of this thesis “How secured are P2P systems” can be only investigated when
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dealing with each P2P overlay’s aspect separately. Therefore, it is important to
reflect the following statement:
Indeed, the aforementioned design practices render P2P networks
susceptible to various attacks. An attacker conducting an attack on
a certain P2P overlay targets exploiting one of those characteristics.
Note that the aforementioned aspects regarding each system model are de-
scribed in details in the corresponding chapter(s).
1.2 Attacks on P2P Overlays
Over the last years, various attacks on P2P overlays evolved and still mutate,
which we refer to throughout the thesis as progressive attacks. For example,
eclipse, poisoning, cheating, flooding, sybil and publishing are examples of the
most known attacks that (a) exist, (b) are easily conducted, and (c) are contin-
uously evolving on P2P overlays [SCD+04; STR10b; ZJT13; KLR09; LMS+10;
Dou02; GRS+14; SND+06; LYL14; IRS18b; IRS18a; KLK+12]. Those attacks
are overlay-specific, i.e., they are conducted through exploiting a single charac-
teristic in a given P2P overlay. Hence, mitigating such attacks becomes more
challenging as no single or generic defense scheme provides a thorough protec-
tion to various P2P overlays due to the different functions and aspects deployed
by peers in each overlay.
While designing a mitigation/detection/sanitizing scheme is desired to en-
hance the overlay’s resiliency to attacks and effectively increase the users’ trust
towards the provided service, various constraints arise that can exorbitantly
entail service degradation as:
(1) schemes that constitutes a central monitoring/ decision-responsible en-
tities conceal the attractive features and data dissemination efficiency of dis-
tributed P2P overlays. Moreover, such central schemes affect the overlay’s re-
siliency due to the additional single point of failure and the elevated probability
that attackers target taking over such entities.
(2) complex cryptographic schemes, which are oftentimes proposed in the
literature for P2P systems, are unfeasible to be processed by light-weight com-
puting devices. Thus, decrease the overall service quality provision.
(3) schemes that are tailored specifically against a single attack variant,
even from the same attack class, become useless when the attacker adapts to
the mitigation scheme, e.g., by modifying a single malicious behavior conducted
by malicious peers.
To this end, in this thesis, we address the susceptibility of various P2P
overlays to different progressive attacks while carefully addressing the afore-
mentioned potential drawbacks when designing a countermeasure.
Our focus in this thesis is on designing countermeasures for different
P2P overlays that: (1) are attack-class generic, (2) are completely
distributed, (3) do not depend on complex cryptographic schemes.
Moreover, we propose more aggressive variants of the investigated attacks
and accordingly analyze their impact as a prerequisite to design an effective
mitigation/detection attack-class generic countermeasure. In a nutshell, this
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Figure 1.2: Attacks investigated per overlay
thesis focuses on analyzing the impact of current progressive attacks on different
P2P overlays and developing a countermeasure that can effectively detect, and
thus mitigate, the attack’s conducted adversarial behavior.
Specifically, in the context of the aforementioned challenges, as depicted in
Figure 1.2, the following attacks are investigated on the corresponding overlays:
Localized Attacks (LA)
LAs are conducted on structured overlays and tackle the closeness-awareness
key factor of such overlays. In other words, the attacker abuses this factor
and targets specific peers to conduct his malicious behavior. We show that the
generic (LA)s, with more focus on the class of Localized Eclipse Attacks (LEA)s,
are feasible and indeed severe on structured overlays.
Routing Table Poisoning (RTP)
Similarly, such attacks target structured overlays, where malicious peers aim
at conquering benign peers contact lists. We prove in our work, specifically in
Chapter 4, that RTP attacks are a higher-level form of LA attacks. This denotes
that by successfully conducting an RTP attack, LAs, Sybil, indexing or other
forms of attacks that can be conducted on structured overlays become feasible.
Outgoing Eclipse Attacks (OEA)
In this part of the thesis, we propose OEAs, where malicious peers target eclips-
ing outgoing messages from benign peers. Unlike structured overlays, where
specific peers can be conveniently attacked due to the closeness notion, OEAs
are conducted using both scenarios, i.e., (a) where every benign peer is attacked,
and (b) the attacker targets only a specific set of peers. Regarding (b), such
attack behavior is of interest as we consider the super-unstructured variant of
unstructured overlays, as described in Section 1.1. In a nutshell, we explore
and validate the impact and feasibility, respectively, of conducting OEAs on
super-unstructured overlays.
Data Dissemination Cheating Attacks
In streaming overlays, as mentioned in Section 1.1, data dissemination tech-
niques are a key factor given the hard delay and overhead constraints of sending
and receiving streaming data. Attacks that target exploiting, and thus perturb,
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such functionalities are continuously evolving. In this part of the thesis, we
investigate the severity of a composite data dissemination attack and propose
a counter measure, where malicious peers are able to be placed in critical po-
sitions in the streaming overlay before conducting several adversarial behaviors
to disrupt the data dissemination technique used.
In the following, we detail the research questions (RQ) we address through
out the thesis and the corresponding contributions.
1.3 Research Questions and Contributions
To that end, our focus in this thesis is on answering the following research
questions, which consequently constitute the contributions as follows.
Research Question (RQ1): How resilient are structured P2P overlays
to attacks
In this research question we aim at investigating the impact of different at-
tacks on structured P2P overlays in order to assess the necessity of designing a
detection and eviction countermeasures. We specifically address two attacks:
Eclipse Attacks (EA): In Chapter 2 we address Eclipse Attacks (EA)s and
especially the class of Localized EA’s (LEAs), i.e., the attacker directs
all of his resources to eclipse a specific set of peers. Subsequently, our
contribution is three-fold as follows.
Contribution (C1): Securing structured overlays against LEAs
• Assessing the severity of variant LEA attacks when existing mitiga-
tion techniques are functioning.
• (C1.1) Developing a highly accurate mechanism to detect malicious
peers when they target a specific peer to attack. This work was
published at ICPADS 2015 [IGS15].
• (C1.2)Developing an eviction mechanism that is generally applica-
ble to various LA types while effectively evicting malicious peers from
the overlay. This work was presented at CNS 2016 [IGS16].
Routing Table Poisoning (RTP) attacks: An RTP attack is defined as the
act of malicious peers aiming to exist in benign peers routing tables to
conduct an attack in a structured overlay, i.e., poison benign peers Routing
Table (RT). In this work, we address the severity of poisoning benign
peers RT and accordingly propose a defending mechanism. This work was
presented at the Journal of Computers & Security 2017 [IGS17]. We detail
our contribution in the following.
Contribution (C2): Sanitizing benign peers RT from malicious
peers conducting RTP attack
• Evaluating the severity of RTP attacks.
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• Developing an adaptable RTP attack mitigation approach. Thereby,
we propose a protocol-independent, fully distributed, simple and ef-
fective detection and overlay-sanitizing mechanism.
Research Question (RQ2): How to defend against Outgoing Eclipse
Attacks (OEAs) conducted on super-unstructured P2P systems.
We show that the class of Outgoing Eclipse Attacks (OEAs) are particularly
threatening for super-unstructured systems, specifically given the criticality and
the small fraction of super peers in such systems. Accordingly, we highlight
the necessity for developing an effective detection and expulsion scheme to re-
store the system’s reliability and availability. We published this work at Trust-
Com 2018 [IRS18a]. To that end, our contribution towards defending against
OEAs is:
Contribution (C3): An effective detection and peer eviction mecha-
nism to mitigate OEAs in super-P2P systems.
• Assessing the impact of OEAs on super peers in unstructured overlays.
• Developing an adaptable OEA mitigation approach. In other words, we
propose a composite proactive and reactive mechanism that mitigates the
effect of routing table infiltration as well as the subsequent OEAs.
Research Question (RQ3): Online data streaming overlays: what is
the impact of internal data dissemination cheating attacks on the
streaming quality and how to mitigate such an attack in a tightly
QoS constrained environment
Our focus here is to address a specific data dissemination cheating attack variant,
where (a) malicious peers are able to occupy the most vital positions in the
overlay to maximize the perturbations, and (b) detecting such an attack is very
challenging for benign peers. In order to do so, we address the severity of data
dissemination cheating attacks on the stream quality, i.e., peers satisfaction from
the streaming service.
Contribution (C4): Designing a detection mechanism to counter the
impact of internal DoS attacks.
This work was presented at WoWMoM 2018 [IRS18b]. Our contribution to this
research question constitutes of the following.
• Investigating the effectiveness of internal cheating attacks.
• Proposing a detection mechanism that ensures peers satisfaction regarding
the streaming quality.
1.4 Thesis Structure
For each overlay type, the system model, the corresponding attack model and
the proposed countermeasure is presented in the designated chapter. In Chap-
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ter 2 and Chapter 3, we describe the detection and eviction mechanisms, respec-
tively, designed for LEA attacks on structured overlays. Chapter 4 presents
the evaluation of RTP attacks on structured overlays along with describing the
developed sanitizing mechanism against RTP attacks.
Afterwards, in Chapter 5 we describe our two-fold proactive and reactive
mechanisms to defend against routing table infiltration on super-unstructured
overlays. Chapter 6 addresses the impact of cheating attacks on online P2P
streaming overlays and proposes a detection scheme to preserve the stream-
ing service quality. Finally, Chapter 7 contains the thesis summary and the
subsequent conclusions.
1.5 Publications
The following publications, in parts verbatim, are used in this thesis:
• H. Ismail, S. Roos, and N. Suri. “A Composite Malicious Peer Evic-
tion Mechanism for Super-P2P Systems”. In: IEEE International Confer-
ence On Trust, Security And Privacy In Computing And Communications
(IEEE TrustCom). 2018
• H. Ismail, S. Roos, and N. Suri. “A Detection Mechanism for Internal At-
tacks on Pull-based P2P Streaming Systems”. In: IEEE International
Symposium on a World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks
(WoWMoM). 2018
• H. Ismail, D. Germanus, and N. Suri. “P2P Routing Table Poisoning:
A Quorum-based Sanitizing Approach”. In: Computers & Security 65
(2017), pp. 283–299
• H. Ismail, D. Germanus, and N. Suri. “Malicious Peers Eviction for P2P
Overlays”. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Communications
and Network Security (CNS). 2016, pp. 216–224
• H. Ismail, D. Germanus, and N. Suri. “Detecting and Mitigating P2P
Eclipse Attacks”. In: Proceedings of the International Conference on Par-
allel and Distributed Systems (ICPADS). 2015, pp. 224–231
The following publications are affiliated to various aspects discussed in this
thesis, nonetheless, they are not included:
• D. Germanus, H. Ismail, and N. Suri. “PASS: An Address Space Slicing
Framework for P2P Eclipse Attack Mitigation”. In: IEEE Symposium on
Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS). 2015, pp. 74–83
• K. Demir, H. Ismail, and T. Vateva-Gurova. “Securing the Cloud Assisted
Smart Grid”. In: Internal Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection
(2018)
Chapter 2
Structured Overlays:
Detecting LEAs
The work presented in this chapter, published in [IGS15], counts towards ad-
dressing Research Question 1 and the corresponding sub-contribution (C1.1).
As mentioned in Contribution 1, this work is two-fold. In this chapter, we
present our detection mechanism for detecting LEA attacks. Secondly, in Chap-
ter 3 we build upon this detection mechanism to design an eviction mechanism
to efficiently expel malicious peers from the system using a sophisticated form
of LEA attacks. Hence, although the system model holds, we present our sub-
contributions differently due to the different progressive attacks we counter.
We start by briefly highlighting the problem which motivates the necessity
of tackling the security threat induced through LEAs on structured overlays.
Afterwards, in Section 2.2 the technical background and related work are pre-
sented. Section 2.3 describes the system model and the concepts underlying the
technical sections covering the attacker model (Section 2.4), divergent lookups
(Section ??), and detection mechanism (Section 2.6). Finally, the attack sever-
ity, mitigation efficiency, and detection rates are evaluated in Section 2.7.
2.1 Problem Statement
P2P networks inherently provide good fault-tolerance due to their design ap-
proach of redundant message exchange and replicated data storage. Moreover,
the decentralized protocol design requires only partial views of the network and
thereby facilitates their scalability. Yet, the partial view of each peer on the P2P
overlay network also introduces susceptibilities to various attacks [LMG+10;
WTC+08; Dou02; SCD+04; CCF+12].
This work focuses on Eclipse Attacks (EA) and especially the class of Local-
ized EA’s (LEA) that are known to have a significant impact on P2P function-
ality [SND+06; DKS12] in terms of availability, integrity, and confidentiality.
Moreover, no generic LEA mitigation technique has been found that also pre-
serves the properties of scalability, decentralization, openness, and timeliness.
Recently, divergent lookups have been proposed as an effective mitigation
technique for a variant of localized EA, known as Topology Aware LEA
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(taLEA), [GRS+14; GIS15], where the attack efficiency stems from very se-
lective placement of malicious peers in the victim peers’ vicinity. taLEA depends
on knowledge of the topology and the overlay protocol to place very few but
very carefully placed malicious peers to cause damage. Unlike the niche taLEAs,
LEAs form the more general attack case with malicious peers scattered all over
the overlay network. To that end, we can describe how LEA attacks are more:
(i) feasible to conduct and (ii) severe than taLEA in the following statement.
While more malicious peers are required to achieve an impact compa-
rable to a focused taLEA scenario, the generalized topology agnostic
placement of peer nodes in a LEA makes for a very easy-to-conduct
high-damage attack, and hence the need for LEA mitigation.
Contributions towards Detecting LEAs
On this background, the contributions in this work are (i) demonstrating limi-
tations of conventional divergent lookup mechanisms resilience to LEAs under
sophisticated attacker behavior scenarios, and (ii) enhancing divergent lookups
via the development of a highly accurate mechanism to detect malicious peers
which is based on a dynamic voting algorithm. This enables divergent algo-
rithms not only to mitigate selected LEA variants, but also the generic LEA
attack cases. We have conducted comprehensive simulation experiments to as-
sess our contributions considering a diverse P2P parameter landscape. Our
approach shows divergent lookup mitigation effectiveness of up to 96% in LEA
scenarios involving up to 25% malicious peers in the overlay network. Moreover,
we are able to detect close to 100% of malicious peers where the detectability
varies depending on the exact attacker behavior.
2.2 Background & Related Work
A variety of EA mitigation techniques have been proposed, yet their effectiveness
as a countermeasure for localized attacks is either quite limited or violates P2P
aspects of scalability or decentralization. We first provide a high-level overview
on relevant EA variants, followed by an overview of our mitigation approach,
and a discussion on related work.
2.2.1 Eclipse Attacks (EA)
The goal of an EA [SCD+04] is to eclipse resources (peers or data managed by
peers), i.e., prevent benign peers’ service provision or provide nefarious services
by using a set of malicious peers. Peers targeted to be eclipsed are referred to
as victims v ∈ V . A variety of approaches can be taken to launch EAs, and in
many cases the decentralized routing mechanism is attacked. Malicious peers
may collude and behave inconsistently which further complicates their detection.
Localized EA (LEA) and topology aware EA (taLEA) are two common variants
of EAs which are discussed next.
2.2 Background & Related Work
St
ru
ct
ur
ed
:
LE
A
-D
et
ec
ti
on
11
2.2.2 Localized Eclipse Attacks (LEA)
LEAs [SND+06] are a subcategory of EAs that eclipse only a subset of peers
in the P2P overlay network where malicious peers are scattered through the
overlay. The adversary chooses the subset, for example, based on the resources
managed by the peers to be attacked.
2.2.3 Topology-Aware Localized Eclipse Attacks (taLEA)
Topology-aware LEAs [DKS12; GRS+14] (taLEA) are a specialized LEA variant
which require only a small, fixed amount of malicious peers to launch an efficient
attack against overlay networks of arbitrary sizes. To this end, the adversary
places malicious peers at specific locations in the overlay network’s topology. In
our previous work in [GRS+14; GIS15], we managed to mitigate taLEA using
divergent mechanisms which are described in Section ??.
2.2.4 Contributions: Detection & Mitigation
In this work, we demonstrate three sophisticated LEA variants in Section 2.4.
To mitigate these attacks, we assess divergent lookups [GRS+14] for their suit-
ability in the new attack’s context. We highlight how divergent algorithms are
unsuitable to mitigate LEAs and how severely does the proposed adversarial
LEA behaviors negatively impact the overlay stability in terms of reliability
and connectivity between peers. Section ?? presents the main concepts of (a)
divergent lookups, and (b) the P2P Address Space Slicing Technique (PASS)
[GIS15], highlighting the threats that exist from a LEA. In Section 2.6, we in-
troduce the technical foundations for mitigating generic LEAs and detecting
malicious peers that conduct the aforementioned LEA variants. Finally, we
evaluate our approach in regard to the lookup reliability and performance in
Section 2.7.
2.2.5 Related Work
In [Dou02], Sybil attacks were introduced where the attacker can launch an
attack with a small set of malicious peers and can consequently garner multiple
addresses which allows malicious peers to fake being a larger set of peers. Using
Sybil attacks, authors in [KLR09] launched a LEA via a chain of Sybil/malicious
nodes. However, the attack relies on the strong assumption about the existence
of a single path towards the victim. In [SEB07], a LEA is launched using
Sybil peers. Although the authors proposed a mitigation scheme, the scheme is
based on a centralized encryption authority. Using the same concept, authors in
[CDG+02] proposed adding Certificate Authorities to peers’ network IDs while
joining the network. Although authors in [FMR+09] proposed a mitigation
scheme based on preventing malicious entities from selecting their own network
IDs, the mitigation scheme is based on a signing entity that uses public key
cryptography.
In [BM07], a mitigation mechanism is proposed based on assigning multiple
paths for each lookup using disjoint paths. Nonetheless, a cryptographic scheme
is used that can only be substituted by a centralized authority. In addition, in
[OC01] a similar approach is proposed. However, messages overhead due to
using multiple paths is not addressed.
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Similarly, the authors in [LMS+10] highlight how publish attacks could be
used to attack the KAD network which is a Kademlia based network through
flooding peers’ index tables close to the victim with false information which is
a simplistic taLEA variant. However, they didn’t provide a mitigation scheme.
In [CCF+12], a KAD network crawler is introduced to monitor the network
status and detect malicious peers during a LEA. However, in a distributed P2P
system, a high overhead arises if each peer uses such a mechanism to detect
malicious entities. This becomes impractical as the overlay size increases.
2.3 System Model
This section presents the system model for structured overlays that is used
for the evaluation of our approaches in Contributions 1 and 2. Utilizing the
established models from [IGS15; IGS16; IGS17], we start by describing the
overlay model topology before presenting the main protocol model aspects.
2.3.1 Overlay Network Model
The network is modeled as a directed graph D = (P,E). P is the set of peers
p ∈ P in the overlay network. Distinct peers p, q ∈ P that maintain a neighbor
relationship are represented by e = (p, q) ∈ E.
We further partition P as follows: benign peers B, malicious peers M and
victim peers V , so that P = B∪M , whereB∩M = ∅, V ⊆ B andN = |P |, where
N is the overlay size. Malicious peers m ∈ M refer to peers being controlled
by an attacker and may behave maliciously. Peers targeted by the attacker are
victims v ∈ V . Furthermore, malicious and victim peers do not churn, which in
fact gives the attacker more control over the available resources.
Peers b ∈ B show benign behavior in the network, i.e., according to the P2P
model specification and no adverse intentions.
Poisoned peers o ∈ O refer to benign peers that store or propagate malicious
information as a consequence of contacting malicious peers, where O ⊆ B.
Churning peers c ∈ C refer to peers that leave the network either randomly or
according to a certain distribution.
As only benign peers, except victim peers, experience churning behavior,
C ⊆ B and V ∩ (O ∪ C) = ∅.
2.3.2 P2P Protocol Model
Our abstraction for structured P2P protocols consists of five salient aspects as
detailed below.
Address Space
Peers have a unique assigned identifier referred to as the peers’ keys. Typically,
keys are generated from an external feature such as the IP address, MAC ad-
dress, a serial number, or a random number. Keys usually have a length of
w ∈ {128, 160, 192} bits and are mapped onto the overlay’s address space which
is used to address resources such as peers and addressable data tuples.
2.3 System Model
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Distance Function
A distance function is defined for peers on the address space. The distance
notion is an important feature for many peer operations and the choice of
the distance function differs among P2P protocol implementations. For exam-
ple, Kademlia [MM02] uses the XOR operation to calculate the common prefix
length (CPL) using the bit-string representation of the keys from two peers.
Routing Table (RT)
Each peer maintains an RT that contains contact information about neighboring
peers. Contact information is a tuple that relates keys of peers with their
underlay network information (e.g., IP address and port number). Routing
tables vary among protocols and usually store k contact information tuples of
peers in w lists for distance ranges [2i, 2i+1) with i = 0 . . . w−1, and k constant.
In order to resolve new contact information a lookup call is initiated.
Proximity
Each peer defines a proximity area, typically a proximate and sparsely populated
region of the address space that is selected based on the overlay size N and the
key length w. We define the proximity of a peer as the set of peers with the
closest distance to this peer, and subsequently stored in its RT.
2.3.3 Lookup Mechanism
In case the destination peer pv for a specific message to be sent by peer pi is
not stored in pi’s routing table, a lookup call is initiated to resolve pv’s contact
information. To initiate a lookup, pi selects α peers from its RT to query them
about pv. We now describe the two main lookup mechanisms used in structured
P2P overlays.
Convergent Lookups
A commonly applied design best practice are convergent lookups, i.e., peer pi
selects a set of known peers with closest possible distance to pv, and iteratively
queries each of them to either return the contact information or to repeat-
edly forward pi’s lookup request to even closer peers until pv can either be
resolved or the lookup is dropped due to a timeout. Due to the structured na-
ture of the overlay, the convergent mechanism guarantees low message overhead
with minimum number of hops for resolving a certain lookup. Nevertheless,
selective placement of malicious peers in a very close distance to the victim
eclipses the victim’s existence as evaluated in [DKS12].
Divergent Lookups
We proposed in [GIS15], divergent lookups to mitigate attacks that make use
of convergent mechanisms. Divergent lookups restrict the ability to contact
peers close to the victim, where the notion of closeness is referred to as the
peer’s proximity. In [GIS15], the PASS algorithm efficiently defines the address
space range that contains peers with high probability of resolving the contact
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information of pv. However, contacting peers during lookups from different
address space ranges naturally results in suboptimal performance and reliability
degradation. Unlike a convergent mechanism, which is highly susceptible to
certain localized attacks, divergent mechanisms show high resiliency to such
attacks while providing a comparable performance to convergent schemes. As
we build upon PASS in the detection mechanism presented in Chapter 2, PASS
is described in details in Section ??.
2.4 LEA Attacker Models
We propose a new attack model based on behavioral patterns of malicious peers.
The attack model builds upon and extends LEA (cf. Section 2.2.2), thus, all
the attack behaviors discussed here represent the generic LEA.
To launch the attack, malicious peers m ∈ M join the overlay and we as-
sume they are uniformly distributed across the address space. Once a peer m
receives a lookup request for the victim peer, different attacker behaviors can
be activated. Moreover, the proposed LEA based behaviors are chosen based
on security goals (availability, integrity, confidentiality) that exploit the lookup
mechanism. Next, we introduce three new complex attacker behaviors that
collectively represent the generic LEA behaviors:
2.4.1 Fake Destination Attacker Behavior (FD-LEA)
In FD-LEA, malicious peers fake the victim’s identity, which threaten the avail-
ability, confidentiality and exploit the inherent partial view of each peer.
Technical Description
During a lookup, once a malicious peer receives a lookup request for a victim
peer, it replies to the lookup initiator pr with contact information that points
to a malicious peer that fakes owning the key pr is looking for.
Behavior Discussion
The overlay’s reliability is severely affected since the lookup call terminates once
a malicious peer returns a fake destination and pr believes that the reply was
sent from a benign peer that holds v’s contact information. Consequently, the
availability of the victim peer’s service provision is negatively affected. More-
over, in case of unencrypted message payloads, the confidentiality would also
be affected, as pr sends its message to the colluding malicious peer that may
subsequently inspect it.
2.4.2 Pollution Selection Attacker Behavior (PS-LEA)
In a PS-LEA behavior, malicious peers reply only with malicious contact in-
formation which threaten the availability and exploit the candidate selection
mechanisms for the lookup initiator peer pr. The main aim of the attacker dur-
ing a PS-LEA is to pollute pr’s candidates selection queue which is maintained
over the different lookup iterations to store contact information of peers that
2.5 PASS: Divergent Lookups P2P Address Space Slicing
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may be queried. Lookup iterations refers to the number of rounds where pr sends
parallel lookup requests to different peers requesting v’s contact information.
Technical Description
Initially, pr stores a list that contains all the possible candidates that could be
queried in the next iterations. This list is updated after each iteration from
other queried peers that have no knowledge about v. The selected candidates
set sent to pr are selected according to the used lookup algorithm.
Behavior Discussion
Once peer m receives a lookup request for a victim peer, only colluding mali-
cious peers located all over the address space are returned. Hence pr contacts
malicious peers in the next iterations until the lookup request times out after
imax iterations. Similarly, the availability of the victim peer’s service provision
is negatively affected.
2.4.3 Mixed Attacker Behavior (FD-PS)
The third attacker behavior is a combination of the previous two, where a prob-
ability parameter is the basis for a switching decision between the proposed
adversarial behaviors. Such a sophisticated attacker behavior has not been con-
sidered in previous work [DKS12; GRS+14] so far.
Technical Description
For mixed FD-PS LEA behavior, the attacker chooses weights for the probability
of either behavior to be active, and behaviors may be subject to a switch in-
between different lookup iterations.
Behavior Discussion
The impact of this behavior on the victim peers is the same as discussed before
for the individual attack behaviors. However, activating both attacks with dif-
ferent weights helps vary the degree of perturbation that can be caused by each
individual attack.
2.5 PASS: Divergent Lookups P2P Address Space
Slicing
Divergent lookups have been proposed as a suitable taLEA mitigation tech-
nique in [GIS15; GRS+14]. In a nutshell, divergent lookups avoid searching
the destination peer’s proximity to skip out on querying malicious peers under
taLEA assumptions. Also, divergent lookups match the mitigation requirements
described beforehand. In this work, we assess the mitigation potential of diver-
gent lookups for the more generic LEA variant. We briefly describe divergent
lookups [GRS+14; GIS15].
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2.5.1 PASS Preliminaries
Divergent lookups segregate the address space into CPL slices, i.e., creating
equivalence classes according to the CPL peers share with the destination. The
technique is called P2P address space slicing (PASS) and requires two more
threshold parameters, namely upper tu and lower threshold tl. We define 0 ≤
tl ≤ tu ≤ tp ≤ w with tp being the proximity threshold. Divergent lookups
that make use of PASS, detailed in our previous work in [GIS15], try to resolve
the destination’s contact information from peers in the CPL slice interval [tl, tu]
because other intervals, as discussed at next, are suboptimal:
• [0, tl): This range contains a large amount of peers, divergent lookups in
that range tend to yield a bad performance or even timeout.
• (tu, tp): This range contains so called dead ends which represent peers
that cannot reach the destination, i.e., no path towards the destination
based on contact information of neighbor peers can be found. Running
divergent lookups in that range yields a low reliability.
• [tp, w): This range is populated with malicious peers, therefore to be
avoided by the lookup. Otherwise, reliability would significantly decrease.
2.5.2 PASS susceptibility to LEA
Nevertheless, in that context, launching FD-LEA, PS-LEA or mixed FD-PS
LEA on the selected CPL range (tu, tp), can severely degrade PASS’s perfor-
mance and reliability. PS-LEA behavior can simply (i) send the set of malicious
peers within the CPL as possible candidates to pr, (ii) divert the set of possible
candidates outside of the suitable CPL range selected by PASS, or even (iii)
divert the request towards dead end peers. Similarly, malicious peers launching
FD-LEA block the request from reaching to benign peers within the selected
CPL that might have a Long Distance Edge (LDE) towards the destination.
Although lookups may be executed in parallel to improve on fault-tolerance
and timeliness, divergent lookups are still susceptible to LEA with its variants
as evaluated in Section 2.7. Obviously, the set of results can differ due to several
malicious and benign causes. Two detection mechanisms presented in the next
section have been designed to deal with such inconsistencies and allow to identify
malicious peers that conduct LEAs (with FD and PS attacker behaviors).
2.6 Detection Mechanisms
We propose two differing detection mechanisms: (i) a lookup result voter, and
(ii) a lookup reply investigator. The first mechanism analyzes the result set after
the lookup completion and detects LEAs with the FD behavior. The second
detection mechanism assesses, after each iteration, the lookup’s candidate list
to detect LEAs with PS attacker behavior. Both variants have been integrated
into PASS and will be evaluated in the subsequent evaluation section.
2.6 Detection Mechanisms
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2.6.1 Lookup Result Voter Mechanism
The obvious reasons for lookup result inconsistencies are overlay perturbations
such as ongoing attacks, outdated routing table entries, or perturbations in
the underlay network. In order to detect inconsistencies, we use a dynamic
majority voter (DMV) [GSC91]. DMVs are used to assess a set of inputs and
thus, decide whether a valid output exists or not, where valid denotes a non
empty majority of matching inputs. Basically, using DMV allows to (i) ensure
reliable lookup operation in perturbed overlays, and (ii) identify maliciously
behaving peers. The DMV can process up to α different inputs, which we group
in three classes: correct, fake, or no Long Distance Edge (LDE) towards the
victim.
In the following subsection, we discuss the DMV’s operation with a focus on
the reliable selection process from an inconsistent result set.
2.6.2 DMV Operation
Initially, pr initiates a divergent lookup with α parallel requests. Once a peer
replies with an LDE towards the victim pv to pr, the lookup terminates and
the result is evaluated. Nevertheless, to allow the DMV to process a set of
results, we modified the PASS algorithm such that lookups wait for maximum
imax iterations until up to α replies are available.
Due to the probability that no different α benign peers have LDEs towards
pv, a maximum of c correct replies are returned to pr. Furthermore, a fraction
fm of malicious peers within the specified CPL might intercept the lookup,
which in turn will return fm fake replies to pr. In addition, ne empty replies
can be returned back to pr due to (i) dropped replies and (ii) the lookup request
can neither be intercepted by a malicious peer nor a benign peer have an LDE
to pv until the maximum number of iterations imax is reached. To that end,
the maximum number of replies that can be passed as an input to the DMV is
α = c + fm + ne. The next step is that the R ≤ α received replies are passed
as inputs to the DMV, which in turn decides whether to accept or reject the
results, as shown in Figure 2.1, based on the following cases:
1. R ≥ 3: the DMV checks if a majority of a valid results is available, i.e.,
either c > fm or c < fm.
2. R = 2: the voter returns the contact information of index R as a valid
reply in case: (i) both replies are identical and (ii) reply R 6∈ Re, where
Re is the set of empty replies. Otherwise, the DMV rejects the results.
3. If R = 1 and reply R 6∈ Re: the DMV returns the only available reply and
assumes it to be valid.
2.6.3 Lookup Reply Investigation
As mentioned in Section 2.4, the lookup replies of malicious peers that con-
duct a LEA with PS attack behavior contain contact information about other
colluding malicious peers. Accordingly, in order to mitigate such attack while
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Figure 2.1: Acceptance cases for the DMV.
providing a detection feature to such malicious adversarial behavior, we pro-
pose an additional detection mechanism to assess further lookup replies before
inserting them into the candidate selection list for subsequent iterations.
Technically, investigating received lookup replies, before inserting possible
candidates in pr’s selection list, is based on (i) detecting peers whose replies point
to peers outside of the CPL range [tl, tu], and (ii) assuring that no candidates
outside of the specified CPL can be inserted in the possible candidates list.
Moreover, each peer is allowed only once in the candidate selection list. As a
consequence, malicious peers that keep on sending malicious replies within the
specified CPL range cannot excessively load the candidate selection list. At
next, we assess our mitigation and detection schemes for the proposed attacks
in a comprehensive simulation case studies.
2.7 Evaluation
In this section, we assess the performance and reliability of PASS. To do so,
we integrated it with our detection mechanism. For evaluation, we present four
study cases:
1. FD-LEA impact on PASS: evaluation of the impact of LEA using FD
behavior on PASS.
2. Voting mechanism against LEAs: PASS resilience assessment after
integrating the DMV as a mean to mitigate LEA launched with FD ad-
versarial behavior.
3. LEA impact on PASS using FD-PS behavior: evaluation of LEA
impact launched with FD-PS attacker behavior on PASS.
4. Detection and mitigation mechanisms for FD-PS: assessment on
how our detection and mitigation techniques perform in a FD-PS behavior
scenario during LEA.
Firstly, we detail the simulation environment, parameters, different models
and metrics used throughout the experiments. Secondly, we present each of the
above mentioned case studies, results and an interpretation of our observations.
2.7.1 Simulation Environment
Simulations were carried out using the OMNeT++ simulator [Pon93] and Over-
Sim [BHK07] that provides various P2P protocol implementations for the sim-
ulator environment. In the evaluation, the different case studies are assessed
2.7 Evaluation
St
ru
ct
ur
ed
:
LE
A
-D
et
ec
ti
on
19
based on Kademlia networks [MM02]. In order to validate our results, each
simulation was scheduled for 4 hours runtime and 12 repetitions were conducted
to allow for confidence interval computation. The simulation parameters used
in conducting experiments are presented in Table 2.1.
Parameter Value Parameter Value
imax 10 α 5
MP 5%, 15%, 25% tp 80
tl 4 tu 6
Table 2.1: LEA detection simulation parameters
2.7.2 Simulation Workload Model - Fully Distributed Ap-
plication
In our simulation workload model, peers send lookup messages looking for ran-
dom peers, on average every 10 seconds with a standard deviation of 5 seconds.
2.7.3 Simulation Churn Models
In our experiments, different churn models are used which are described below.
Churn refers to the rate peers join and leave the overlay. NoChurn: refers to a
static overlay where peers never leave the overlay once they have joined. Pareto
(P-7200): Using the Pareto churn model, peers acquire an average lifetime and
a dead time of 7200 seconds according to a Pareto distribution which gives a
more realistic overview to real life scenarios [ZL06].
2.7.4 Simulation LEA Model
A central LEA parameter that we will refer to in the experiments’ result dis-
cussion is Malicious Peers per CPL (MP). It reflects the average number
of malicious peers for a given PASS CPL region. This metric provides insights
about the severity of LEA attacks for an increasing amount of malicious re-
sources. Data collection occurs at periodic intervals for each simulation run
to assure the representativeness of the metrics measurements. To address the
severity of the proposed adversarial behaviors according to the attacker’s avail-
able resources, each scenario is simulated where different amounts of malicious
peers per CPL, MP , are inserted.
2.7.5 Evaluation Metrics
Lookup Success Ratio (LSR)
measures the average ratio of successful lookups over all lookups destined to vic-
tim peers. This provides insights about the accuracy of the voting mechanism.
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Message Complexity (MC)
is the average number of messages exchanged per lookup process until either
α replies or imax is reached. This metric is used to provide message overhead
calculations for a given lookup.
Number of Iterations (NoI)
provides the average number of iterations a given lookup requires to reach α
replies which gives an approximation about the average latency of a request.
Malicious Detection Rate (MDR)
provides the average number of detected malicious peers per lookup. MDR
evaluates the accuracy and scalability of the detection mechanism.
2.7.6 Case Study 1: LEA impact on PASS using FD be-
havior
This case study evaluates the impact of LEA using FD-LEA adversarial be-
havior to highlight the unsuitability of PASS to mitigate generic LEA in terms
of performance and resiliency without the mitigation and the detection mecha-
nisms.
Results are evaluated based on LSR, MC, and NoI. As we are evaluating the
performance of PASS under LEA, data is collected only for lookups destined
to the victim. We start by describing the experimental results depicted in Fig-
ures 2.2 through 2.5, and we close each case study with a detailed interpretation
of the results.
Discussion of the results
Figure 2.2a shows LSR of lookups compared to different overlay sizes N =
5000, 10000, 20000 and different malicious peers ratios per CPL, i.e., MP =
5%, 15%, 25%. As shown, LSR degrades when increasing MP since the prob-
ability of intercepting the lookup request by a malicious peer increases. For
MP = 5%, 15%, 25%, LSR values average between 63% and 91%. This is a sig-
nificant LSR decrease compared to the PASS performance in a benign overlay
(i.e., MP = 0) which results in a LSR between 91% and 100%.
In Figure 2.2b, MC for PASS average between 7.5 and 11 for different sizes
of N and regardless of MP ratio. Figure 2.2c shows NoI results in the range
from 1.38 to 1.74 regardless of different choices for N and MP . This means
that for a successful lookup, less than two iterations are required to find a
peer with an LDE to the victim. Compared to other convergent and divergent
algorithms [GRS+14], PASS provides low latencies as a consequence of the low
NoI required for successful lookups.
Interpretation of the results
LSR decreases as a consequence of fake destination replies. The reason is that
a lookup terminates once a peer replies with an LDE to pr or when imax is
reached; LSR decreases for larger choices of MP .
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A major advantage of PASS is PASS’s CPL region choice, such that it tends
to resolve peers with LDEs to the destination with high probability. Accordingly,
NoI shows low values due to the high probability in contacting a peer that
replies with an LDE to the victim. In turn, the number of messages exchanged
decreases as only few iterations and peers are contacted until an LDE is found.
In addition, terminating the lookup once a peer has sent an LDE reply is a
major reason for the low lookup MC.
Nevertheless, the results clearly show how PASS with no additional mitiga-
tion and detection mechanisms is susceptible to generic LEA. LSR is severely
degraded since lookup results depend only on the first reply. So, we conclude
here that although keeping the MC and NoI to minimum is favorable, it imposes
a reliability issue for the PASS algorithm, as shown in Figure 2.2a. To that end,
in the next case study we assess our mitigation technique by deviating from the
FD-LEA behavior while maintaining a high PASS LSR and low MC/NoI.
(a) Lookup success rate (LSR)
(b) Message complexity (MC)
(c) Number of iterations (NoI)
Figure 2.2: FD-LEA impact on PASS using different MP .
2.7.7 Case Study 2: Voting mechanism DMV against LEA
attacks
In this case study, we evaluate PASS’s performance after integrating the DMV
to evaluate the enhancements of PASS performance. For better comparison with
case study 1, we make use of the same parameter choices for N and MP .
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Discussion of the results
LSR results are shown in Figure 2.3a with LSR average values ranging from
83% to 98% which is a remarkable LSR increase compared to case study 1.
Figure 2.3b presents MC for PASS in combination with the integrated DMV.
MC during a lookup average between 17.5 and 26 which is relatively higher than
MC values in case study 1 without DMV. As shown in Figure 2.3c, a successful
lookup demands NoI between 2.14 and 2.83. NoI results without mitigation
were lower in the first case study, where values averaged between 1.38 to 1.74.
Interpretation of the results
The remarkable enhancement in the LSR values is due to integrating the mitiga-
tion mechanism through the DMV. Basically, due to the assessing criteria of the
voter, chances of picking a correct reply is considerably high even in case where
MP = 25%. We note that, increasingMP escalates the probability of malicious
peers to get picked and thus, the number of fake replies increases which in turn
degrades the system’s reliability.
The noteworthy MC increase compared to case study 1 is due to the fact that
the voter maintains the lookup process until α replies are received, which is not
the case in case study 1 where the lookup terminates once the first resolving reply
is received. Due to PASS’s approach to query only a certain CPL range which
expectedly contains a high percentage of peers with LDEs to the destination, the
NoI required to receive α replies are very small, i.e., between 2 to 3 as observed
from Figure 2.3c. As a result, due to low NoI needed to reach α replies, MC
ranges provide an acceptable increase compared to case study 1 where only a
single reply is required.
From the results, we assert that PASS algorithm combined with the DMV
provides a very good performance in mitigating LEAs as it provides high LSR
values while keeping MC and NoI minimized compared to case study 1.
Our mitigation model for high LEAs shows that PASS, in conjunction with
the proposed mitigation mechanism, is scalable to maintain overlays with thousands-
millions of peers.
2.7.8 Case Study 3: LEA impact using weighted FD-PS
impact
In this case study, we assess the impact of launching a LEA using weighted FD-
PS to show the effect of the proposed attack behavior combinations on PASS
based lookups.
Here FD and PS are weighted equally, i.e., the probability that a malicious
peer will choose an FD-LEA or a PS-LEA behavior is 0.5. Same overlay sizes
N = 5000, 10000, 20000 and same ratios of malicious peers per CPL, where
MP = 5%, 15%, 25% are used in these experiments. We note that scales for
comparable figures may vary due to distant ranges of values as can be seen in
NoI values between Figure 2.4c and Figure 2.5c.
Discussion of the results
Figure 2.4a shows the LSR for different overlay sizes and MP ratios. Values
range between 63% and 94%. Obviously, when MP increases, the LSR value
2.7 Evaluation
St
ru
ct
ur
ed
:
LE
A
-D
et
ec
ti
on
23
(a) Lookup success rate (LSR)
(b) Message complexity (MC)
(c) Number of iterations (NoI)
Figure 2.3: Combined PASS/DMV performance with different values for MP .
decreases accordingly as more malicious peers are able to intercept the parallel
lookup requests sent by pr. In Figure 2.4b, we notice that a remarkable MC
increase stems from the message exchange until α replies are received; MC values
range between 19 and 34 messages. Figure 2.4c shows an increase for NoI, i.e.,
values range from 2.2 to 4. Compared to case study 2 where only FD-LEA are
launched, the NoI increased 30% in the weighted FD-PS LEA.
Interpretation of the results
The noticed LSR decrease occurs due to the combined effect of both FD-LEA
and PS-LEA behaviors which can be summarized as follows: (i) the impact
of fake replies that are sent to the voter and (ii) the increment of malicious
peers’ ratio due to PS-LEA effect where malicious peers intentionally insert more
malicious entities into pr’s candidate list. Moreover, due to (ii), NoI required
for a successful lookup increases as the number of malicious peers inside the
candidate selection list increases. As a result, the probability of picking more
malicious peers for the next rounds increases, which in turn forces the PASS
algorithm to run more iterations until α replies are received.
Increasing the NoI has an impact on the average number of messages ex-
changed during a lookup as it requires contacting more peers. Accordingly, MC
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increases per lookup. To that end, we conclude the unsuitability of PASS with
no detection mechanism to mitigate generic LEAs.
We note that according to our observations from running experiments for
different weights, Increasing the weight of PS behavior have a direct impact
on the average NoI and MC which is the target of PS attacks. Meanwhile,
increasing the weight of FD-LEA behavior impacts negatively on the LSR values.
For instance, running the same experiment with an FD-LEA weight of 0.25 and
a PS-LEA weight of 0.75, we achieve results with MC= 47 and NoI= 5.37.
(a) Lookup success rate (LSR)
(b) Message complexity (MC)
(c) Number of iterations (NoI)
Figure 2.4: Baseline results for FD-PS without detection.
2.7.9 Case Study 4: Detection and mitigation mechanisms
response against weighted FD-PS behaviors
Now, we assess the performance of PASS when integrating the proposed miti-
gation and detection techniques against FD-PS LEAs. We evaluate the results
compared to the previous case study where no detection mechanism were inte-
grated.
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Discussion of the results
In Figure 2.5a, LSR values average between 90% and 99% which is a noticeable
increase compared to case study 3, even in scenarios where MP = 25%, where
LSR averaged between 63% and 94%. Figure 2.5b shows the average MC where
values range between 18.5 and 23. In this scenario, average MC are relatively
similar to case study 2, where only FD-LEA based attack is running. Moreover,
in Figure 2.5c, average NoI average between 2.1 and 2.4 which is again relatively
similar to case study 2 where no malicious peers launched a PS-LEA. A notice-
able decrease is noted, comparing NoI and MC values to case study 3. Since we
aim to evaluate the efficiency of our detection and mitigation mechanism, we
evaluate the MDR per lookup. In Figure 2.5d, MDR averaged between 0.55 and
6 depending on N and MP which provide insights about the average number
of malicious peers that launch a PS-LEA contacted during a lookup.
Interpretation of the results
After DMV integration with PASS, a remarkable LSR enhancement can be
noticed. This is due to the fact that detecting malicious peers before insert-
ing malicious entities decreases the probability of polluting the candidate list
which in turn reduces the probability of launching FD-LEA by other malicious
peers. Moreover, once a peer is detected, the MP value decreases which in turn
enhances the chance of pr to contact benign peers. For the same reason, NoI de-
creases since α replies can be collected in less number of iterations. Accordingly,
the number of messages that needs to be exchanged during a lookup decreases.
For high values of MP , the detector shows that malicious peers manifesting
a PS-LEA behavior contacted during a lookup call are detected. In fact, MDR
values underline the detector’s positive impact on LSR, NoI, and MC.
We conclude that the combination of our detection and mitigation mech-
anisms yields excellent reliability and performance in the presence of FD-PS
LEAs. Also, it is a preparatory step to achieve reliable and decentralized mali-
cious peer removal from overlays.
2.8 Conclusion
We briefly conclude this chapter in the following. However, in Chapter 7, where
the main conclusion of the whole thesis is presented, the main contributions
related to Research Question 1 are depicted.
Localized Eclipse attacks (LEA) pose a significant threat to P2P-based ap-
plications. We extend the divergent lookup mechanism, which was originally
developed to mitigate the specialized topology-aware Eclipse Attack (taLEA),
to mitigate the more generic LEA.
Moreover, we introduced a sophisticated attacker model which causes sig-
nificant decreases in reliability and performance in divergent lookups. Conse-
quently, we integrated a new detection mechanism that allows identifying attack
peers with high accuracy. We, furthermore, assessed the performance of our
novel eviction mechanism, which is the second sub-contribution Chapter 3 that
we describe in detail in the following chapter.
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(a) Lookup success rate (LSR)
(b) Message complexity (MC)
(c) Number of iterations (NoI)
(d) Malicious detection rate (MDP)
Figure 2.5: Detection performance of FD-PS based LEAs.
Chapter 3
Structured Overlays: Evicting
Malicious Peers
In this chapter, we address Research Question 1 and the second sub-contribution
(C1.2). In a summary, this chapter presents the work done towards designing
a light-weight eviction mechanism that builds upon the detection mechanism
described in Chapter 2 to counter a progressive variant of LEA attacks. This
work was published in [IGS16]. Note that the system model already described
in Section 2.3 holds and is used as is throughout this work.
3.1 The Necessity of Eviction
For some P2P applications, a subset of peers might experience request rates
above average by both, legitimate users as well as attackers. This can be due
to the criticality or the popularity of their stored data, centralized services such
as authentication hosted by that particular subset, or their considerable stor-
age/bandwidth provision. In particular, due to the delay intolerance and fast
response time constraints for applications such as video streaming or online
gaming, a subset of peers is assigned more responsibilities to support the re-
quired QoS such as high level peers in tree based P2P streaming [LLR09], or
peers promoted as super peers [YK13]. Such peer subsets represent vital assets
that ensure reliable overlay service provision. Unfortunately, various “Local-
ized Attacks” (LA) target specific peer subsets. LAs continuously evolve and
can severely degrade an overlay’s reliability and performance due to the pertur-
bations they cause using only a comparably small amount of malicious peers.
Examples for LAs are Eclipse attacks (EA), sybil, index poisoning and DDoS
attacks [SCD+04; DH06; KCW10; LNR06; ZJT13; STR10b; KLK+12].
In our previous work [GRS+14; IGS15; GIS15], we proposed an effective
mitigation and detection technique that addresses LAs. In addition, a variety of
mitigation techniques have been proposed to counter LAs [SND+06; CCF+12;
GIS15; LYL14; FMR+09].
However, the existing mitigation techniques lack generic applicability, as
their efficiency is either bound to specific P2P networks or LA variants. Also,
to the best of our knowledge, no mitigation technique exists that is, generally ap-
plicable for a wide range of LA variants, detects malicious peers, and announces
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the eviction of previously detected malicious peers to benign ones [CCF+12;
BM07; LML13].
The absence of an eviction mechanism leaves overlays exposed to severe se-
curity threats since malicious peers are only known to a small fraction of peers.
Consequently, malicious peers can effectively exploit benign peers’ partial view
of the overlay, e.g., by targeting newly joined peers or peers which are inept
to detect their malicious behavior. Malicious peers can adapt to new adver-
sarial variants to overcome particularly fitted detection techniques. Detection
techniques that are only locally executed by individual peers may be rendered
useless from an overlay service perspective.
For the aforementioned reasons, we emphasize the necessity of proliferat-
ing information about detected malicious peers to the majority of peers in the
overlay as a precondition for their eviction. To that end, we propose a novel
two-fold eviction mechanism based on the formation of distributed quorums
which reliably propagate information about malicious peers.
Contributions:
We focus on the following aspects in this work:
• Assessment of a distributed eviction mechanism that is (i) generally appli-
cable to various LA types (ii) able to effectively evict malicious peers from
the overlay and thus, restore reliability and performance requirements,
and (iii) capable of propagating the existence of malicious peers to the
rest of the overlay.
• Development of an LA model that does not assume a specific LA instance
and thereby offers generality and extensibility, and provides the required
parameter landscape for evaluation of the eviction mechanism.
The evaluation of the proposed mechanism shows high detection and eviction
rates for sophisticated LA variants of up to 99% for up to 10% malicious peers
in overlay networks of varied sizes.
In Section 3.2, we discuss the related work addressing the existing LAs and
the proposed mitigation techniques. The proposed LA model is discussed in
Section 3.3. Next, the technical details of the proposed eviction mechanism are
provided in Section 3.4. Finally, we evaluate the impact of the proposed LA
and the effectiveness of the eviction mechanism in Section 3.5.
3.2 Related Work
The severity of LAs along with various countermeasures has been addressed in
literature. Drawbacks of existing techniques include the limited applicability to
specific LA variants, the need for centralized coordinating peers, sophisticated
encryption schemes, or their lack of an eviction mechanism.
A mitigation and detection mechanism is proposed in [CCF10] that focuses
on removing suspicious peers from the list of possible candidates to contact.
However, the mechanism does not address the eviction of malicious peers from
benign peers Routing Table (RT). In [CCF+12], the authors introduce a net-
work crawler for KAD, a Kademlia based network, for monitoring and detecting
malicious peers. However, no eviction technique is introduced.
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A detection mechanism for streaming P2P applications using a belief propa-
gation algorithm is introduced in [GG13]. In [FMR+09], a study on the severity
of EAs on KAD is conducted with proposing a mitigation technique based on
a trusted cryptographic scheme. Nevertheless, in both studies, no eviction is
proposed in addition to the usage of a centralized approach.
In [BM07], the authors introduce a mitigation mechanism for LAs based
on assuring multiple, disjoint paths during lookup initiation. However, the
proposed mitigation mechanism uses a cryptographic scheme and no malicious
removal mechanism is proposed. Similarly, a self-eviction scheme against false
routing information is proposed in [LML13]. In addition to the absence of a
propagating criterion for detected malicious peers, the mechanism is based on
strong encrypting technology.
In [LL10], a stochastic detection and removal scheme is proposed as a coun-
termeasure against pollution attacks. However, the mechanism is only applica-
ble for pollution attacks and in P2P streaming systems. Furthermore, a miti-
gation scheme against DDoS attacks via validating membership information is
introduced in [STR10a]. Nonetheless, no eviction mechanism was introduced.
In [ST15], the authors propose a detection scheme against sybil attacks by cal-
culating trust values for each peer joining the overlay. However, the scheme
relies on central entities, specific to a single LA variant and no evaluation is
provided.
The authors in [LMS+10] highlight the basis of conducting the most com-
monly launched LAs, such as EAs, publish attack and node insertion attack.
The common aspect while launching the aforementioned LA variants is inter-
cepting messages destined to the victim via poisoning benign peers RT. However,
the paper proposes no mitigation or eviction mechanism.
Next, as discussed in [LMS+10] we address a generalized LA model that
constitutes the fundamentals of various existing LAs for evaluating our proposed
eviction mechanism.
3.3 Localized Attack Model
This section presents the attack model. It is the basis to assess the central
contribution of this particular work in the thesis, i.e., the eviction mechanism,
which will be presented afterwards.
The novelty of this attack model is its generality as it covers a wide range of
existing LAs, e.g., EA, sybil, poisoning attacks and DDoS. Hence, the resilience
of the proposed eviction mechanism is validated for a diverse set of LAs.
As discussed in Section 3.2, the severity of LAs correlates with the amount of
lookup messages that are intercepted by malicious peers and which are meant to
resolve the contact information of the victim peer pv. Our attack model focuses
on different adversarial strategies and behaviors that illustrate the trade-off
between immediate attack severity and detection hardness. In our model, the
amount of malicious peers and their placement in the overlay are referred to as
strategies, whereas the behavior refers to the interaction of malicious peers with
benign ones that deviates from the specification of the P2P network’s protocol.
The next three subsections describe the strategies and the behaviors.
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3.3.1 Malicious Resources
Although using a large amount of malicious peers might increase the LA’s sever-
ity, this has also drawbacks in terms of an increased detection probability, as
well as higher LA cost.
Recent LA studies [CCF+12; IGS15; GIS15] indicate that malicious inser-
tions of only 5-10% in terms of the overlay size is sufficient to intercept a large
majority of lookups requesting pv’s contact information. Therefore, we focus on
that percentage range for malicious insertions in the overlay.
3.3.2 Malicious Placement
Now, we discuss the strategy for placing malicious peers to maximize lookup
interception. As presented in Section 2.3, various lookup mechanisms may be
used by P2P networks.
Depending on the particular lookup mechanism in a P2P network, patterns
on the lookup request message forwarding among benign peers that try to resolve
the contact information of pv can be determined by the attacker. Hence, an
efficient placement focuses on overlay regions that reveal a higher probability of
receiving such lookup requests.
In proposed in [GIS15; GRS+14], a divergent lookup mechanism is consid-
ered that spans the whole address space, i.e., lookups are equally probable of
being forwarded to any region in the address space. Here, we make use of diver-
gent Random Walks mechanism which is based on random peers selection while
restricting only peers within pv’s proximity for forwarding lookup requests. This
means that placing malicious peers uniformly across the address space yields
equal probability that malicious peers, independent of their location in the ad-
dress space, intercept lookup requests destined to pv. Such placement provide
a full overview about the generality and suitability of the proposed eviction
mechanism.
Once a malicious peer has been placed, it can launch an LA by performing
different adversarial behaviors, which are discussed in the next subsection.
3.3.3 Adversarial Behaviors
This subsection highlights various adversarial behaviors of malicious peers as a
mean to intercept lookup requests addressed to the victim pv. Lookup message
intercepting LAs follow a threefold approach: (i) poison benign peers’ RTs,
(ii) malicious collusion, (iii) dynamically alternate adversarial behavior. Each
behavior is described below.
3.3.3.1 Poisoning benign peers
Depending only on the inserted malicious peers to intercept lookups destined to
pv is suboptimal due to the limited amount of malicious peers. In order to let
benign peers unknowingly partake in the LA execution and promote the inter-
ception of lookup messages by malicious peers, benign peers RTs are poisoned,
i.e., RT entries pointing to pv are altered to point towards a malicious peer.
Initially, malicious peers propagate a fake reply regarding pv by (i) pretend-
ing to own pv’s contact information, (ii) advertising the contact information of
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Figure 3.1: Eviction process overview
another malicious peer as the destination contact information. Fake replies are
a common practice to achieve RT poisoning.
Once a peer with a poisoned entry towards pv receives a lookup request, it
replies with poisoned information that points to a malicious peer, hence, the
lookup initiator forwards the lookup request to the malicious peer. Such adver-
sarial behavior is shown to yield severe impact on the overlay as substantiated
in Section 3.5.
3.3.3.2 Malicious collusion
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed eviction mechanism in
the worst case LA scenarios, we assume that malicious peers are capable of
colluding through informing each other about their status. This means that
each malicious peer has a periodically updated list about the location and the
status (on-line, detected, removed) of other malicious peers.
Moreover, malicious peers are able to exchange messages to inform each
other once a peer is detected. As a consequence, malicious peers can alternate
between sending fake or correct replies in order to falsify monitoring procedures
used by the detection and eviction mechanisms.
3.3.3.3 Alternating behavior
The probability of generating a fake reply is controlled through a configurable
parameter for the attacker. We refer to this parameter as FR. Once pm inter-
cepts a lookup request destined to pv, pm sends a fake reply with probability
FR to pi.
In Section 3.5, we evaluate how FR is a vital parameter for the attacker in
terms of detectability and LA severity.
3.4 Eviction Mechanism
In this section, we describe the technical aspects of the Eviction Mechanism
(EM) proposed as a countermeasure against general forms of sophisticated LAs.
In order to effectively evict the overlay from malicious peers, an accurate detec-
tion scheme must be applied beforehand that allows to detect peers that exhibit
possible malicious behavior.
As depicted in Figure 3.1, the EM is divided into two main blocks, Detection
and Removal. We start by illustrating the detection process that allows peers
to locally suspect certain peers based on their lookup replies. Afterwards, the
removal process which is responsible for inspecting suspected peers and conse-
quently evict malicious peers is described.
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Figure 3.2: Detection procedures
3.4.1 Detection Process
The objective of the detection process is to enable peers to locally suspect a
given peer according to its lookup reply.
In previous work [IGS15], we introduced a modified lookup mechanism which
allows peers to gather more than a single lookup reply in order to compare replies
according to (i) the average number of hops for each reply compared to the
known average from previous lookups, (ii) the compliance of the replying peers’
location with the lookup protocol and (iii) the destination contact information
returned in the replies. Once a peer violates any of these detection criteria,
this peer is announced to be suspected. The original implementation of the
P2P lookup mechanism is based on accepting the first reply that contains the
requested information about a given peer pv. This coerces the lookup initiator
pi to accept the lookup result without being able to validate the results since
only a single reply is considered. In turn, whenever a malicious peer receives
the lookup request and generates a fake reply, pi consequently accepts the reply
which poisons pi’s RT.
The developed modified lookup mechanism which allows pi to consider a set
of replies instead of only the first received reply, is discussed below.
3.4.1.1 Lookup modification
From the original operation of the lookup mechanism, i.e., before introducing
the modification, pi picks α candidate peers from its RT to start forwarding
a lookup request for pv’s contact information. Once peer pr receives such a
request, it replies with pv’s contact information if pr has an entry for pv in its
RT. Otherwise, pr replies with a list of peers that, according to the routing
protocol, have a high chance of knowing pv. pi generates α new requests from
this list for the next iteration. This process terminates immediately once pv’s
address is resolved or imax iterations are reached.
Our lookup modification continues the lookup process until R replies con-
taining pv’s contact information are received or imax iterations are reached,
where R ≤ α. Consequently, pi will be able to compare multiple replies from
different peers and, thus, decide whether certain peers are suspicious.
For this purpose, we make use of a Dynamic Majority Voter [BJ91] (DMV)
to process the R received replies. The details of the DMV are discussed below.
3.4.1.2 DMV
From the modified lookup mechanism, peers are compared according to their
replies given the aspects described earlier and suspected peers are added to the
suspicion set S, where S ⊂ R. Afterwards, the remaining unsuspected peers
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from the set of R are provided as inputs to the DMV. Note that a suspected
reply in this context refers to a suspected peer as replies are only accepted from
distinguished peers, i.e., no peer can provide more than a single reply.
The DMV decides whether a valid majority of identical, non-empty replies
exists or not. If such majority is found, the lookup reply is considered successful
and pi stores the corresponding contact information. Otherwise, the lookup is
declared to be unsuccessful and consequently, pi initiates a new lookup to resolve
pv’s contact information.
In addition, the unmatched minority is added to the suspicious list, i.e., the
remaining set of replies that did not constitute the majority. Detailed technical
description about the detection process is available in previous work [IGS15].
Once the detection process announces a set of suspected peers, the removal
process is invoked to further inspect and accordingly evict malicious peers. Next,
the technical concepts of the removal process are described.
3.4.2 Removal Process
The basic functionality of the removal process is to further inspect suspected
peers and evict peers confirmed to be malicious. In order to do so, a distributed
process is required to monitor the suspected peers and then reach a decision
about their status. Afterwards, peers that turn out malicious are evicted from
peers RT.
The removal process comprises four main procedures. First, Quorum Forma-
tion defines the criteria of forming a distributed quorum. Second, Monitoring
handles monitoring the behavior of suspected peers. Third, Decision Making is
responsible for reaching a decision regarding each suspected peer. Finally, RT
processing defines the removal criteria about peers confirmed to be malicious.
For more convenience, a list of all abbreviations used within the following
sections is provided in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: LAs eviction: acronyms description
Var. Description Var. Description
ps Suspected peer S Set of suspected peers
pi Quorum initiator pv Victim peer
Q Set of quorum peers pq Peer joined Q
R number of replied peers FR fake reply probability
3.4.2.1 Quorum Formation
Here, we describe how the initiating peer pi forms a quorum Q, as depicted in
Figure 3.3a. Each process is defined in terms of mechanism and interpretation
about the notions behind the development of each process.
Mechanism
Once pi detects suspicious peers ps ∈ S through the DMV, pi executes the
following steps:
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(a) pi sends a lookup notification to all R peers, recall that R peers contain the
set of all peers that replied with pv’s contact information to pi. A lookup
notification contains an acknowledgment that some replies are suspected.
The notification message does not convey any information about the identity
of the suspected peers, however, its purpose is to alert benign peers about
the possibility that they have replied with poisoned entries.
(b) pi selects only unsuspected peers from the R peers to form a quorum. The
set of peers that form a quorum is referred to as Q, including pi.
(c) pi sends a quorum joining request to each peer pq ∈ Q. The joining request
contains: (i) a list containing all suspected peers and (ii) a time-stamp that
defines when pq has to start monitoring each ps.
(d) Each pq replies to pi with either an acceptance or rejection to the quorum
joining request. pq may reject a QR due to several reasons as pq might be
malicious, already joining another quorum, due to low CPU capabilities or
currently experiencing loaded network traffic.
Process interpretation
Malicious peers exist in Q may provide correct replies according to the FR
parameter discussed in Section 3.3.3. Therefore, colluding malicious peers are
capable of informing malicious peers about being suspected.
As a countermeasure to restrain suspected malicious peers from changing
their behavior if they reveal the identity of any pq, pq receives only a list of
suspected peers without being informed about other peers in Q or their time-
stamps. Malicious peers that are informed about being suspected can behave
as follows:
1. Decrease the FR parameter, i.e., behave benignly to avoid being evicted
if confirmed malicious.
2. Keep providing fake replies with the same rate, i.e, exploit chances to
poison benign peers RT regardless of the risk of being evicted.
Poisoned peers exist in S due to providing suspicious replies to the DMV.
For this reason, poisoned peers make use of the notification message to restore
their benign state. Once a poisoned peer receives a notification message, it
initiates a lookup requesting pv’s contact information in order to re-evaluate
its reply to pi. After a poisoned peer proves its benign state, it receives the
suspected set S without joining Q, i.e., it can monitor peers in S and accordingly
removes malicious peers based only on its own decision. The main advantage
is that poisoned peers are able to restore pv’s correct contact information in
addition to removing other malicious entries that might exist in their RT, which
allows for higher removal rate of malicious peers.
Churning peers in Q refer to either benign or malicious peers that might
leave the overlay or do not complete the removal procedures. Due to the small
number of peers that forms a quorum, procedures are executed over a short
time frame. Hence, the churning amount of peers do not interrupt the removal
process or deviate the final decision of the quorum as evaluated in Section 3.5.
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Figure 3.3: Removal Procedures
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3.4.2.2 Monitoring procedure
This procedure defines the monitoring basis that pq follows with each ps and
how results are gathered at pi, as shown in Figure 3.3b.
Mechanism
Once pq accepts joining quorum Q, the following steps are executed in parallel
|S| times by pq.
(a) pq sends a regular lookup request, using the modified lookup mechanism, to
each ps ∈ S requesting pv’s contact information according to the time-stamp
assigned by pi in the quorum joining request. Note that each pq sends a
single lookup request to ps, however, in order to be able to decide about
ps, it sends a lookup request to other α − 1 peers, i.e., modified lookup
mechanism.
(b) After pq processes the received replies via the DMV, pq decides accordingly
whether ps is malicious or not.
(c) pq sends a monitoring reply to pi containing the DMV decision about each
ps, i.e., a boolean that depicts the monitoring result.
Process interpretation
The purpose of using regular lookups is to provide anonymity to the monitoring
procedure so as malicious peers can not differentiate between lookups inter-
cepted from normal peers and those intercepted from pq. Moreover, pi assigns
different time-stamps to each pq so that ps does not receive multiple lookup re-
quests simultaneously more than its expected in-going bound to assure ps does
not detect any abnormal behavior.
Through the detection mechanism, pi uses the DMV to process lookup replies
that include ps’s reply, and hence, decide whether ps is malicious or not. No-
tably, if the DMV does not suspect ps, this might be inferred that ps was in a
poisonous state.
3.4.2.3 Decision making procedure
In this procedure, we discuss the procedure that allows to reach a decision about
ps, as illustrated in Figure 3.3c.
Mechanism
pi reaches a decision about ps through executing the following steps:
(a) pi waits for either timeout tmax or receives |Q|−1 monitoring replies.
(b) pi inputs the received monitoring replies about each ps ∈ S separately to
its DMV.
(c) Finally, pi sends the DMV results to each pq ∈ Q, we refer to this message
as “monitoring decision reply”.
3.4 Eviction Mechanism
St
ru
ct
ur
ed
:
LA
-E
vi
ct
io
n
37
Process interpretation
Timeout tmax assures malicious peers do not block the removal process since
a malicious peer in Q might not send a monitoring reply to pi. tmax is set
according to the latest time-stamp assigned to any peer in Q.
The monitoring decision message includes pi’s decision about each ps, i.e., ps
is malicious or was poisoned with malicious entry. Consequently, each pq ∈ Q,
proceeds to the “RT processing” procedure.
3.4.2.4 RT processing
Here we define the criteria of removing malicious peers from RTs as depicted in
Figure 3.3d. Moreover, we highlight how information about malicious peers are
propagated through the overlay.
Mechanism
After pq compares the received decision from pi about each ps with its own
decision, the following steps are executed when pq decides to proceed with re-
moving ps. Note that different comparison cases are discussed in details in the
procedure interpretation.
(a) In case ps exists in pq’s RT, pq removes ps and adds it to a blacklist to
assure no further contact with ps.
(b) Otherwise, in case ps does not exist in pq’s RT, ps is added to pq’s blacklist
to hinder adding ps in its RT in the future.
(c) pq initiates a new lookup for pv’s contact information. During different
lookup iterations, no replies or candidates suggestions will be accepted if
such peers exist in pq’s blacklist.
Process interpretation
pq compares the monitoring decision received from pi about each ps with its own
decision about ps concluded during the monitoring procedure, i.e., pq checks
whether both decisions match or not.
Recall that pq’s possible decisions about a suspected peer are: 1) Benign, 2)
Suspicious. Similarly, for pi, possible states reported in the monitoring decision
reply are: 1) Poisoned, 2) Malicious. For simplicity, we state here the consequent
decisions according to the possible combinations.
pi: Poisoned, pq: Benign
In this case, pi states that ps was poisoned, which confirms pq’s status that ps
is benign. As a result, no further action is taken about ps.
pi: Poisoned, pq: Suspicious
This denotes that either ps was poisoned during the monitoring period of pq,
or ps is malicious but the majority of monitoring replies was correct due to low
FR at ps. At this point, pq initiates new lookup request to ps asking for pv’s
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contact information to decide whether to remove ps or not before deciding to
initiate a quorum to monitor pi.
pi: Malicious, pq: Benign
This case refers to ps being malicious according to the majority of monitoring
replies reported to pi. However, due to low FR, pq reached to a decision that
ps is benign. pq initiates a new lookup in order to re-monitor ps before deciding
to start monitoring pi. In fact such approach assures malicious peers do not
exploit the removal procedure. Meanwhile, pi further proceeds to the removal
steps.
pi: Malicious, pq: Suspicious
As both pi and pq confirms ps being malicious, pi and pq proceed to the removal
steps.
3.5 Evaluation
In this section, we provide an evaluation of the proposed EM against general
attack model that constitutes the basis of various specific LAs. We first start
with case study 1 “LA impact” that evaluates the impact of launching a severe
LA on a P2P overlay. Case study 2 “EM evaluation” assesses the performance
and effectiveness of EM.
First of all, the simulation environment, parameters and metrics used for
evaluation are introduced. Afterwards, each case study is presented with results
discussion and interpretation. Finally, a summary that highlights the main
results and conclusion about EM is provided.
3.5.1 Simulation environment
Case studies were conducted using the OMNeT++ simulator [Pon93] and Over-
Sim [BHK07] which provides various P2P protocol implementations. Each sim-
ulation experiment was running for 4 hours. Moreover, for confidence interval
measurements, each simulation was scheduled for 10 repetitions. In Table 3.2,
the simulation parameters used in the experiments are provided.
Table 3.2: LAs eviction simulation parameters
Parameter Value
Maximum iterations (imax) 10
Number of victims (|V |) 1
Maximum received lookup replies (α) 9
Key length (w) 128
Lookup Divergent Random Walks [GRS+14]
Malicious Insertion ratio (MI) 5%, 10%
Overlay size (N) 5k, 10k, 20k, 30k
Fake Reply probability (FR) 50%, 80%
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3.5.2 Simulation model
In order to validate the scalability of our approach, EM is assessed using differ-
ent overlay sizes, i.e., N = 5k, 10k, 20k, 30k. Different malicious insertion ratios
MI = 5%, 10% and fake reply probabilities FR = 50%, 80% are used to repre-
sent the impact of varying amounts of malicious peers with different probabilities
of generating fake replies, resulting in 16 different overlay configurations.
3.5.2.1 System workload
Our target is to base our evaluation on launching an LA on P2P networks with
special set of peers that are more frequently contacted and offer special services
to the overlay. For this reason, simulations are based on a “Service Overlay
Network” where 80% of lookup requests are addressed to the victim. In general,
lookups are sent on average every 10 seconds with 5 seconds standard deviation.
3.5.2.2 Simulation Churn Models
In order to simulate churning rate of peers, a Pareto (P-500) is used where
the average life-time and dead-time of peers is 500 seconds. The choice of such
distribution is due to the realistic experimental results provided for P2P overlays
in [ZL06].
3.5.3 Evaluation Metrics
3.5.3.1 Lookup Success Ratio (LSR)
the ratio of successful lookups to the total number of lookups initiated to the
victim only. LSR assesses the reliability of the network.
3.5.3.2 Message Complexity (MC)
the overhead exerted on the system due to lookups initiation, malicious existence
and EM procedures execution.
3.5.3.3 Poisoned Replies (PR)
the average number of poisoned replies per lookup. This metric is used to assess
the impact of poisoning benign peers RT on the victim’s service provision.
3.5.3.4 Malicious ratio per RT (MRT )
the average ratio of malicious entries in benign peers RT. This metric evaluates
the impact of malicious peers insertions.
3.5.4 Case Study 1: LA Impact
In this study, we assess the impact of launching an LA with the proposed ad-
versarial behaviors discussed in Section 3.3 and how poisoning benign peers RT
can severely degrade the system’s reliability.
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Discussion
As shown in Figure 3.4a, LSR shows negligible values that average below 1% due
to LA impact, i.e., more than 99% of lookups initiated to resolve pv’s contact
information fail. MC overhead is depicted in Figure 3.4b where values are in the
range of 8 to 13. For MI = 10%, MC is slightly lower, 8-9 messages, compared
to values observed for MI = 5%.
In Figure 3.4c, the average number of poisonous replies per lookup is re-
markably high as ranges are between 78% and 90%. PR values For MI = 5%
are higher than inMI = 10% with an average of about 6%. Finally, Figure 3.4d
depicts the average MRT . For MI = 5%, values ranges between 20%-22%. For
MI = 10%, higher existence of malicious peers is observed in peers RT where
values average between 25%-26%.
Interpreting the results
Due to the malicious existence and poisoned peers which propagate malicious
information, lookup requests are almost completely intercepted as depicted in
Figure 3.4a. Consequently, pv’s service provision is markedly degraded as 99%
of lookups initiated to pv fail.
From [GRS+14], the average MC overhead using divergent Random Walk
mechanism is in the range of 11-13. However, as indicated for particular LA
configurations,MC indicates less overhead as indicated in Figure 3.4b. The rea-
son is that benign peers’ RT entries pointing to pv are poisoned with malicious
peers that fake storing pv’s contact information. Accordingly, such peers reply
with malicious information and the whole lookup is falsely resolved in the first
or second iteration at most which lowers MC value. For the same reason, MC
is lower for MI = 10% as more malicious peers intercept the lookup request
than for MI = 5% and thus, reply with fake replies which accelerates collecting
α replies which terminates the lookup process. In fact, such abnormal MC is
one of the criteria used by the detection mechanism to suspect malicious peers.
PR highlights the impact of poisoning benign peers entries towards pv as
an application of the adversarial behavior of malicious peers as discussed in
Section 3.3. As shown in Figure 3.4c, a smaller amount of malicious peers
as MI = 5% yields a higher probability for poisoned peers to receive lookup
requests than forMI = 10% where a larger amount of malicious peers intercept
the lookup request. Regardless of the selected value of FR, a large fraction of
benign peers is poisoned due to the severe impact caused by small MI. Such a
large fraction of poisoned replies per lookup is the main reason of the resulting
severe degradation in LSR.
As illustrated in Figure 3.4d, malicious peer insertions in the range of 5%-
10% is capable of polluting 20%-26% of benign peers RT. The reason for that is
the propagation of entries pointing to malicious peers. Consequently, whenever
a peer selects α different peers from its RT for the first lookup iteration, or
replies to a lookup request with a list of possible candidates, malicious peers
are selected with high probability. The severity of launching LA various forms
can be concluded from the small amount of required malicious insertion to com-
pletely intercept messages destined to the victim.
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(a) Lookup success rate (LSR)
(b) Message overhead complexity (MC)
(c) Poisoned Replies per lookup (PR)
(d) Malicious ratio per RT (MRT )
Figure 3.4: LA impact
3.5.5 Case Study 2: EM Evaluation
Now, we evaluate the performance of the proposed EM in terms of the detec-
tion and propagation effectiveness. For comparability reasons, the same set of
metrics and evaluation criteria are used.
Results discussion
As depicted in Figure 3.5a, activation of EM results in high LSR rates in the
range of 90% to 97%. LSR values are relatively comparable to the case where
lookup requests are not intercepted by malicious peers through different itera-
tions in [GRS+14].
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Figure 3.5b provides the average message overhead exerted by EM. Measure-
ments average between 41 and 53 which is higher than MC values provided in
case study one.
In Figure 3.5c, the average number of poisoned peers is provided. PR aver-
ages between 2%-7%, which shows a significant decay compared to case study
one where the average ranged between 78%-90%.
As shown in Figure 3.5d, the average number of malicious peers per RT
remarkably decreases as values average between 0.2%-0.6% regardless of MI.
Figure 3.5e depicts the average ratio of peers per Q. Note that data collection
time starts at t = 300s and the EM is set to be triggered after 1800 sec. The
ratio of benign peers increases from 10% to 90% as the EM is continuously
triggered while malicious peers ratio decreases from 72% to 3%.
Interpreting the results
A significant increase in LSR is shown in Figure 3.5a due to the effect of EM.
As malicious peers are evicted and poisoned peers are restoring correct entries
towards pv, the number of successful lookups increases. This denotes that the
reliability of pv’s service provision is effectively restored when EM is activated.
As shown in Figure 3.5b,MC during the different removal procedures depicts
reasonable overhead given the amount of lookups initiated and the restored
reliability. As poisoned peers continuously attain correct RT entry towards pv
and malicious peers are evicted due to EM, the number of suspected peers in
S decreases. Consequently, less overhead is exerted on the overlay due to EM,
which is the reason MC maintains a steady average even when MI increases.
Given that the number of peers inQ depends on α,MC decreases when choosing
less value for α.
As depicted in Figure 3.5c, PR decreases as an effect of the notification
message sent to peers during the quorum formation procedure. Besides, less
peers are subject to poisoning as EM evicts malicious peers from the overlay.
Accordingly, more poisoned peers are able to restore their benign status.
Moreover, EM allows poisoned peers to recover independent of the FR pa-
rameter as the large number of initiated quorums allows a large fraction of
poisoned peers to exist in S, although FR determines the ratio of malicious to
poisoned peers that might be suspected by the detector. The number of quo-
rums initiated when a high detection rate is observed reaches up to 96% from
the total number of initiated lookups. Once a large fraction of malicious peers
are evicted from the overlay, average quorum initiated settles around 0.6%.
As illustrated in Figure 3.5d,MRT decreases as a result of evicting malicious
peers at high rates as 96% of lookups initiated trigger EM. In addition, malicious
peers are effectively evicted since the monitoring procedure is designed such that
malicious peers are not aware of the monitoring peers or the monitoring timings,
which yields no gain for malicious peers to lower FR value.
As shown in Figure 3.5e, the ratio of benign peers continuously increases
in Q due to the effect of malicious peers being evicted and poisoned peers
restoring their benign status. Subsequently, malicious peers existence in the
quorum decreases around 0.5%. Regarding churning peers, out of α = 9 peers
that may form a quorum, the number of churning peers average around one
peer per Q due to the effect of P-500 churn model. Also, as malicious peers
target maximizing lookups interception, their in-going bound expects high rate
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of receiving lookup requests. For this reason, removal procedures are executed
in a small time-frame as time-stamps are closely assigned to quorum peers and
hence, churning peers do not affect the eviction process.
3.5.6 Summary
In case study one, it was shown that LAs severely impact on the overlay as LSR
values drop below 1% due to malicious interception. Moreover, PR significantly
increases to 90% while MRT averages between 20%-26%.
A remarkable enhancement in the overlay’s performance due to EM is ob-
served as LSR values increase to 97% while PR and MRT dropped to 2% and
0.2%, respectively. Simultaneously, MC values average around 41-53 message
for different network sizes and various malicious insertions. EM stable perfor-
mance on different overlay size yields its ability to be deployed in large-scale
applications that host thousands-millions of users.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we propose a malicious Eviction Mechanism (EM) for P2P
overlays that can efficiently perform against various LA models using decentral-
ized quorums to monitor, decide and accordingly propagate and evict malicious
peers. Our comprehensive simulation experiments shows a high malicious re-
moval rate of up to 99% while restoring the overlay’s reliability to 97%. The
studies were conducted using a generic LA model that includes an established
attack variety including Sybil, Eclipse attack, and more.
We also highlight the interest in assessing the EM performance on real P2P
networks using Planet-lab. Progressively, as we show in Chapter 5, we tackled a
different variant of EAs, namely OEA (where malicious peers target intercepting
out-going messages) on super-P2P networks. Finally, we refer the reader to
the fully detailed conclusion in Chapter 7 that connects and concludes the
contributions to the respective research questions.
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(a) Lookup success rate (LSR)
(b) Message overhead complexity (MC)
(c) Poisoned Replies per lookup (PR)
(d) Malicious ratio per RT (MRT )
(e) Peers ratio in Q
Figure 3.5: EM performance
Chapter 4
Structured Overlays: A
Sanitizing Mechanism
Against RTP Attacks
In this chapter, which addresses Research Question 1 and the corresponding
Contribution 2, we focus on evaluating the severity of Routing Table Poisoning
(RTP) attacks on structured overlays. This work was published in [IGS17].
Subsequently, we propose a sanitizing mechanism to expel malicious peers from
benign peers Routing Table (RT).
4.1 Defending against RTP Attacks
In order to support scalability and low overheads in P2P networks, the design
practices typically result in partitioned groups where a peer has only a partial
view of the network as obtained from its neighboring peers. However, the afore-
mentioned design practices render P2P networks susceptible to various attacks,
e.g., RTP attacks, which are an inherent part of composite attacks such as
Eclipse (EA), sybil, flooding and publishing attacks [KLR09; LMS+10; Dou02;
GRS+14; SND+06; LYL14]. While the fault tolerance aspect ensures correct
operation even for high rates of random peer failures, the disruptions inserted
into peers routing tables (RT) as a form of RTP result in significant degrada-
tion of the network services. Notably, using a detailed simulation study, we
demonstrate the significant RTP impact of up to 65% message loss. Moreover,
we illustrate how the propagation of malicious RT information about the vic-
tim peers of RTP attacks further facilitates launching Eclipse, Sybil and other
aforementioned attacks.
The existence of RTP attacks and the resulting degradation have received at-
tention [LMG+10; CCF+12; UPS11]. A considerable variety of proposed coun-
termeasures [LKC+12; KLK+12; LC08; CDG+02; RSV+15; SMK+01] exists,
yet these techniques entail one or more of the following inefficiency drawbacks:
(i) They are only applicable for a specific P2P protocol, i.e., the countermeasure
mechanisms are specifically tailored according to a single P2P protocol speci-
fications. (ii) They are effective against a single form of RTP attack. Hence,
4.2 Related Work: Typical Attacks & Mitigation Approaches
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countermeasures show no resiliency once the attack is modified. (iii) They typ-
ically require a central entity that coordinates the detection, monitoring, and
decisions about malicious peers. However, in practice, the system’s services are
degraded as the overlay’s fully distributed architecture is compromised. (iv)
They often rely on cryptographic schemes, which can then constrain communi-
cation between lightweight peers to necessitate enhanced computing.
Aiming towards finding a general solution to overcome the aforementioned
deficiencies, we explored a detection and sanitizing scheme in Chapter 3 as a
countermeasure against a single attack variant of Localized Attacks (LAs). In
this chapter, we build upon the basic notions of providing anonymous detec-
tion from our proposed mechanism in [IGS16] to develop a generalized attack
handling approach applicable to multiple attack models and overlays.
4.1.1 Contributions:
In the course of our previous work, we develop an adaptable RTP attack mit-
igation approach that overcomes the aforementioned deficiencies. We propose
a protocol-independent, fully distributed, simple and effective detection and
overlay-sanitizing mechanism.
As a mean of an adaptable mitigation, we make use of a majority voting-
based detection in order to detect inconsistencies in RTs. Our detection mech-
anism shows high accuracy with detection rates up of to 90% even for 20%
malicious peers attacking. The sanitizing mechanism is triggered by initiating a
quorum of peers in order to unveil the inconsistencies stemming from RTP at-
tacks. Once the quorum investigates and accordingly declares finding malicious
RT entries, the sanitizing mechanism informs other peers in order to let them
reliably remove the RT information inserted by the suspected malicious peer.
Overall, our contributions span (i) demonstrating the high impact of RTP
attacks on benign peers RTs and the overall network’s service provision, and (ii)
proposing a novel quorum based sanitizing mechanism that efficiently removes
malicious peers and propagates information about their identity while providing
anonymity and scalability.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 presents the technical back-
ground along with related work. Note that the system model for structured
overlays provided in Section 2.3 is used in the course of this work. The attack
model is presented in Section 4.3, followed by the description of the detection
mechanism provided in Section 4.4. The proposed sanitizing mechanism is de-
tailed in Section 4.5. The attack severity, mitigation efficiency, and detection
rates are evaluated in Section 4.6, followed by providing a conclusion to this
work in Section 4.7.
4.2 Related Work: Typical Attacks & Mitigation
Approaches
Given the diverse set of applications that utilize the P2P functionality, a corre-
sponding variety of attack types exists threatening the operations and reliability
of P2P services. However, as routing constitutes a core P2P functionality, nat-
urally most threats stem from deliberate attempts to compromise the peers
4.2 Related Work: Typical Attacks & Mitigation Approaches
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routing tables with malicious information. Consequently, the launching of RT
attacks on P2P networks has attracted considerable research interest.
While a variety of countermeasures are proposed, most existing techniques
either address a specific P2P protocol or a specific adversarial behavior arising
from the malicious side of the network. To that end, we discuss (i) the existing
work that addresses the impact of related attacks and the feasibility of inserting
malicious peers in peers RT, (ii) the existing mitigation, detection and sanitiz-
ing techniques and their respective pros and cons, and (iii) the main aspects
and challenges for the development of the generalized attack handling mecha-
nisms. We highlight the factors that lead to providing a generalized sanitizing
mechanism (as in our proposal) for malicious information removal.
4.2.1 Contemporary Approaches
We categorize each of the following presented related work according to their
objective and developed techniques. For each of the presented papers, we sum-
marize the discussion listing the pros and cons for each of them, i.e., whether
such mechanisms allow for malicious peers detection, sanitizing and propagating
information about malicious peers or not.
4.2.1.1 Specific mitigation techniques
Here we discuss all the relevant mitigation and detection mechanisms. This
category contains mechanisms which are: (i) only effective against a certain
attack, (ii) only applicable in a specific topology, (iii) dependent on the lookup
approach used or (iv) only consider secure routing mechanisms as a solution.
The authors in [NW06] present a technique termed SALSA to increase
lookups successful rate in the presence of malicious peers. SALSA organizes
the address space into groups, thus, each peer has a limited view of the over-
lay. Subsequently, an anonymous forwarding scheme is used to reliably deliver
lookup requests while lowering the probability of malicious peers intercepting
the lookup requests. Although the proposed technique shows a successful lookup
delivery rate of up to 89%, a remarkable false negative rate is noticed where ma-
licious peers can actually bias the lookup replies. In fact, experimental studies
in [MB12] show that SALSA technique can be greatly compromised when the
number of malicious peers averages around 20%. Moreover, the proposed tech-
nique is only applicable in structured overlays and no sanitizing is proposed. In
fact, this work is relatively comparable to our mitigation scheme proposed in
[GIS15], where the mitigation approach is based on modifying the lookup for-
warding protocol to prevent malicious peers from intercepting lookup requests.
Another countermeasure for RT pollution attacks was introduced in [RSV+15]
that addresses P2P attacks in Smart Grids using auxiliary RT in Chord protocol
[SMK+01]. However, the mitigation technique is not generalized as it is only
applicable for P2P Chord based networks.
A random walk technique for structured overlays is proposed in [MB09],
where peers periodically sign and certify their neighbors. Eventually, a secure
route can be established for forwarding lookups. In [GRS+14], we proposed a
similar random walk strategy to mitigate topology aware attacks, which yields
reliable lookup delivery in trade of imposing lookup forwarding overhead on the
overlay. Although these mitigation techniques effectively increase the overlay’s
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reliability, they do not provide detection or removal schemes and are specific to
either a specific overlay topology or a specific attack variant.
In [DM09], the authors propose a labeling mechanism named SybilInfer that
identifies honest and malicious peers. SybilInfer relies on a probabilistic model
of social networks. Analytically, SybilInfer efficiently provides high accuracy.
However, the proposed mechanism is not applicable for traditional P2P net-
works as the mechanism assumes that the network is aware of social connections
between users, which is true for a specific subset of P2P topologies.
Usphere [KAL+15] is a countermeasure mechanism against Sybil attacks
that is based on a location-independent routing protocol. Usphere relies on the
trust edge created by each peer towards its 1-hop neighbors. Although the re-
sults show high resiliency against Sybil with a path stretch of O(1), the proposed
mechanism has the following drawbacks: (i) relies on elliptic curve cryptography
[Ber06], (ii) is only applicable to social-P2P based networks and (iii) considers
neither any sanitizing mechanism nor any propagation of information about
detected malicious peers.
4.2.1.2 Centralized authorities-based mitigation
A secure routing approach was introduced in [CDG+02] via encapsulating cer-
tificate authorities to peers’ IDs during joining the network. Nevertheless, the
proposed scheme relies on a centralized encryption authority.
In [ST15], a detection mechanism against Sybil attacks is proposed based on
calculating trust values for each peer joining the overlay. However, the mecha-
nism is effective against a single attack variant, relies on central authorities and
no evaluation is provided.
4.2.1.3 Anonymity-based mitigation
In [IGS16], we proposed an anonymous detection and eviction scheme as a coun-
termeasure to Localized Attacks where LAs refer to attacks that only target a
certain set of victims. Through the detection mechanism, peers are able to make
a collaborative decision along with the other peers who received the lookup re-
quest. Hence, malicious peers are removed from the benign peers RT’s. Given
that our approach was focusing on a specific type of attacks, the detection and
the sanitizing criteria can be characterized as being (i) attack specific, and (ii)
with an absence of a rapid information propagation scheme to accelerate sani-
tizing the overlay from malicious peers that would, in turn, increase the cost of
conducting an attack. Nevertheless, using the insights developed over [IGS16],
we build our generalized sanitizing mechanism utilizing the basic techniques of
anonymous detection and attack sanitizing. The proposed sanitizing mechanism
is evaluated against general attack scenarios, where general attack denotes com-
mon adversarial behaviors that constitute most of the well established attack
forms in P2P networks.
As anonymity plays a major role in maintaining security in P2P networks
and have a direct impact on the distribution of information and scalability,
in [MTH+09], an anonymous low-latency networking protocol called Torsk is
presented. Through the efficient relay selection and root verification schemes
between peers, Torsk manages to mitigate various common P2P attacks in the
Tor structured network [loesing2010case] while allowing the network to scale.
4.2 Related Work: Typical Attacks & Mitigation Approaches
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Similarly in [PRR09], the authors present NISAN, an anonymous approach that
assures high scalability while anonymously distributing the network information.
In fact, NISAN shows high resiliency to known P2P attacks. Nevertheless, the
absence of detection and sanitizing schemes might put the overlay at risk if the
attacker manages to insert more malicious resources in the overlay or gain newly
joined peers’ trust during verification. In addition, the proposed protocol is only
suitable for structured overlays.
In [SND+06], the authors proposed an anonymous auditing scheme to mit-
igate eclipse attacks. The auditing scheme focuses on monitoring the ingoing
and outgoing bounds of each peer and thus, detects peers that exceed a given
threshold. Although the proposed technique allows for detecting maliciously
behaving peers and locally removes those peers from the RT, no propagation
or collaboration between peers to advertise such information about malicious
peers exists.
In [SF12], the authors propose a partitioning scheme for large-scale over-
lays called Commensal cuckoo. Thus, such small groups cooperate to keep the
group’s decision correct despite of the launched join-leave attacks. Depending on
several mechanisms such as secure routing, group authentication and bootstrap-
ping, the proposed technique shows high resiliency even when higher fraction
of malicious peers than the average state-of-the-art values exists. However, the
proposed technique does not allow for propagating information about malicious
peers and only addresses a single form of attack (join-leave).
4.2.1.4 Reducing complexity and overhead-based techniques
The authors in [YKG+10] discuss the overhead imposed by different mitigation
and detection techniques in Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs) and how imprac-
tical these techniques are when applied to real world applications. Moreover,
they present a technique to bound the message complexity when distributed
quorums are required. Although the proposed technique remarkably lowers the
overhead compared to already existing quorum-based techniques, the proposed
technique: (i) uses a complicated cryptographic scheme and (ii) assumes that
malicious peers in each quorum can maximally be < 1/3 of the quorum size.
A mitigation approach is proposed in [KT08]. The authors present a recur-
sive algorithm that can reliably locate resources in the presence of malicious
peers. Although the evaluation of the algorithm’s performance yields very high
accuracy in locating resources, the algorithm is protocol dependent. In ad-
dition, no removal or propagation of information about malicious peers from
benign peers RT is provided.
4.2.1.5 Attack assessment
In [LMG+10], the authors launch an RT poisoning attack on DHTs by attacking
nodes close to the victim. During the search process, malicious nodes were able
to intercept and thus, manipulate the replies. Similarly, in [LKC+12; KLK+12],
the authors implement an RT pollution attack in kAD, a Kademlia-based net-
work [MM02], via allowing malicious peers to manually select keys that match
the key of the victim. Consequently, malicious peers receive lookup requests
directly and in turn falsely convince the lookup initiator to trust their replies.
4.3 Routing Table Poisoning (RTP)
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Nevertheless, both attack mechanisms address only convergent approaches and
no practical removal or mitigation techniques were proposed.
In [LC08] the authors propose an RT poisoning technique based on altering
the “Hello” request messages in Kademlia-based P2P networks such as KAD.
However, neither a detection nor a mitigation scheme is provided. The impact
of launching RT attacks on Pastry based P2P networks is provided in [EMG14],
but no further countermeasures were proposed.
Similarly, the authors in [WTC+08] evaluate the impact of several well-
known attacks on the KAD network. In addition, they propose a new attack
that exploits the main features of index poisoning and Sybil attacks. However,
no detection or sanitizing schemes were proposed.
The authors in [NR06] point out the severity of attacking peers RT in DHT
systems through proposing a DDoS attack to overload the key resources at
the victim. Mainly, malicious peers manipulate benign peers to insert multiple
entries in their RT with the same IP address of the victim which in turn flood
the victim with messages. Similarly, in [LNR06; GK14], the authors highlight
the severity of RT poisoning. However, in both works, no sanitizing mechanism
for malicious entries were introduced.
Given the above discussion, we infer that: (i) RT attacks evolve in vari-
ous contexts and are capable of severely degrading the network services caus-
ing significant impairments in the network functionalities, (ii) the absence of
a generalized sanitizing mechanism that does not require central coordination.
Accordingly, this highlights the importance of designing a generalized sanitizing
mechanism that relies neither on a protocol specific parameter nor on a central
coordinating entity.
4.3 Routing Table Poisoning (RTP)
In this section, we present the fundamentals of launching an RTP attack that
targets inserting and propagating malicious entries in benign peers RT. The pro-
posed attack model constitutes the basis for evaluating the proposed sanitizing
mechanism, which is presented in Section 4.6.
In order to validate the effectiveness and applicability of the sanitizing mech-
anism in various RTP attack scenarios, we consider a sophisticated general
attack model that (i) is not only applicable for a specific P2P protocol and
topology, (ii) does not target a specific victim or (iii) considers various attacker
capabilities and adversarial behaviors that represent severe attack scenarios.
First, we state the attacker’s target. Second, the attacker’s capabilities in
terms of the available malicious resources and the placement criteria are de-
scribed. Finally, the adversarial behaviors of inserted malicious peers that allow
for poisoning peers RT are discussed.
4.3.1 RTP Attacks Types and Targets
RTP attacks are launched by allowing malicious peers to intercept lookup re-
quests. The RTP attack’s target is defined based on the intercepted lookup
request’s destination, i.e., malicious peers behave adversarial or not when in-
tercepting a given lookup. RTP attacks are launched either to generally cause
perturbations to the overlay (undirected RTP) or to hide the existence (directed
4.3 Routing Table Poisoning (RTP)
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RTP) of a specific data or peer, referred to as directed RTP. Both attack targets
are described below.
Directed attacks
In case of directed RTP, malicious peers target only a certain victim set V such
that |V |< |B|. The selected victim set are those peers with critical or popular
content. The main target of malicious peers, inserted in the overlay, is to poison
entries that point to a targeted victim set [LMG+10; WTC+08; IGS16].
As the focus of this work is to assess the efficiency of the sanitizing mecha-
nism under severe attack conditions, we do not focus on directed attacks for the
following reasons: (i) a major fraction of RT entries is not poisoned. Hence, the
validity of the evaluation of the sanitizing mechanism is affected as the target
of the proposed sanitizing mechanism is to remove malicious peers from RTs
regardless of their targeted entries to poison and (ii) directed attacks coerce
specific adversarial behaviors and thus, are not suitable to assess the generality
of the sanitizing mechanism. For these reasons, we do not consider directed
attacks in our work.
In [IGS16], we highlight how the proposed sanitizing mechanism against
directed attacks stems from the general form of the attacks proposed in this
work. We study and highlight the modifications needed to launch such attack
and the relative modifications in the sanitizing mechanism. Furthermore, we
evaluate the impact of such attack along with the effectiveness of the proposed
eviction mechanism.
Now we discuss the challenges that arise from continuously attacking all
possible peers and the specific adversarial behavior executed by malicious peers.
Undirected attacks
The target of undirected RTP attacks is to poison benign peers RT where no
specific victim is targeted. In this case, B = V .
Unlike directed RTP, a major fraction of the benign peers RT is poisoned
as malicious peers do not only target specific entries to poison. As this attack
target shows more severity and thus, is suitable for evaluating the performance
of the sanitizing mechanism, we focus on undirected RTP as the attack’s target.
The target of undirected RTP attacks is to intensively pollute benign peers RT
(b ∈ B) via blocking, altering or diverting lookup requests.
4.3.2 Attacker Capabilities
Now we detail the attacker’s capabilities to launch an RTP attack. Capabili-
ties refer to the amount of available malicious resources and the placement of
malicious peers according to the selected undirected RTP attack.
Malicious resources
As the amount of malicious resources inserted in the overlay increases, the per-
turbations that can be imposed on the overlay also increase. In order to validate
the performance of the sanitizing mechanism in severe attack scenarios, we as-
sume the attacker is capable of inserting various amounts of malicious peers up
4.3 Routing Table Poisoning (RTP)
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to 20% of the whole overlay size. The malicious insertions are done by inserting
new peers into the network or hijacking existing peers.
Malicious placement
The placement of malicious peers mainly depends on the lookup forwarding
approach specified in the P2P protocol. Hence, we start by defining the lookup
approach and the matching placement criteria.
In order to validate the applicability of the sanitizing mechanism for various
P2P protocols, we make use of a lookup approach that does not impose any
specific criteria or route for forwarding lookup requests, i.e., to increase the
attack’s impact via allowing maximum interception of lookups when malicious
peers are inserted. Therefore, the divergent PASS lookup approach from our
previous work in [divpass] is usable here. The reason for selecting divergent
PASS is that the peers get randomly selected within a specific address range for
forwarding lookup requests.
Accordingly, the malicious peers are randomly placed within the specified
range. In turn, lookup requests are equally probable to be intercepted by a
benign or a malicious peer depending on the amount of inserted malicious peers.
4.3.3 RTP Adversarial Behaviors
To emphasize the impact of the attack, we propose a variety of adversarial
behaviors, where malicious peers are capable of dynamically altering the actions
taken according to the attacker’s resources and target. We note here that since
a lot of the existing research addresses the problem of join-leave attacks such as
[SF12], we consider this attack behavior out of scope of this thesis.
Malicious peers attack the lookup mechanism by intercepting lookup re-
quests and hence, replying with malicious information which affects the lookup
reliability, integrity and confidentiality. Consequently, malicious information
propagates to benign peers RTs causing an RTP. Once a malicious peer pm ∈M
successfully intercepts a request, pm replies with an Fake Reply (FR) as a re-
solving address to the lookup request.
In an FR, pm inserts the contact information of another colluding malicious
peer which claims to hold the key of the lookup destination that pi is requesting
and falsely convinces pi that the request was successfully resolved. As a result,
pi ∈ B updates its RT with the newly received entry which allows malicious
information to propagate through the overlay and thus, poison benign peers
RT. We now define the content and the frequency of generating an FR reply.
Generating False Replies (FR)
Malicious peers are assumed to always reply with colluding malicious infor-
mation to the lookup initiator. This adversarial behavior is chosen when the
attacker’s main target is to propagate malicious routing information regardless
of the detection likelihood. This denotes that, in case of malicious peers gen-
erating false replies based on a certain probability, the detection and thus, the
sanitizing of the overlay would require longer time.
Nonetheless, the perturbations effect on the overlay will be relatively less
compared to the perturbations caused by malicious peers continuously lying.
4.4 Detection Mechanism
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We refer to our previous work in [IGS15] where the detection accuracy in case
of randomly lying malicious peers is evaluated.
Note that another reason for choosing this behavior is that the attacker may
target fast spreading of perturbations in the overlay. Such case can occur when
the attacker owns enough resources and the attack is time dependent, i.e., the
attacker’s aim is to launch the attack in a specific time period or during a time
triggered event in the overlay. Hence, as our focus is to evaluate the effectiveness
and the applicability of the sanitizing mechanism in drastic attack scenarios, we
assume that malicious peers always generate fake replies.
False Reply (FR) Content
Malicious peers control the content that should be sent in a fake reply. The
possible FR content can potentially cover:
1. Replying to all intercepted lookups with a single malicious lookup reply.
Such behavior is executed when a specific information needs to propagate
through the overlay. Nevertheless, such adversarial behavior makes pm
more susceptible to detection.
2. Replying with different malicious replies. As malicious peers collude,
pm can reply to the lookup request with selecting one of the malicious
peers that pm is aware of. Such behavior is deployed by pm when seeking
general perturbations. In addition, replying with different malicious fake
destinations further complicates the detection process.
Further details about the detection procedure of the consistent malicious replies
are provided in Section 4.4.
4.4 Detection Mechanism
We now introduce the detection mechanisms used locally by each peer to suspect
other peers based on the received lookup replies. In order to detect lookup
inconsistencies, we propose a modified lookup mechanism in [IGS15] where peers
are able to gather more than a single reply.
The lookup initiator can detect inconsistencies through comparing the set of
received replies according to (i) the consent of the replying peers’ location with
the lookup protocol specifications, (ii) the average number of hops experienced
by the lookup reply compared to the recorded average from previous lookups
and (iii) the returned contact information in the lookup reply. Consequently,
peers are suspected when violating these criteria. The most important feature
in our detection mechanism is comparing replies, i.e., peers are also suspected
when replies are not identical which are detected through a certain feature in
the detector discussed through this section.
Originally for a given lookup mechanism, the lookup is terminated once
the first reply that contains the requested information about a given peer pv is
received . This coerces the lookup initiator pi to accept the lookup result without
being able to validate the results since only a single reply is considered. As a
result, whenever a malicious peer receives the request and replies with a fake
reply, pi accepts the reply which results in poisoning pi’s RT with a malicious
4.4 Detection Mechanism
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Figure 4.1: Detection procedures.
entry. The modified lookup mechanism is discussed below which provides the
operations that allows pi to gather a set of lookup replies from different peers.
4.4.1 Modified lookup Approach
We first outline the drawbacks of the contemporary lookup mechanisms, which
highlights the motive of using a modified lookup mechanism. Subsequently, the
operations of the modified lookup approach are presented.
The drawback of existing lookup approaches
In prior lookup implementations, pi picks α candidate peers from its RT to start
forwarding a lookup request for pv’s contact information, where α is a lookup
specific parameter for the maximum number of parallel requests that can be
sent. Once the lookup request is received by peer pr, it replies with pv’s contact
information if pr has an entry for pv in its RT. Otherwise, pr inserts a list of
potential candidates that, according to the lookup specification, have a high
chance of owning pv’ contact information in their RT. Iteratively, pi initiates α
new requests from this list. Finally, the look up process terminates immediately
once pv’s address is resolved or imax iterations are reached.
Such approach coerces pi to accept the single received reply. This means
that pi has no comparing base to validate the received reply, i.e., no multiple
replies to enable pi to detect inconsistencies. Hence, malicious peers can mis-
use this approach to falsely terminate the lookup without being detected while
simultaneously resulting in a very low overhead for the lookup process.
To obviate the above mentioned drawback, we proposed a lookup modifica-
tion in Chapter 2. As depicted in Figure 4.1, the major extension in the lookup
modification is that the lookup process is not terminated till: (i) R replies con-
taining pv’s contact information are received or (ii) imax iterations are reached,
where in this case, R ≤ α. Consequently, pi is able to compare multiple replies
from different peers and thus, detects inconsistencies to suspect certain peer(s).
Note that, in this context, a suspected reply refers to a suspected peer as replies
are only accepted from distinguished peers, i.e., no peer can provide more than
a single reply.
For this purpose, we make use of a Dynamic Majority Voter [BJ91] (DMV) to
process the R received replies, for more details we refer to our work in Chapter 2.
4.5 Sanitizing Mechanism (SM)
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Table 4.1: RTP attacks & defenses: acronyms description
Variable Description
ps Suspected malicious peer
pi Quorum initiator
pv Denotes the victim peer
Q Quorum
pq Peer p in Q
n Number of peers in Q
QB Set of benign peers in Q
QO Set of poisoned peers in Q
QC Set of churning peers in Q
QM Set of malicious peers in Q
MR Monitoring Request
RT Routing Table
4.5 Sanitizing Mechanism (SM)
In this section we present the sanitizing mechanism. Prior to the operation of
SM, the detector proposes a set of suspected peers according to their lookup
replies as discussed in Section 4.4. Afterwards, the SM is invoked to investigate
and thus, reach a decision about the suspected peers. Consequently, the SM
executes a removal procedure for suspected peers identified malicious to sanitize
the benign peers RT.
Unlike the detector which is operated locally by peers, SM is executed as
a distributed quorum to reliably investigate and propagate information about
malicious peers. Such propagation further accelerates the sanitizing rate for the
overlay. Hence, the SM results in a stable and reliable P2P service provision.
We note that the quorum needs to be obtained in the decentralized P2P
environment and in the presence of malicious peers. Accordingly, byzantine
resilient SM procedures are developed. The sanitizing mechanism is constructed
from four main procedures where each procedure is illustrated in the following
subsections. For consistency, Table 4.1 provides a list of the variables and
annotations used through the rest of this section.
The first procedure (Forming a quorum) defines how pi creates: (i) a quorum,
(ii) the quorum size dependabilities, and (iii) the quorum members constraints.
The second procedure (Quorum investigation) describes how the quorum inves-
tigates ps’s behavior. Afterwards, the third procedure (Reaching an agreement)
handles messages exchanging and reaching a coordinated decision between pi
and the quorum peers. Finally, the removal procedure (Malicious removal) is
invoked to sanitize benign peers RT from peers identified to be malicious as
illustrated in Figure 4.2.
4.5.1 Forming a Quorum
As shown in Figure 4.2a, once the detector suspects certain peers, pi starts the
sanitizing mechanism by forming a quorum. In the following, we describe the
criteria for choosing a quorum size along with the constraints regarding joining
peers’ types raised by the existence of malicious peers in the overlay. Afterwards,
4.5 Sanitizing Mechanism (SM)
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Figure 4.2: Technical aspects of SM procedures.
the formation mechanism which describes the messages exchanged while forming
a quorum and the acceptance-rejection criteria for joining a quorum is described.
4.5.1.1 Quorum size and members selection
Initially, pi selects n peers from its RT where selected peers are uniformly dis-
tributed according to their distance in pi’s RT. This selection approach guaran-
tees peers from all possible distances participate in investigating ps which accel-
erates propagating information about peers identified malicious in the complete
address space.
The generality of the mechanism allows to choose any distribution according
to the already used lookup approach. In our experiments we use PASS, charac-
terized by an address space divided into regions according to the common prefix
in the peers’ keys. Within the lookup forwarding mechanism, peers forward the
lookup request to other peers located in the same address space region.
In order to propagate such information to all regions, we make use of the
uniform distribution selection of quorums, so that all peers in different regions
are updated with the correct information and can propagate it when requested
from peers within the same region. This demonstrates that, the sanitizing mech-
anism is adjustable according to the basic information about the used lookup
approach in the overlay.
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As pq is a member of Q, pq belongs to one of the four sets listed in Table 4.1.
Hence, n can be defined as:
n = |QB\O∪C |+|QO\C |+|QC |+|QM | (4.1)
where |QB\O∪C | denotes benign peers that are not poisoned and do not churn.
|QO\C | refers to the number of poisoned peers that do not churn.
In order to assure reaching a reliable decision in Q, the size of the quorum
n must follow certain constraints regarding the maximum number of malicious
peers that can exist in the quorum. Based on Practical Byzantine Fault Toler-
ance (PBFT) and Byzantine Agreement [CL99; APR+15; Fis83; HC15; CL02],
the number of peers in a decentralized system that is capable of maintaining a
correct state of the system is bounded by n ≥ 3f +1, where f is the amount of
faulty peers in the system. As f peers can be malicious and another f can be
poisoned or churning, this adds up to 2f . This means that at least f +1 should
exhibit: (i) no malicious behavior (neither malicious nor poisoned and (ii) alive
(not churning) in order to maintain a correct system state.
Similarly, the selected quorum is capable of providing reliable results in case
the number of non-poisoned non-churning benign peers |QB\O∪C | outnumbers
the rest of other selected peers, therefore:
|QB\O∪C |> |QM |+|QC |+|QO\C | (4.2)
As these peers can deviate the quorum’s decision according to the following
possible actions:
1. |QO\C | peers such as pQ ∈ O \ C may provide malicious replies due to
acquiring a poisoned entry from other malicious peer.
2. |QM | where pQ ∈ M . These peers behave maliciously via sending fake
replies (see Section 4.3) to divert votes majority.
3. |QC | peers where pQ ∈ C that initially accept to join the quorum. How-
ever, although these peers are neither malicious nor poisoned, they are
subject to churning out and thus, do not respond to pi.
Accordingly, the quorum size n that is capable of reliably investigating and
thus, correctly reaching an agreement about suspected peers is constrained to:
n ≥ |QM |+|QC |+|QO\C |+|QB\O∪C | (4.3)
Such constraint guarantees that the quorum’s majority votes about ps are be-
nign, neither poisoned nor churning as depicted in Figure 4.3. In Section 4.6,
we validate how such constraints hold conveniently given the existence of a
remarkably high fraction of malicious peers of up to 20%. Now we describe
the quorum formation mechanism in terms of messages exchanged and joining
acceptance/rejection criteria.
4.5.1.2 Formation mechanism
Initially, pi sends a monitoring request message to pq as depicted in Figure 4.2a.
A monitoring request contains the contact info of each ps. As the DMV at pi
might suspect multiple peers at the detection phase, pi encapsulates all sus-
pected peers in a single monitoring request which allows for the following:
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Qo Qm
Qm
Qm
Qb
Qo
Qo
pi
Qb
Qb
Qb
Qb
QbQc
QcQb
Qb
…
.
Figure 4.3: Example of types of peers in Q.
1. Avoid excessive quorum formations which remarkably decreases the mes-
sages exchanged by the quorum’s peers during executing the SM.
2. Increase the cost of generating fake quorums by malicious peers since the
probability of detecting such adversarial behavior increases. This is due
to the ability of pq to suspect pi after investigating the suspected peers.
Hence, the SM will be invoked against pi, more details are provided in
(Malicious Removal) procedure (see Section 4.5.4).
Once pq receives the monitoring request, it can either accept and proceed to
the next step, or reply with a rejection to pi. Rejections could be due to: (i)
being involved in another quorum, (ii) loaded traffic or (iii) malicious behavior
to limit quorum formations. In case pq agrees on joining the quorum, it starts
executing the quorum investigation procedure which is described below.
4.5.2 Quorum Investigation
As illustrated in Figure 4.2b, the target of this procedure is to allow each pq
to monitor ps’s behavior and thus, confirm or deny pi’s suspicion about each
ps. After receiving a monitoring request from pi and accepting joining Q, the
investigation procedure is triggered. The idea of this procedure is to check
whether ps is manipulating requests or not. Therefore, pq monitors ps’s behavior
via requesting information from ps that pq can validate from ps’s reply.
Nevertheless, the investigation procedure should be conducted seamlessly to
obviate ps from acting benignly once it detects being monitored. The two main
aspects that define the procedure’s anonymity are: (i) the type of messages
pq sends when monitoring ps and (ii) the content requested from ps in such a
message. Both factors are detailed below.
4.5.2.1 Messages Exchange
Communication between pq and ps must be handled seamlessly as ps can di-
vert the monitoring process once it detects being monitored by pq, which can
remarkably impact on the sanitizing process.
For this reason, pq makes use of regular lookup messages defined by the P2P
protocol to avoid being detected by ps. This means that pq initiates lookup
request to α peers, including ps. Afterwards, pq processes the replies to the
detector to detect inconsistencies in ps’s reply.
Nonetheless, ps can detect being monitored when it receives multiple requests
requesting only pv’s contact information, i.e., assuming ps collect statistics on
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how frequently it has been requested about each peer. Hence, the content of the
lookup request should not reveal the victim’s identity which is discussed next.
4.5.2.2 Messages content
As the RTP attack proposed in Section 4.3 targets maximizing RT perturba-
tions, malicious peers are assumed to reply with fake replies regardless of the
lookup key in the lookup request. Hence, in order not to exceed ps’s expected
average of receiving lookup requesting only pv’s contact information, pi attaches
a list of peers in addition to pv in the monitoring request. Consequently, pq can
assign any peer in the list as the lookup destination key. Using the detection
mechanism discussed in Section 4.4, pq decides whether to confirm or deny pi’s
suspicion about ps.
To sum up, the investigation procedure assures that:
1. pi keeps the identity of the victim pv anonymous to the quorum, which in
turn prohibits malicious peers that may exist in the quorum from colluding
against pv.
2. ps cannot predict or estimate being monitored as it receives normal lookups
requesting different contact information.
3. pq can validate its decision about ps through the detection mechanism.
Adjusting SM: we note that our approach does not depend on a certain
attack or lookup mechanism, i.e., the approach is adjustable according to the
basic information such as the used lookup approach and the overlay topology.
For example, in case of the BitTorrent protocol where only one NodeID is con-
sidered, the detection is applied based on: (i) the replies’ consistency about
the destination ID, (ii) the average number of hops and (iii) the visited nodes
compliance with the lookup forwarding criteria towards this single node. Af-
terwards, the detector applies the DMV to decide about the suspicious replies.
Clearly, in case the fraction of malicious peers is larger than the benign ones,
the detection is useless., which is detailed in [IGS15].
4.5.3 Reaching an Agreement
As depicted in Figure 4.2c, once pq decides locally about each ps, the decision
is forwarded to the quorum initiator pi along with a time stamp identifying the
reply time of ps. Note that pq forwards its local decision about ps directly to
pi instead of mutually exchanging decisions with other peers in Q. Hence, pq
have no information about the other participating peers in Q. Obscuring the
identity of Q’s members from each other yields:
1. decreasing the probability of malicious peers colluding against benign
peers in Q.
2. preventing manipulation of the results aggregation procedure as malicious
peers might intercept the aggregated results messages.
Simultaneously, pi waits for a timeout tmax to receive all the monitoring
replies. Otherwise, in case the waiting time exceeds tmax, pi proceeds with the
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set of received monitoring replies. tmax is set according to the average time a
lookup process consumes plus adding a guard time for considering the quorum
formation time which is an application configurable parameter.
Afterwards, pi inputs the set of received replies to the DMV to decide about
the majority of the replies, i.e., whether the majority of the replies suspects ps or
not. Based on the DMV output, pi reaches a decision about ps and accordingly,
inform each pq about its decision. Now the possible decisions reached by pi
about ps along with the consequent actions are discussed.
4.5.3.1 ps is poisoned
pi checks the time stamp encapsulated in each pq monitoring reply in order
to differentiate whether ps is malicious or was poisoned. This is done through
checking the time stamps sequence for each reply. In case ps starts to consis-
tently provide correct information about a lookup key till the last time stamp
for the same key, it’s considered to be poisoned. Otherwise, if ps consistently
replying or alternating with fake information, ps is considered malicious.
4.5.3.2 ps is malicious
Two cases lead pi to consider ps as malicious. First, if all the monitoring requests
regardless of their time stamps report suspicious about the replies provided
by ps. Second, in case ps’s replies show alternating behavior. Alternating
behavior refers to providing fake replies after providing correct ones which can
be inspected from the time stamps of the received replies.
4.5.4 Malicious Removal Procedure
The agreement reached by the quorum allows pi to determine whether to proceed
with removing ps from its RT or not. Thus, we now discuss how pi proceeds
according to the DMV decision.
4.5.4.1 Suspicion confirmed
If pi decides that ps is malicious, pi executes the following Malicious Removal
(Mal-Rem) steps as depicted in Figure 4.2d.
1. removes ps from its RT and blocks any further contact with ps.
2. initiates a new lookup to search for the correct contact information of pv.
3. sends the decision to all peers in Q.
Once each pq is informed that the quorum’s decision confirms that ps is ma-
licious, pq performs one of these actions depending on its local decision about
ps.
1. In case pq’s local decision also confirms the adversarial behavior of ps, pq
executes the (Mal-Rem) steps.
2. If pq’s DMV decision about ps’ reply is benign, pq suspects pi and initiates
a quorum against pi.
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Since pi is aware of the conflict between both decisions, pi expects to be moni-
tored by a new quorum. Accordingly, in case pi is benign, pi consistently replies
to all the lookups so that pq detects pi’s benign status. Afterwards, pq initiate a
lookup request to ps to investigate it’s status without launching new quorums.
Without such a scheme, malicious peers will be able to invoke the sanitizing
mechanism towards benign peers which can severely affect the network stability
through (i) eclipsing pv by initiating a malicious majority quorum or (ii) ex-
hausting the network bandwidth and overload peers with exchanging messages
via joining fake quorums. Such countermeasure prevents malicious peers from
starting fake quorums as consequently, such malicious behavior will re-trigger
the sanitizing mechanism towards these malicious peers.
Moreover, encapsulating multiple peers in monitoring requests forces mali-
cious peers to behave benignly to avoid being suspected. Otherwise, this mali-
cious behavior is clearly detected when ps sends multiple fake replies at once to
pq. Thus, malicious peers refrain from initiating fake quorums.
In Section 4.6, we investigate the impact of turning poisoned entries in the
quorum to benign and how propagating the correct information about the vic-
tim(s) sanitizes the overlay and increase the isolation of malicious peers.
4.5.4.2 Suspicion declined
In case pi decides that ps was poisoned, after processing the monitoring replies
through the DMV, pi initiates lookups to ps requesting the contact informa-
tion of the same monitoring set that was initially sent to the quorum members.
Note that pi selects distinctive time slots to initiate such set of lookups to ps.
Therefore, ps cannot detect any abnormal behavior from ps due to receiving ex-
cessive lookups or multiple lookups from pi requesting pv’s contact information.
Afterwards, according to ps replies, pi executes one of the following steps:
1. If ps replies correctly, pi trusts ps and thus, inserts ps and any reply
provided by ps in the future into its RT.
2. In case the DMV reconfirms suspicion about ps, pi suspects that the ma-
jority of peers in Q is malicious. To that end, pi creates a new quorum to
re-monitor and subsequently unveil ps, after restricting peers in Q from
joining the new quorum.
In Section 4.6, we evaluate the likelihood of forming a quorum with malicious
majority and validate the constraints regarding forming a quorum along with
evaluating the effectiveness of the proposed sanitizing mechanism.
4.6 Evaluation
This section assesses the effectiveness of SM as a countermeasure for RTP at-
tacks launched with the set of the proposed adversarial behaviors. The target
is to evaluate the severity of RTP attacks on the overlay’s reliability and the
imposed perturbations resulting from poisoning RT entries. Consequently, SM
is evaluated in terms of reliability enhancements, imposed overhead on the net-
work and malicious removal ratio from benign peers RT.
In order to do so, two experiments are conducted. The first experiment
(RTP attack severity) evaluates the impact of launching RTP attacks on
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Table 4.2: RTP attack & defenses: simulation parameters
Parameter Value
Maximum iterations imax 10
Maximum replies number α 7
Key length w 128
Lookup approach Iterative
Malicious insertion ratio MI 10%, 15%, 20%
Overlay size N 2.5k, 5k, 10k, 20k, 30k
structured P2P overlays while focusing on how these attacks severely degrade
the overlay performance. The second experiment (Sanitizing mechanism in-
fluence) is conducted to assess the effectiveness of SM on sanitizing overlays
during launched (undirected) RTP attacks while analyzing the correlation be-
tween different SM parameters.
First we start by introducing the simulation environment, metrics and pa-
rameters used for evaluation. After that, we introduce each case study with
related discussion and results interpretation. Finally, we provide a detailed
summary about the results that highlight the effectiveness of SM.
4.6.1 Simulation environment
Experiments were conducted using the OMNeT++ simulator [Pon93] and Over-
Sim [BHK07]. OverSim provides the OMNeT++ simulator with various P2P
protocol implementations. Our focus here is on Kademlia networks [MM02]. For
Average-Min-Max calculations, each simulation is scheduled for 10 repetitions.
Moreover, for results validation, each simulation duration was scheduled to 4
hours runtime. In Table 4.2, the simulation parameters used in the experiments
are provided.
4.6.2 Simulation Model
In order to validate the reliability and the scalability of the sanitizing mech-
anism, the experiments were conducted for different overlay sizes, where the
network sizes considered are N = 2500, 5000, 10000, 20000, 30000. Moreover,
high values of malicious peers |MI|= 10%, 15%, 20% were injected in the over-
lay. MI is used to measure the impairments caused in the network given a
certain amount of inserted malicious resources. We now provide a description
of the system workload and churn distributions used in our simulation model.
4.6.2.1 System Workload
In order to evaluate the experimental results for undirected RTP attacks where
every peer is a potential victim, we use a “Fully Distributed Application (FDA)”
workload where every peer initiates lookups requesting the contact information
of randomly selected peers. Lookups are sent on average every 10 seconds with
a standard deviation of 5 seconds.
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4.6.2.2 Simulation Churn Models
We use a Pareto (P-500) churn model to simulate the churning rate of benign
peers. Using the Pareto (P-500) distribution, peers acquire average life-time and
dead-time of 500 seconds. Pareto distribution provides realistic experimental
results for real P2P overlays scenarios [ZL06].
4.6.3 Evaluation Metrics
For both experiments, the aforementioned performance metrics used in Chap-
ter 3 are used for consistency. conveniently, they are defined and listed below.
• Lookup Success Ratio (LSR) measures the average ratio of successful
lookups over all lookups destined to random peers. LSR provides insights
about the reliability of the P2P overlay in both experiments.
• Message Complexity (MC) evaluates the average message overhead on the
network per lookup. MC also assesses the message overhead imposed by
the sanitizing mechanism.
• Malicious ratio per RT (MRT) provides the average ratio of malicious en-
tries poisoned in benign peers RT as a result of the existing malicious
resources in the overlay.
4.6.4 Experiment 1: RTP attack severity
The target of this experiment is to assess the severity of undirected RTP attacks
with the proposed adversarial behaviors and to highlight the reliability degrada-
tion of the system’s service provision. Results are evaluated based on LSR, MRT,
MI and MC. As in undirected RTP attack, where all peers are potential victims,
data is collected whenever a lookup is initiated regardless of the lookup key.
We continue with describing the experimental results depicted in Figures 4.4
through 4.7, and we conclude each case study with a detailed interpretation of
the results.
4.6.4.1 Discussion of the results
Figure4.4a shows the LSR values across different overlay sizes. The different
combinations used are: N = 5k, 10k, 20k, 30k with MI = 10%, 15%, 20% in
order to assess the correlation between inserting different malicious peers, the
perturbations level in peers RT entries and the hosting overlay size. LSR re-
markably decreases when MI increases as the number of malicious peers that
intercept lookup requests increases. LSR values range between 36% and 91% for
N = 5000,MI = 10% and N = 30000,MI = 20%, respectively.
In Figure 4.4b, the average number of malicious peers inserted into benign
peers RT is calculated through measuring the percentage of malicious entries
to the total number of entries per RT. Note that each entry represents a dis-
tinct peer, i.e., the same peer can not exist in multiple entries. As shown, MRT
increases when the percentage of malicious peers inserted into the overlay in-
creases from 10% to 20% where the average MRT ratios range between 24% to
31% regardless of the overlay size.
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(a) Lookup success rate (LSR)
(b) Malicious ratio per RT
(c) Message Complexity (MC)
Figure 4.4: RTP attack impact.
The average message overhead complexity (MC) using divergent lookups is
depicted in Figure 4.4c. MC measurements show comparable values across dif-
ferent overlay sizes and MI ratios, where MC ranges between 18 and 24 message
per lookup.
4.6.4.2 Interpretation of the results
The significant decrease in LSR occurs due to malicious interception of the
lookups. Due to the effect of RTP adversarial behavior, malicious peers reply
with fake replies to pi. Consequently, such behavior results in a non successful
lookup according to the DMV decision due to the depicted majority resulted
from α malicious replies.
The trend depicted in Figure 4.4a is that LSR decreases when MI increases
as seen in different values of MI within the same N . Hence, at the same
malicious insertionsMI values and different values for N such as (combinations
of {MI,N}): {MI = 0.15∧N = {10k, 20k, 30k}}, {MI = 0.1∧N = {5k, 10k}}
and {MI = 0.1 ∧ N = {20k, 30k}} the values are closely comparable to each
other. This is due to the impact of the same fraction of malicious peers on the
overlay size N .
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Further degradation of the success ratio occurs when poisoned peers adver-
tise for malicious entries whenever they are queried about a lookup destination
that points to a poisoned entry in their RT. In addition, as benign peers RT
is polluted with malicious entries, the probability of querying malicious peers
during lookup iterations increases. Hence, the corresponding ratio of benign
peers queried decreases, which in turn significantly impacts the LSR.
In Figure4.4b, perturbations in benign peers RTs due to malicious peers
insertion can be inferred as MI = 10% results in more than 24% poisoned
malicious entries in benign peers RT. Moreover, slight increases of MRT cause
significant perturbations as for MRT = 31%, 64% loss rate at N = 30 is
depicted. Although at MRT = 22% the loss rate is 26% at N = 30. This
denotes that, with a few resources, RTP attacks are able to cause substantial
impairments in the overlay.
Figure 4.4c, MC shows moderate messages overhead per lookup despite of the
degraded LSR and high values of MRT. Note that the average MC overhead due to
divergent PASS averages between 10-12 messages as evaluated in our previous
work in [GIS15]. Nevertheless, due to the modified lookup approach, where the
lookup is not terminated till α replies are returned, MC overhead increases to
18-24 messages per lookup. Although α replies are required instead of one reply,
PASS shows a reasonable increase in MC due to forwarding lookup requests to a
specific range in the overlay where peers are most likely to store the destination’s
lookup address.
Furthermore, RTP attacks do not introduce more messaging overhead on the
overlay since malicious peers directly provide fake replies which minimizes the
average messages exchanged per lookup. However, maintaining reasonable MC
does not indicate high reliability for the overlay when RTP attack is launched.
Although divergent lookups show high resiliency against localized attacks, such
protocol specific approaches are inefficient against RTP attacks.
4.6.5 Experiment 2: SM Influence
In this experimental study, we evaluate the performance of the proposed SM on
the basis of: (i) the restored reliability, (ii) the malicious removal effectiveness,
(iii) the imposed overhead on the overlay during the sanitizing process. More-
over, we investigate the correctness and accuracy of the quorum’s decision via
analyzing the ratio of selected peers according to their types (benign, poisoned,
churning or malicious) during quorum formation discussed in Section 4.5.1. For
consistency, same overlay sizes and evaluation metrics are used for evaluation
and comparison of the results with the previous experimental study.
4.6.5.1 Discussion of the results
Figure 4.5a shows the average LSR when SM is on. A remarkable increase in
LSR is noticed compared to the first experimental study, where LSR averaged
between 36% and 91%. When SM is operating, the average LSR ranges from
97% to 100%.
The average MRT is illustrated in Figure 4.5b. MRT values average from 0.02
to 0.04 which is a significant decrease in the average amount of malicious entries
per RT compared to the first case study where values range from 0.24 to 0.31.
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Figure 4.5c depicts the average MC overhead induced on the overlay as a
result of messages exchanged during executing the sanitizing procedures. As
messages overhead due to SM varies with time according to the rate at which
the mechanism is invoked, MC varies from 22 to 710 messages.
Although the MC values with SM running are remarkably high at the starting
phase of the SM, MC decreases to show similar behavior as in experiment 1
starting at time t=2000s where messages average between 18 and 24. For better
interpretation of the results, a time line of MC imposed on the overlay is provided.
In addition, For comparing the variations of MC with the first experiment, both
cases where SM is on and off are shown in the same figure. MC is measured at
each data collection point which is scheduled every 200 seconds.
In Figure 4.6, the average MRT in benign peers RT is measured during SM
runtime, which gives an overview about the required sanitizing time given dif-
ferent MI values.
Figure 4.7 evaluates the correctness of decisions taken by the initiated quo-
rums as discussed in Section 4.5.1 which depends mainly on the types of selected
peers, i.e., the ratio of benign, malicious, poisoned and churning peers selected
by pi during the quorum formation procedure.
(a) Lookup success rate (LSR)
(b) Malicious ratio per RT
(c) Message Complexity (MC)
Figure 4.5: SM performance measurements.
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Figure 4.6: MRT decay due to SM
4.6.5.2 Interpretation of the results
As malicious peers are sanitized from benign peers RT, the number of malicious
peers contacted during different lookup iterations decreases. Hence, more cor-
rect replies are passed to the detector resulting in a remarkable increase in the
ratio of successful lookups, as shown in Figure 4.5a.
Moreover, once pQ receives a lookup request for pv’s contact information,
pQ replies with the correct information that do not contain a malicious entry.
Consequently, the propagation of malicious entries decays, which in turn in-
creases the availability of the correct contact information of peers. This results
in increasing LSR which indicates full restoration of the reliability through SM.
As shown in Figure 4.5b, the ratio of malicious peers that exist in benign
peers remarkably decreases below 5%. This is due to the effect of removing
malicious entries from benign peers RTs which consequently blocks propagating
malicious entries and provide correct lookup replies to other peers.
In addition, once ps is announced to be malicious, all peers in Q block ps
which restrains any further contact with ps. Hence, the attacker is not capable
of restoring the ratio of malicious entries in benign peers RT using the same
malicious resources. For large overlay sizes as in N = 30000, there is a lower
probability that all malicious peers are contacted during lookup iterations. This
is the reason MRT shows higher values (4%) than in smaller network sizes as for
N=5000 the average MRT ratio is 2%.
Figure 4.6 provides more insights about the effectiveness of SM in decreasing
MRT. Measurements are shown for N = 10000 and MI = 10%, 15%, 20%. Ma-
licious insertions are applied at the initialization phase of the network in order
to evaluate the decaying rate of MRT where peers RTs are highly poisoned with
malicious entries due to RTP attack. Hence, the sanitizing rate can be assessed
when the attack’s impact is maximized.
MRT significantly decreases below 5% even in cases when RTs are initially
poisoned up to 30%. Such sanitizing rate is due to the selection of an average
quorum size of n = size(RT )/3. Accordingly, a relatively high fraction of
peers simultaneously remove ps from their RT which accelerates the sanitizing
process. Moreover, as the RTP attack is undirected, pQ decides about ps based
on sending a lookup request destined to any random peer which allows for faster
monitoring procedure as pi assigns closer time stamps to the quorum’s peers.
Note that choosing large quorum size entails a high message overhead. As
seen in Figure 4.5c, the average MC generated due to quorum formations exceeds
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700 messages at N = 30000. This is due to around 30% malicious insertions in
benign peers RT which in turn increases the triggering rate of SM.
Nevertheless, MC shows a decreasing trend as MRT decreases. This denotes
that the number of quorums initiated decreases as peers RTs get sanitized over
time which leads MC to restore the average number of messages exchanged per
lookup. In fact, a key factor of our approach is that the sanitizing mechanism
do not impose permanent message overhead as the mechanism is invoked only
through the detector while no permanent periodic monitoring is required.
Notably, MC depends on the quorum size. This means that selecting smaller
n results in lower MC due to decreasing: (i) the number of lookups initiated to
monitor ps and (ii) the number of messages exchanged to reach an agreement.
However, minimizing MC comes at the cost of a slow sanitizing rate as the number
of peers joining Q decreases, which in turn decreases the number of peers that
removes ps per quorum. Subsequently, the propagation rate of peers’ correct
contact information is affected.
Figure 4.7 depicts peers participating in quorum formation according to
their types. Such measurements are conducted for network size N = 30000
and MRT = 0.28 to evaluate the reliability of the quorum’s decision in drastic
RTP attack impact. As peers RT highest poisoning level is at time t = 0,
the measured values show that the average recorded amount for benign peers
|QB\O∪C |= 0.59 which is greater than |QM |+|QC |+|QO\C |= 0.492.
This denotes that the majority of the replies in the quorum is benign and
thus, the quorum is capable of tolerating the existence of malicious (Byzan-
tine) replies, even at remarkably high MRT values. Hence, the quorum is able
to successfully reach a reliable decision. In addition, as SM is triggered, the
average number of benign peers |QB\O∪C | per quorum continuously increases
due to removing malicious peers from benign peers RT. Consequently, the ratio
of malicious peers picked during quorum formation that affects the sanitizing
mechanism decreases, which provides more reliability for Q to reach an accurate
agreement about ps.
Figure 4.7: Ratio of types of peers in quorum Q.
4.6.6 Summary
Two groups of experiments were conducted in order to (i) assess the impact of
launching RTP attacks on P2P networks and provide measures for the impair-
ments imposed on the overlay and (ii) evaluate the performance of our proposed
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sanitizing mechanism as an approach to remove malicious peers from benign
peers RT and accordingly restore the overlay’s reliability.
The first experiment evaluates the impact of RTP attacks that target poi-
soning benign peers RT. Results show that RTP attacks severely degrade the
reliability and cause significant perturbations in the overlay as peers can experi-
ence more than 64% lookup failures. Further evaluation indicates that acquiring
10% of network resources is enough for the attacker to poison more than 22%
of peers RT entries.
The second experiment assesses the performance of the proposed SM. SM
provides a remarkable increase in the overlay’s reliability as LSR increases up
to 100% at a reasonable, non permanent messaging overhead. Moreover, due
to SM, malicious peers are removed from the overlay as malicious entries are
eliminated from benign peers RT. Consequently, MRT drops from 28% to 3%.
4.6.6.1 SM possible challenges
One of the challenges for SM is the excessive message overhead exerted on the
network when the network is drastically under attack. Given that some critical
applications or lightweight peers with limited computing capability such as WSN
cannot tolerate such overhead, SM might need some adjustment.
Although selecting a small quorum size n effectively decreases the message
exchanged between the quorum’s peers, the time delay to sanitize the overlay
might be intolerant to critical applications. Hence, in order for SM to be appli-
cable for such applications, decreasing the messages exchange between peers is a
potential solution, taking into consideration the anonymity and accuracy of SM
is not affected. For this, we propose to introduce a set of trusted peers in critical
P2P environments that can easily manage the quorum initiation. Accordingly,
the decision making procedure would result in much lower overhead.
4.7 Conclusion
RTP attacks pose a significant threat to P2P networks as reliability is severely
degraded to cause service impairments. As a countermeasure, we have proposed
a distributed sanitizing mechanism based on reaching a consensus once a peer is
suspected over the lookup process by the DMV-based detector. The proposed
sanitizing mechanism eliminates more than 90% of the malicious entries from
the peers RTs, and successfully restores the benign state of the overlay as the
lookup success rate increases to almost 100%. The developed approach has been
shown to be independent of the overlay structure and attack types to result in
a generalized P2P attack detection and mitigation mechanism.
As a future work, we recommend assessing the performance of our sanitizing
mechanism on directed RTP attacks where malicious peers manipulate replies
destined to specific victims in the overlay. Malicious peers can also collude
against the sanitizing mechanism once a malicious peer detects being monitored.
Besides, testing and validating the efficiency of the sanitizing mechanism
on a real test-bench such as PlanetLab will be very helpful to migrate future
work in that area to real deployments. Similar to the previous and the following
chapters, we present in Chapter 7 a higher-level conclusion of this work while
relating to the relevant research question, which is question 2 in this chapter.

Chapter 5
Unstructured Overlays:
Proactive and Reactive
Mechanisms
In this chapter, we address unstructured P2P overlays. The focus is on super-
unstructured overlays, where a special EA attack variant, referred to as Outgo-
ing EA (OEA), is being conducted. This work was published in [IRS18a] and
counts towards Research Question 2 with the corresponding Contribution 3.
The work is presented in the following structure: Section 5.2 provides the
system model along with the concepts underlying the attacker model and the
conducted adversarial behaviors are defined. Section 5.3 discusses the related
work and the background. The detection mechanism is fully presented in Sec-
tion 5.4, while the theoretical analysis is provided in Section 5.5. The internal
attack’s impact, along with the detection mechanism’s performance and effi-
ciency, are evaluated in Section 5.6. Finally, we conclude our work and discuss
the future work in Section 5.7.
5.1 Motivation: OEA and Super-P2P Overlays
Large-scale P2P systems for video streaming, VoIP, Massively Multiplayer On-
line Games (MMOG) and other popular applications host millions of users
[AAM+15; GE12; WK13]. On this scale, despite their ease of maintenance, un-
structured P2P systems are often inefficient as they rely on flooding or random
walks to disseminate requests. Hence, the performance penalty grows rapidly
with the number of nodes [LCP+05]. In contrast, structured P2P systems re-
quire considerable maintenance overhead to adapt to such scale and are vulner-
able to a number of denial-of-service attacks [CCF+12; LCP+05]. Therefore,
system developers increasingly rely on semi-structured super-P2P systems to or-
ganize service provision in P2P systems and form the foundation of large-scale
applications [TLH14].
In a super-P2P system (or overlay), super peers disseminate messages on
behalf of regular peers, which then only request or provide a service without re-
laying traffic. Typically, super peers exhibit an above-average performance with
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regard to indicators such as bandwidth or reliability, thus improving the service
quality in contrast to random peers. In addition, the hierarchical nature of a
super-P2P system increases their scalability and efficiency compared to unstruc-
tured overlays as peers flood messages only between super peers. Based on a
simple hierarchical network structure, super-P2P systems entail minimal topol-
ogy maintenance and load balancing issues while providing inherent protection
against certain denial-of-service attacks [BG03; TLH14].
However, due to their distinguished nature, super peers present tempting tar-
gets for attackers. Disabling a large fraction of super peers, which corresponds
to a low fraction of all peers, effectively undermines the service provision of the
overlay. The class of Outgoing Eclipse Attacks (OEAs) are particularly threat-
ening for super-P2P systems. When launching an OEA, an attacker infiltrates
the routing tables of super peers such that all or most relayed messages of these
peers end up at malicious peers. These malicious peers then perform a denial-
of-service attack by either dropping the requests or faking replies. Indeed, a
simulation study based on real-world super-P2P systems highlighted that 0.1%
of malicious peers incur a performance degradation of up to 40% [AEO12], in-
dicating that denial-of-service (DoS) attacks might cause detrimental damage
to large-scale applications that rely heavily on super-P2P systems.
Eclipse attacks and their countermeasures constitute an active area of re-
search. However, the existing work is primarily concerned with eclipsing incom-
ing messages in structured overlays. Therefore, most of the proposed counter-
measures are not suitable in the context of super-P2P systems as they (i) rely
on the routing scheme of structured overlays [FMR+09; BM07], (ii) are lim-
ited to specific adversarial behavior such as localized or topology-aware attacks
[LL10], (iii) are inefficient in terms of communication or computation overhead
[DKC08], or (iv) require central parties [RL03; KBC+00].
5.1.1 Contributions:
In this work, we propose an effective detection and peer eviction mechanism
to mitigate OEAs in super-P2P systems. Our composite proactive and reac-
tive mechanism mitigates the effect of routing table infiltration as well as the
subsequent denial-of-service attack. Our proactive scheme aims to reduce the
number of appearances of malicious peers in routing tables. For the proactive
mechanism, we modify a previous auditing scheme proposed [SND+06] that
enforces an upper bound on the number of connections that peers can estab-
lish. We improve the existing protocol by reducing negative impacts on honest
peers that could lead to the accidental eviction of these peers in the original
scheme. we provide an in-depth theoretical analysis of our modified algorithms,
which provides bounds on the likelihood to recognize malicious peers within a
certain time frame. Complementing our anonymous auditing scheme, our novel
reactive mechanism detects denial-of-service attacks. Peers assign trust values
to their neighbors and collectively blacklist peers with low trust values using a
distributed consensus protocol, resulting in a permanent eviction of these peers
from the system.
The evaluation of the proposed mechanism is twofold. In the theoretical
evaluation, we leverage a probabilistic model to ascertain that our proactive
mechanism detects malicious infiltration with high probability while erroneous
removals of honest peers are rare. Combining the resulting upper bound on the
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number of malicious connections with a combinatorial argument about the re-
active mechanism, we provide tight bounds on the number of honest peers that
an attacker can eclipse. Our extensive simulation study validates the theoret-
ical bounds. Furthermore, our experimental results indicate that our compos-
ite detection mechanism significantly increases both lookup success ratios and
throughput while only imposing overheads as low as 5%. We thus effectively
mitigate a serious threat to super-P2P networks.
5.2 System Model
In this section, we present the system and adversary model. We first introduce
the notation regarding the different parties in a super-unstructured overlay,
followed by an overview of neighbor selection and communication protocols.
Afterwards, we describe our adversary model.
5.2.1 Overlay Model
We model a P2P overlay as a directed graph D = (P,E) with the set P of peers
and the set E ⊂ P × P connections between those peers. More precisely, each
peer pi ∈ P maintains a routing table RTi containing the contact information
of other peers. We write (pi, pj) ∈ E if RTi contains the contact information of
peer pj ∈ P .
Peers exchange messages to serve requests and maintain the overlay. When
a peer pi sends a request to a destination peer pd, peers forward the message to
pd using connections e ∈ E. A lookup mechanism determines which connections
are chosen to forward the message.
In this chapter, we focus on super-P2P networks; i.e., we divide the set
of peers P = S ∪ R into two subsets of super peers S and regular peers L.
We assume that super peers evolve from regular peers, where a regular peer is
promoted to a super peer if it exhibits promising characteristics such as high
bandwidth, CPU capabilities, reliability and storage limit.
Various super peers selection strategies have been proposed [LZL+05], though
the selection strategies per se are not the focus here. A regular peer pi obtains
the contact information of one super peer spi, e.g., from a web-server or via an
already known peer in the network. A super peer spi maintains connections to
all regular peers pi that are connected to it. We call the set of spi and its con-
nected regular peers a cluster. In addition, spi maintains connections to super
peers spj in order to serve requests from both regular and super peers.
As message delivery in super-P2P systems relies primarily on super peers,
regular peers forward their lookup requests to super peers for dissemination.
Consequently, super peers forward the lookup requests to other super peers
until the destination address is resolved. Otherwise, the lookup fails.
5.2.2 Attack Model
We now describe the OEA model used for evaluating the impact of eclipsing
super peers’ outgoing messages. We start by stating the attacker’s goal and
motivation, followed by representative high-level attack strategies.
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For P2P systems, we are primarily concerned with an internal attacker that
infiltrates the system by inserting malicious peers. Hence, we divide the set of
peers into benign and malicious peers B and M , i.e., P = B ∪M .
Attack Goals and Motivation We consider an internal and active adver-
sary. The adversary aims to execute a denial-of-service attack and minimize the
number of successful message deliveries. For that purpose, an attacker executes
an Outgoing Eclipse Attack (OEA) on a set of victims V ⊆ B with the goal of
capturing all their outgoing messages. OEA is a variant of EAs: malicious peers
only target outgoing messages whereas typical EAs target ingoing messages to
victims. Hence, we highlight the feasibility of launching OEA as intercepting
messages is a well deployed adversarial strategy. As regular peers have little to
no impact on the success of message deliveries1, we focus on malicious super
peers. The attacker might either target all super peers equally, referred to as
passive OEA, or focus on a specific victim set, denoted as active OEA.
In a passive OEA, the attacker has no specific set of victim super peers,
therefore V = S ∩B. Rather, the attacker targets capturing as many messages
as possible regardless of the originating peer. The reasons for launching a passive
OEA include, among others, (i) a desire to degrade the overall reliability and
(ii) an incapability to specifically connect to certain targeted peers.
In contrast, in an active OEA, the attacker aims to eclipse a specific subset
V ⊂ S ∩ B of super peers. Complementary to the scenario of passive OEAs,
the reasons for launching an active OEA include (i) a desire to prevent certain
users from receiving services and (ii) the limited attacker resources to perform
an attack on all peers.
Attacker’s Capabilities and Strategy A decisive quantity for the strength
of the attacker is the malicious fraction MI of super peers it can control, i.e.,
MI = |M ||S| . We assume that malicious peers collude and are aware of all ma-
licious peers in the network. In particular, malicious peers can observe, drop
and replay received messages. Furthermore, they can send, and possibly forge,
messages in the absence of a valid message authentication scheme.
Based on the above capabilities, the attacker can execute a two-fold strategy
to maximize the impact of a denial-of-service attack. In the first step of the
attack, malicious peers aim at receiving as many messages as possible in order
to maximize their impact on the system. Being in as many routing tables as
possible increases the probability to receive a message. Hence, malicious peers
aim to maximize their presence in routing tables by leveraging the neighbor
discovery algorithm of the overlay. Usually, they execute the algorithm at a
higher frequency and accept more neighbors than intended.
Regarding the second attack strategy, when receiving a lookup request, mali-
cious peers may either forge a reply, drop the request, or pretend that a time-out
occurred and the request cannot be served. As the effect of an alleged timeout
on the successful delivery is identical to the effect of dropping, we focus on the
first two attack strategies.
1Indeed, their only option is launching a DoS attack on their super peer, which can easily
be detected.
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5.3 Background & Related Work
The purpose of this section is twofold. First, we summarize the existing work on
EAs detection mechanisms in various P2P overlays and highlight their unsuit-
ability for super-P2P systems. Second, we introduce Singh et al’s anonymous
auditing protocol for enforcing degree constraints [SND+06].
5.3.1 Attack Detection Mechanisms
There are various approaches for detecting EAs in structured P2P overlays that
rely upon the existence of deterministic lookups and address-based resource
allocation. For instance, Young et al. integrate a quorum into each step of
the deterministic lookup [YKG+10]. It is unclear how to select the quorum
members for super-P2P overlays. Moreover, an unstructured lookup involves
the majority of all peers in the system, such that the additional communication
overhead induced by the quorum drastically reduces the efficiency.
Furthermore, there exist malicious peer detection and eviction schemes for
structured overlays based on quorums [IGS15; IGS16]. However, the proposed
mechanisms consider only directed attacks, i.e., attacks launched against a spe-
cific set of victims based on their addresses in the structured overlay. These
approaches are not applicable for semi-structured overlays.
In contrast, OceanStore [KBC+00] and Rosebud [RL03] offer more general
protocols for malicious peer eviction in large-scale storage systems. However,
both require a centralized server to handle node eviction.
Although Commensal Cuckoo [SF12] and HQ [CML+06] offer fault toler-
ance mechanisms, they either focus on very specific attacks or fail to evict
malicious peers. Similarly, Scheideler et al. [Sch05; SS09] propose a mitigation
approach against join-leave and Sybil attacks based on continuous node relo-
cation. Though their mechanisms are efficient and provide high robustness, no
reactive mechanism for detection or eviction is provided.
5.3.2 Anonymous Auditing of Node Degrees
In the following, we discuss the widely known anonymous auditing scheme in-
troduced by Singh et al. [SND+06], that aims to limit the number of routing
tables a peer exists in. Next, we highlight the key elements presented in their
work that are utilized in our proactive mechanism. In the process, we iden-
tify weaknesses in the original algorithm and motivate the necessity of a new
auditing scheme.
In [SND+06], the authors aim at limiting the incoming connections of peers,
i.e., the number of routing tables a peer exists in. For this purpose, they propose
an anonymous auditing scheme to ensure that peers adhere to an upper bound
on the in-degree.
Let the backpointer set bp of peer u refers to the set of peers whose routing
table contain u. A peer v, the challenger, anonymously requests the backpointer
set of each peer u in its routing table. If, for peer v, a neighbor u’s backpointer
set exceeds the maximal allowed size or does not contain the challenger v, u does
not adhere to the protocol and v removes u from its routing table. Requesting
the backpointer set anonymously is the main challenge of the algorithm: peer
v has to employ an anonymizer w to query the responder u so that u cannot
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deduce the identity of v. We discuss the selection of anonymizer peers after
elaborating on how to overcome a small fraction of malicious anonymizers.
If the responder u is malicious, a malicious anonymizer w can reveal v’s
identity to u so that u can include v in its reply. In contrast, if u is honest, the
use of authenticated messages prevents a malicious anonymizer w from forging
a reply but does not prevent w from dropping the request.
In order to account for these strategies, v executes k requests using diverse
anonymizers w. If any of these requests results in a backpointer set that is too
large or does not contain v, v removes u. Otherwise, v keeps u only if at least
l responses contain v in the backpointer set. Under the assumption that the
fraction of malicious peers is small and the peers are selected approximately uni-
formly, the probability to accidentally remove an honest peer or keep a malicious
one is low.
Singh et al. consider several methods for selecting the anonymizer w. They
rely on a secure lookup for the key H(xu) with xu denoting the address of u. In
this manner, all peers v rely on the same set of anonymizers when querying for
u’s backpointer set so that the anonymizer selection does not reveal information
about the requesting peer. If sufficiently many peers in the setH(xu) are honest,
u is unable to increase its in-degree beyond the permitted bound.
Our proactive mechanism builds upon Singh et al.’s work. However, we iden-
tify two key concerns that require careful modification of the original protocol:
1. A secure lookup for specific peers in an unstructured overlay is highly
inefficient.
2. The fact that H(xu) is identical for all challengers v might lead to the ex-
pulsion of honest peers from the system and allows for individual malicious
peers of arbitrary degree.
In order to clarify the second aspect, consider the scenario that more than l of
the closest k nodes to H(xu) can be malicious with a certain probability. If u
is malicious, more than l malicious anonymizers imply that u can convince all
challengers that it is honest. Thus, u could have an arbitrary high in-degree.
On the other hand, if u is honest, more than k− l malicious anonymizers imply
that all challengers will drop their connection to u, ultimately exiling the honest
peer u. In contrast, if each challenger v uses a distinct set of anonymizers for
the responder u, only a small fraction of challengers with malicious anonymizers
removes u. Hence, u can still participate in the system.
In summary, the work by Singh et al. provides some key ideas on how to
monitor the number of connections a node can establish. Nevertheless, the algo-
rithm in its current is unsuitable for our scenario. As a consequence, we propose
a novel two-fold mechanism that specifically overcomes the aforementioned is-
sues. Our mechanism provides (a) a method for selecting dynamic and distinct
anonymizer sets and (b) a distributed consensus protocol that expels malicious
peers, which is an aspect that is not considered in Singh et al. ’s work.
5.4 Detection Mechanisms
In this section, we present our proposed combined proactive and reactive mech-
anisms for detecting malicious behavior. The goal of the proactive mechanism
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is to prevent malicious peers from gaining a disproportional influence. Comple-
mentary, the reactive mechanism detects and expels malicious peers. Table 6.1
enumerates variables used throughout this relevant work in the thesis.
5.4.1 Proactive Detection
An attacker usually attempts to maximize its influence by infiltrating as many
routing tables as possible. In order to mitigate the impact of the attacker, we
aim to reduce the fraction of routing tables malicious peers can infiltrate.
Our mechanism keeps the key ideas of the anonymous auditing scheme by
Singh et al. presented in Section 5.3.2 but i) replaces the secure deterministic
lookup with a gossiping protocol, ii) bases its decision upon a sliding window
of replies from individually chosen anonymizers, and (iii) does not require a
structured overlay for selecting anonymizers. We now detail these modifications.
First, we integrate a gossiping protocol in our system, such as Cyclon [VGV05].
Here, super peers periodically spread their contact information through the net-
work2. In this manner, all peers eventually obtain the contact information of
all other peers. Note that the overlay consisting of super peers usually is of a
smaller size and higher stability. Hence, spreading the contact information of
all peers is indeed feasible.
Second, we propose a new protocol for selecting diverse anonymizers using
the information disseminated by the above gossiping protocol. As each chal-
lenger v has the contact information of all or most other peers, v periodically
selects an anonymizer uniformly at random from all known peers. v then bases
its decision on whether to remove a neighbor u from its routing table upon the
last k queries; i.e., the decision is based on a sliding window of the most recent
queries. In other words, v removes u from its routing table if:
• a received backpointer set is too large,
• a received backpointer set does not contain v, or
• v received fewer than l valid replies from the last k queries for u’s back-
pointer set.
Otherwise, v keeps u for the time being but continues to periodically requests
its backpointer set, see Figure 5.1a.
Malicious peers are mostly unable to bias the selection of anonymizers for
such a gossiping protocol. Unless the sub-graph induced by the benign peers
B is disconnected, dropping the contact information of honest peers is of little
consequence as the blocked information reaches the peer via a different path.
Similarly, spreading their own information at a higher frequency, malicious peers
might bias newly joined peers initially. However, peers only store each peer’s
contact information once. As soon as a peer has received the contact information
of all benign peers, the bias disappears. Thus, the peer selection is indeed
close to uniform and the probability to select a malicious anonymizer peer is
approximately equal to the fraction MI of malicious peers.
2For brevity, we write ’peers‘ for the rest of the section rather than ’super peers‘. However,
only super peers participate in the proposed mechanisms, as malicious regular peers do not
have significant impact on the system.
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v u
k window k = 4
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W5
Anonymizers
Challenger Responder
(a) Proactive mechanism
v u
Select least trusted neighbor u
z1 z2 z3 z4
1
2 Create a quorum of u neighbors
3 zi informs other peers about 
its trust in u
zi Is u trusted? 
4 Potentially blacklist u?
Inserted in blacklistu
Inform others
(b) Reactive mechanism
Figure 5.1: Proactive and reactive detection mechanisms
Figure 5.1a Our proactive mechanism prevents malicious peers from occupy-
ing too many routing tables (malicious peers are marked with dark grey).
Peers v anonymously request the backpointer set of their neighbors and
remove those that i) reply with too large sets, ii) reply with sets that do
not contain v, or iii) fail to reply too often (here: 3 out of the last 4 times).
Figure 5.1b Our reactive mechanism aims to expel malicious peers executing a
denial-of-service attack. Peers construct a quorum on the trustworthiness
of a peer exhibiting a bad performance.
5.4 Detection Mechanisms
Su
pe
r-
un
st
ru
ct
ur
ed
:
O
E
A
s
79
We now explain how our modification prevent the unintentional exiling of
honest peers. The continuous changing of anonymizer nodes implies that even-
tually one set of anonymizer nodes is dominated by malicious peers. As a
consequence, an honest peer v will remove an honest peer u from its routing ta-
ble as malicious peers create the impression that peer u is unwilling to respond
and, hence, is likely malicious. However, v does not expel u from the system
but only from its own routing table, so the removal merely requires v to select
a new neighbor. Such additional edge churn is acceptable if its frequency and
the associated overhead is low.
Thus, as detailed in [SND+06], the probability that more than l of k ran-
domly chosen anonymizer peers are malicious corresponds to the probability
that a binomially distributed random variable X with parameters k and f at-
tains values of at least l + 1, i.e.,
P (X ≥ l)
k∑
i=l+1
(
k
i
)
f i(1− f)k−i (5.1)
For values of f ≤ 0.2 and l = dk/2e, the probability to accidentally accept a
malicious peer is very low, as we show in Section 5.6.
5.4.2 Reactive Detection
Our reactive mechanism expels malicious peers based on a two-step process.
First, a super peer v keeps track of the reliability of its neighbors. If a neighbor
u does not perform adequately, v marks u as suspicious and initiates a quorum in
order to decide upon u’s continued presence in the system. The quorum consists
of all peers with outgoing connections to u, i.e., peers in u’s backpointer set, as
the misbehavior of u primary affects these peers as they forward requests to u.
Note that v uses the most recent backpointer set it received while executing the
proactive mechanism from Section 5.4.1.
Second, the quorum then collectively decides to either allow the peer to
remain in the system or not. This means that a malicious peer thus might remain
in the system if either more than 1/3 of its in-coming connections are from
malicious peers or it only selectively misbehaves in order to fool the majority of
peers into believing that it is benign. Next, we specify how i) the peer v decides
to initiate a quorum and ii) to reach an agreement on the expulsion of a peer.
In order to determine a neighbor’s reliability, v needs to be capable of de-
termining if a request forwarded to the neighbor u was adequately processed by
u. Usually, v cannot detect the misbehavior of u with absolute certainty but
can determine if the requested service has been provided, e.g., if the correct
file was retrieved. However, the lack of a positive response does not necessarily
imply a misbehavior of u. Rather, a failed request can indicate a misbehavior
by any other peer contacted via u to provide the desired service. Furthermore,
an inability to provide the desired service, e.g., requesting a non-existent file,
results in failure without the presence of misbehavior. Accordingly, individual
failures to provide the desired services should not directly result in marking the
corresponding peer as suspicious. Rather, we propose an iterative adjustment
of the neighbors trust-values [ZSD12].
Peers assign their neighbors trust-values tvv(u), which are increased by δ1
upon the successful completion of a request forwarded to the neighbor. On the
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other hand, if such a request fails, the trust value is decreased by δ2. Note that
peers periodically check their contacts’ liveliness to differentiate between oﬄine
and non-cooperative peers. Periodically, peers v select their neighbor with the
lowest trust value that has not been subject to a quorum for at least time τ . v
initiates a quorum to decide if the peer should be expelled.
After v has decided to establish a quorum to decide upon removing a neigh-
bor u, v retrieves the contact information of the peers in u’s backpointer set from
the most recent backpointer set received during the execution of the proactive
mechanism from Section 5.4.1. As depicted in Figure 5.1b, each member w of
this quorum ranks the trust values of their super peer neighbors SN(w) and
considers Lw,r, the set of the brSN(w)c neighbors with the lowest trust value
for r ∈ [0, 1]. If u ∈ Lw,r, then w agrees with the expulsion of u, otherwise
not. Finally, w sends its decision to all other peers participating in the quorum.
After a time-out, each quorum member considers the received votes. If more
than half of them declare that u is malicious, all quorum members remove u
from their routing table. In this manner, all honest peers in the backpointer set
remove u from their routing tables.
If u is indeed expelled, the above protocol drastically reduces u’s connectiv-
ity. Ideally, u does not have any remaining neighbors and cannot join again.
However, malicious peers can remain connected to u and continue to advertise u
as a potential neighbor to honest peers. Furthermore, the returned backpointer
set might only be a subset of u’s actual set.
Due to the in-degree bound, the number of additional honest neighbors
should be small and restricted to peers that recently added u to their rout-
ing tables, so that those peers did not yet receive a backpointer without their
entry. We thus suggest keeping a blacklist of expelled peers. In order to ensure
that all peers in the list have indeed been removed, peers blacklisting others have
to provide i) the backpointer set used for the quorum signed by the expelled
peer u, and ii) the signed responses of all members regarding the expulsion of u.
Peers can spread new entries to the blacklist via gossiping, so that eventually
all honest peers remove blacklisted peers. For consistency, newly joining peers
or peers changing status (oﬄine to online) receive the latest blacklist prior to
adding new contacts.
However, malicious peers can abuse the quorum mechanism to discredit hon-
est peers. If the majority of the backpointers of an honest peer u points to
malicious peers, these malicious peers can collectively decide to expel u. The
remaining honest peers in the quorum remove u from their routing tables and
effectively expel u from the network. Because the blacklisting algorithm re-
quires the signatures of all quorum members, blacklisting is only possible if the
peer was indeed expelled. So, the blacklisting does not allow for additional
abuse. However, we show that the probability of malicious peers dominating
the quorum of an honest peer is low in the following section.
5.5 Analysis
In this section, we first derive the probability of erroneously removing honest
peers and correctly removing malicious peers whose degree exceeds the upper
bound θ from routing tables. Afterwards, we show that our collective agreement
protocol further reduces the number of edges an attacker can use to launch an
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attack. Based upon this bound on the number of edges, we present an upper
bound on the damage that a denial-of-service attack can cause.
5.5.1 Effectiveness of the Degree Bound
To assess the effectiveness of our approach for enforcing a degree bound (cf.
Section 5.4.1), we have to consider 1) the probability of forcing malicious peers
to adhere to the bound on the degree, and 2) the probability of accidentally
removing peers from routing tables.
As the set of anonymizer peers changes over time and malicious peers are
largely unable to bias or predict the selection, any peer v with a malicious
neighbor eventually obtains a set of anonymizer peers with less than l malicious
peers. In contrast, v also eventually obtains a set of more than k − l malicious
peers to check upon an honest neighbor u, thus erroneously removing u from its
routing table. The parameters k and l should be chosen such that the duration
of connections between honest peers is long, while malicious peers are removed
nearly immediately. Hence, the rare removals of honest peers should barely
affect the performance and allow the removed peers to obtain new neighbors
easily. On the other hand, the frequent removals of malicious peers from routing
tables should force them to maintain the prescribed limit θ. In the following,
we evaluate the frequencies of removals for both honest and malicious peers.
We model the response behavior as a Markov chain. Each state of the
Markov chain (Xi)i∈N0 corresponds to a set of anonymizer nodes. The absorbing
states of the Markov chain correspond to the removal of a peer u from v’s routing
table. Then, we can derive the probability that a peer v removes its neighbor u
as the probability that the Markov chain has reached an absorbing state.
Formally, the state space S = {0, 1}k describes the distribution of malicious
peers within the last k anonymizer nodes. In other words, let a vector s =
(s1, . . . , sk) ∈ S represents k anonymizer nodes with si = 1 indicating that the
k − i+ 1-th recent anonymizer node is malicious. As M is the set of malicious
peers, with MI = |M ||S| denoting the fraction of malicious super peers, we have
P (si = 1) = MI for all i and consequently P (si = 0) = 1 −MI. The initial
probability of a state s is the probability to obtain a certain list of malicious
and honest anonymizer nodes from the backpointer set:
P (X0 = s) =
k∏
i=1
MIsi(1−MI)1−si (5.2)
The transition between states is governed by two rules. The set of absorbing
states AX , i.e., states s such that the transition probability P (X1 = t|X0 = s) =
0 for all states t 6= s, corresponds to all states s with∑ki=1 si ≥ k−l+1. In other
words, absorbing states correspond to more than k − l malicious anonymizer
nodes, resulting in the removal of u from v’s routing table. Transitions from
a non-absorbing state to any state correspond to removing the first entry in
the vector, i.e., the k-th recent anonymizer node, shifting all other entries, and
adding a new entry. The new entry is either 1 or 0 with probability MI or
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1−MI, respectively. Hence, for all non-absorbing states s ∈ S, we have
P (X1 = t|X0 = s) =
MI, tk = 1, ti = si+1, i = 1..k − 1
1−MI, tk = 0, ti = si+1, i = 1..k − 1
0, otherwise
(5.3)
After enumerating all elements in S, we can construct an initialization vector I
and a transition matrix T based on Eqs. 5.2 and 5.3. The probability distribu-
tion of the random variable Xi corresponds to T iI. We obtain the probability
of reaching an absorbing state at step i as pi =
∑
s∈A P (Xi = s). Expressed
in terms of our original question, an honest peer u remains in the routing table
after k + i + 1 anonymizer nodes have been contacted with probability 1 − pi.
We derive the probability for various values of k and l in Section 5.6.
Malicious peers As above, we derive the probability of removing a malicious
peer u after i steps based on a Markov chain model. However, if v requests the
backpointer set of a malicious peer u via an anonymizer node w, u can apply
diverse strategies. Thus, the probability to remove a peer u depends on u’s
strategy, such that the derivation is slightly more complex.
The reaction of a malicious peer u receiving a backpointer set request de-
pends partly on the anonymizer node w. If w is malicious, u can construct a
backpointer set containing the requesting peer v and thus, provides a correct
response. If w is honest, u does not know which peer initiated the request.
Thus, if u’s degree exceeds the bound θ, u might be unable to construct a cor-
rect response. Hence, one strategy of u is not to reply. Alternatively, u can
reply with a subset of θ of its backpointers, including each backpointer z with
a probability q(z).
For instance, umight return the same subsetW for every request, i.e., q(z) =
1 for z ∈ W and q(z) = 0 for z /∈ W . As a consequence, if the requesting peer
V ∈ W , v is unable to detect that u does not satisfy the bound on the degree.
However, if v /∈W , v can detect that u is malicious once it receives one response
via an honest anonymizer node. Thus, peers not contained in W remove u from
their routing tables instantly. Alternatively, u could select potentially different
sets of randomly chosen backpointers for each request. However, as long as u
maintains more than θ incoming links, the peers eventually receive a backpointer
set that does not contain them and drop u. Again, the set of backpointers of
u should soon be reduced to size θ. In contrast, if u does not respond, the
requesting peer v does not immediately remove u but considers the responses
of the last k requests. If v receives l responses in total (l < k), it removes u.
In the following, we assume that u responds with probability p. If u responds,
it includes the backpointer z with probability qt(z). Note that the probability
qt(z) to return z is likely to change over time, as the backpointer set of u is
dynamic.
We now describe how to integrate the different strategies of u into our
Markov chain (Yi)i∈N. Again, our state space SY = {0, 1, 2, 3}k characterizes the
responses to the last k requests. However, we now consider four different types
of responses Rt, namely 0: malicious anonymizer node w (P (Rt = 0) = MI),
1: honest w, u does not respond (P (Rt = 1) = (1 −MI)(1 − p)), 2: honest
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w, u’s response includes v (P (Rt = 2) = (1 −MI)pqt(v)), 3: honest w, u’s
response does not include v (P (Rt = 3) = (1−MI)p(1− qt(v))). Hence, we can
approximate the initial distribution by
P (Y0 = s) =
k∏
i=1
P (Ri = si) (5.4)
with Ri indicating the i-th query3. The set of absorbing states AY consists of
all states for which at least one element is 3, i.e., the response does not contain
v, or more than k− l elements are 1, i.e., u did not respond. For non-absorbing
states, the transition probabilities are obtained analogously to Eq. 5.3, removing
the first element of the vector indicating the state and adding a last element
corresponding to any of the four possible response types with the respective
probability.
Given the initial and transition probabilities, we derive the probability that
a malicious peer u remains in the routing table after k + i anonymizer peers.
We present results for various values of k and l in Section 5.6.
5.5.2 Effectiveness of the Quorum
In Section 5.4.2, we proposed a method to collectively expel malicious peers
from the system rather than only removing them from a set of routing tables.
Here, we analyze to which extent malicious peers can counteract this method
by i) ensuring that quorums against malicious peers fail, and ii) discrediting
honest peers to expel them from the system. Based on the results, we show that
passive eclipse attacks are unlikely to have any impact. However, active eclipse
attacks might result in eclipsing a small set of peers but only after remaining in
the system for an extended time period.
Throughout this section, D denotes the average routing table size, which is
equal to the average in-degree. In a well-performing system, D should be close
to θ for maximal connectivity and performance.
Honest peers We start by considering the less complex case of discrediting
honest peers. Let E denote the event that malicious peers dominate the
backpointer set of size |bp| of an honest peer and hence, can expel the peer from
the system. Intuitively. The malicious peers have to control b|bp|/2c+ 1 of the
pointers. As pointed out in Section 5.5.1, malicious peers maintaining more
than θ in- or outgoing connections are likely to be detected soon. Thus, the
routing table size of a malicious peer is essentially bounded by θ, disregarding
short-time connections that are quickly dissolved when the lack of adherence
to the degree bound is revealed. The total number of routing table entries
of all malicious peers is bounded by θ|M |, while the number of edges in the
system is D|B ∪M |. Hence, the fraction of edges to malicious peers is at most
θ|M |/(D|B ∪M |) = θDMI.
Now, we consider how the fraction of malicious edges corresponds to the
probability of discrediting an honest peer. If malicious peers establish random
3We here assume that routing table entries are independent, which is not strictly true, as
each peer can appear at most once in another peer’s routing table. However, the approximation
error is negligible for a large network.
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connections rather than targeting individual peers, each incoming connection of
an honest peer v is to a malicious peer with probability θDMI. Thus, the number
of connections to malicious peers in an honest peer u’s bp (approximately under
the assumption θ << n, where n is the network size) is binomially distributed
with parameters |bp| and θDMI, such that
P (E) =
|bp|∑
i=b|bp|/2c+1
(|bp|
i
)(
θ
D
MI
)i(
1− θ
D
MI
)|bp|−i
(5.5)
In contrast, if malicious peers target a set V of peers, they should eventually
control a considerable fraction of incoming connections of these peers. Assuming
that each targeted peer has an average in-degree of D, malicious peers need to
control at least 0.5D|V | of the edges to peers in V to discredit them. Thus,
they can execute the attack on sets of size up to |V |= 2θD |M |. However, super
peers are usually very stable, such that the connections between super peers are
likely to change slowly and thus, establishing targeted connections should take
considerable time. In particular, targeted peers might leave before the attack is
successful. We evaluate the duration of targeted attacks in Section 5.6.
Malicious peers In general, malicious peers can either prevent the quorum
or manipulate it such that the malicious peer is not removed. However, in order
to prevent quorums, malicious peers have to provide better service than some
honest peers. If malicious peers provide acceptable service, their removal does
not improve the overall quality of service since their attack cannot really be
seen as a DoS attack. Thus, improving the (malicious) peer’s performance such
that quorums with regard to malicious peers are not initiated is generally not a
viable strategy for an attacker aiming to degrade the service.
In order to prevent a quorum from expelling a malicious peer u, at least half
of the peers in the quorum have to vote for u to stay. The peers voting for u can
be either malicious or honest peers that actually received service from u. Thus,
each malicious peer can show malicious behavior towards at most 1/2θ peers.
There are a total of |B ∪M |D edges in the network, where at most 1/2θ|M |
edges can be used for malicious behavior. As a consequence, the fraction of
edges along which peers execute malicious behavior is bound by θ2DMI. We
call a malicious peer actually executing malicious behavior towards a peer v a
maliciously behaving neighbor.
Now, we consider the likelihood that maliciously behaving neighbors eclipse a
peer by controlling x or more of its rt routing table entries. If malicious peers do
not target individual peers but accept random connections, the probability for
any entry in the routing table to be a maliciously behaving neighbor is θ2DMI.
Hence, the probability distribution X of the number of maliciously behaving
neighbors is approximately binomial with parameters rt and θ2DMI, such that
P (X = x) =
(
rt
x
)(
θ
2D
MI
)x(
1− θ
2D
MI
)rt−x
(5.6)
If malicious peers target a set of peers |V |, they might again eventually control
all |V |D outgoing edges of these peers, as long as |V |D < θ/2|M |. The maximal
size of V is hence θ2D |M |. Still, manipulating an honest peer to accept new
malicious peers might take a considerable amount of time, which we further
assess in Section 5.6.
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5.6 Evaluation
We now show the overall effectiveness of our detection mechanism in two case
studies. First, we demonstrate the importance of an effective detection mech-
anism by quantifying the impact of OEAs on super-P2P systems. Second, we
show how different parameters affect the effectiveness of our detection mecha-
nism and its communication overhead.
5.6.1 Simulation Framework
We leverage the widely used discrete event based OMNeT++ simulator [Pon93]
with the OverSim framework [BHK07]. In order to realize communication be-
tween super peers, we make use of OverSim’s GIA module, short for Gianduia,
for unstructured overlays [CRB+03]. GIA communication is restricted to super
peers: regular peers attach themselves to one random super peer and restrict
their communication to this peer only. The super peer assignment leverages
existing techniques [MHC06].
Upon promotion to super peers, these peers receive a list of existing super
peers, e.g., via gossiping and choose potential neighbors from this list. We
assume all connections to be bidirectional, i.e., a node v has u in its routing
table if and only if u has v in its routing table.
As discussed in Section 5.2, both super and regular peers initiate lookup
requests to retrieve content stored in the system. Once regular peers contact
their super peer, super peers use flooding to discover the requested content.
The detection mechanism is implemented based on the description in Sec-
tion 5.4. For the proactive mechanism, we consider two attack strategies. If
a malicious responder u with more than θ neighbors encounters an honest
anonymizer, u either replies with a random (but constant over one simulation
run) backpointer set containing θ of its actual backpointers (denoted guess-
reply) or refuses to reply (denoted no-reply). We assess the impact of these
adversary behaviors below.
For the reactive mechanism, we consider two denial-of-service attacks. At-
tackers can either drop received lookups (denoted drop) or return a fake reply
(denoted FR). Faking replies are usually more effective as only one reply is
forwarded to the originator of the request. Hence, super peers may forward a
fake reply despite finding a route to the correct target. However, if the content
is authenticated, peers detect fake replies and discard them. Thus, it is also
essential to consider the impact of drop reply.
5.6.2 Simulation Set-up and Metrics
In our simulation study, we consider overlays of 3,000, 6,000, and 10,000 peers in
total to validate the performance of our approach when the overlay size scales.
We set the ratio of super peers to 10%, which is common for such overlays
[BG03; BS06]. The maximal routing table size of honest peers corresponds to
25% of the total number of super peers and the maximal depth for flooding is
15. The fraction of malicious peers MI varies between 10% and 20%.
Each peer initiates a lookup every 4 seconds on average. Peers choose the
target of the lookup randomly. However, for active OEAs (a targeted specific
victim set), we limit the computed statistics to lookups addressed to peers
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within this set. Our simulation time is 1000s with 10 runs of each parameter
combination. Statistics collection is every 15s. The proactive detection starts
at t = 100s and is invoked every 10s, and the reactive mechanism starts at
t = 500s to allow peers to acquire trust values and is invoked every 70s.
In our second case study, we evaluate various parameter settings for both
the proactive and the reactive mechanisms. For the proactive mechanism, we
consider window sizes k ∈ {6, 12, 16} and required correct replies l ∈ {3, 4, 6, 8}.
For the reactive mechanism, we choose the interval τ = 100s, 150s between
subsequent quorum initiations to the same peer and the factor r to determine
the list of the lowest trust value peers r = {0.07, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2}. Initially, peers
assign each of their neighbor a trust value of 0 and the trust increment δ1 and
decrement δ2 are both 1.
In this manner, we cover a wide range of overall parameter combinations. In
our discussion, we focus on the most prominent results of the parameter study.
We focus on the following common metrics for characterizing the performance
of lookup and detection mechanism:
Lookup Success Ratio (LSR)
the fraction of successfully answered requests, averaged over all peers and lookups
for passive active OEAs and all lookups originating from victim peers.
Detection Overhead (DO)
the ratio of the number of messages exerted on the overlay by the detection
mechanism and the total number of messages sent or processed by a super peer.
Malicious Ratio per RT (MRT )
the ratio of malicious peers in an honest peer’s routing tables, averaged over all
honest peers per collection interval.
Expulsion Ratio per RT (ERT )
the ratio of correctly expelled malicious peers and the overall number of mali-
cious peers in an honest peer’s routing table, averaged over all honest peers.
Honest Keeping Ratio per RT (HRT )
the ratio of successfully keeping honest peers when queried and the overall num-
ber of proactive initiations to honest peers.
The first two of the above metrics are the main performance indicators of a
well-functioning system, so our primary goal is to maximize the lookup success
at acceptable detection overhead. In contrast, the latter three metrics allow us
to evaluate the effectiveness of our detection mechanism.
5.6.3 Case Study 1: OEA impact
The main goal of this study is to highlight the severity of OEAs on super-P2P
overlays based on the aforementioned metrics and parameters.
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(a) Lookup success rate (LSR)
(b) Malicious ratio per RT (MRT)
Figure 5.2: OEA impact on super-unstructured networks
We start by considering a super-P2P system without any attacks. Without
attacks, we achieve an LSR of at least 99%, more precisely 99.8% for 3,000
peers, 99.2% for 6,000 peers, and 99.0% for 10,000 peers. The slight chance of
failure is due to the limited depth of the flooding, i.e., the rare cases where all
peers storing a specific content are out-of-reach.
In contrast, attacks result in a low LSR, as illustrated in Figure 5.2a. In
particular, FR results in a very low LSR with an average success ratio between
8%-11% for MI = 10% and 4%-7% for MI = 20%. The low LSR is due to the
instant termination of the lookup upon receiving a fake reply. The dropping
behavior shows a higher average LSR of 80%-96% and 51%-89% for MI = 10%
and MI = 20%, respectively.
The reason for this higher LSR average is that, unlike in FR, the dropping
behavior does not instantly results in a failed lookup. Hence, depending on
the flooding value used, honest peers still may receive and accordingly respond
with the destination’s contact information, which results in a successful lookup.
Nevertheless, the reduction in successfully served requests is considerable, which
highlights the impact of OEA attacks on super-P2P systems.
We consider the MRT metric to show that malicious peers indeed make up
a disproportional fraction of routing table entries for both passive and active
OEAs. Indeed, for MI = 10%, we observe an MRT between 18.5%-23.5%
rather than the expected 10%, whereas MI = 20% increases MRT further to
38%-41.5%, as depicted in Figure 5.2b. Thus, malicious peers indeed manage
to infiltrate routing tables.
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5.6.4 Case Study 2: Detection assessment
In this study, we evaluate the reliability, accuracy and effectiveness of the pro-
posed two-fold detection mechanism. We start by considering the composite
proactive and reactive mechanism for various network sizes. Afterwards, we
consider the proactive and reactive mechanism individually. For the first, we
vary the number of correct replies l whereas we consider the impact of the frac-
tion of routing table entries r that are considered untrustworthy on the latter.
We compare the simulation results with our analytical results from Section 5.5.
Composite Mechanism Figure 6.3 exemplifies the effectiveness of our de-
tection mechanism for k = 12, l = 6, τ = 100 and r = 0.1. We vary the network
size between 3,000, 6,000, and 10,000 peers. Malicious peers make up either
MI = 10% or MI = 20% of the set of super peers.
Our detection scheme is indeed highly effective. The composite detection
mechanism increases the lookup success ratio to at least 98% for all considered
parameters, as depicted in Figure 5.3a. In comparison to the often enormous
failure rate experienced in case study 1, we now can achieve success ratios close
to the no-attack scenario.
We only incur a detection overhead of 4%-5% regardless of the network
size, as illustrated in Figure 5.3b. The reason for the low overhead is that the
mechanism only requires contacting a low fraction of peers in comparison to the
flooding-based lookup mechanism. Furthermore, the mechanism is only applied
at a low frequency, i.e., every 10s for the proactive and every 70s for the reactive
mechanism. More frequent detection attempts did not considerably improve the
performance.
Figure 5.3c depicts the successful expulsion rate ERT , which provides a
deeper understanding on how the detection mechanism works. Regardless of the
attack strategy and infiltration rate, the expulsion ration ranges from 99.98%-
100%.
Malicious peers are expelled locally via the proactive mechanism and glob-
ally via the reactive mechanism. Indeed, the result agrees with our analytical
model, which states that the likelihood to expel malicious peers at some point is
essentially 1. Similarly, both the simulation and the theoretical results (Equa-
tion 5.5) indicate that the chance to evict an honest peer is negligible. We
consider the slightly higher chance of removing an honest node from a routing
table in the following.
Proactive Mechanism We compare the theoretical and simulation results for
the proactive scheme and elaborate on the impact of the parameter l. Through-
out this evaluation of the proactive mechanism, we set MI = 0.1.
In general, our theoretical results for removing malicious peers from routing
tables match closely with the simulation. The agreement between theory and
simulation holds for both attack strategies: no-reply and guess-reply. For guess-
reply, we restrict our results to the peers not contained in the guessed reply, as
peers that are always contained in the reply are inherently unable to detect
that the peer is malicious. Indeed, as peers are allowed to maintain θ neighbors,
keeping these θ peers does not violate the protocol.
Figure 5.4a illustrates the closeness of the results for both guess-reply and
no-reply with k = 6 and l = 3. We consider the cumulative distribution function
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(a) Lookup success rate (LSR)
(b) Detection Overhead (DO)
(c) Expulsion ratio per RT (ERT)
Figure 5.3: Detection mechanism performance
of the fraction of removed malicious peers in terms of the number of windows
(i.e., the number of queried anonymizers minus (k-1)). If malicious peers send a
random reply when asked by an honest anonymizer, peers that are not contained
in the reply recognize the misbehavior almost immediately. Hence, honest peers
almost always remove malicious peers in the first window if the malicious peer
uses guess-reply as a strategy, resulting in a removal rate of 1 in Figure 5.4a.
In contrast, if the malicious peer chooses not to reply, it might initially not be
detected if there are at least l malicious anonymizers. However, the likelihood to
continuously choose such l anonymizers decreases exponentially over the number
of windows. Hence, malicious peers applying no-reply are detected rapidly as
well, as depicted in Figure 5.4a.
We consider the honest removals in Figure 5.4b. The theoretical model
presents an upper bound on the cumulative removal rates exhibited in the sim-
ulation. Overall, the chance of removing an honest peer from a routing table
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(a) Malicious-removals CDF
(b) Honest-removal CDF
Figure 5.4: Comparing theoretical and simulation results (k, l) = (6, 3)
is several orders of magnitude lower than for a malicious peer. Hence, our
proactive mechanism rarely disadvantages honest peers.
Now, we evaluate the effect of the number of correct replies l. For that
purpose, we fix k = 12 and choose l ∈ {4, 6, 8}. As shown in Figure 5.5a, for both
malicious behaviors types (guess-reply and no-reply), the honest keeping ratio
HRT exhibits a slight decrease when l increases. The reason is the increased
number of required honest anonymizers, which are increasingly unlikely to have
over an extended period of time. In contrast, even at low values of l, the
malicious detection rate is not equally affected as it is already at its maximum.
Reactive Mechanism In this study, we assess the reactive mechanism, we
vary r ∈ {0.07, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2}. We set τ = 100s and MI = 10%. The effect
of varying r is shown in Figure 5.5b. Choosing a very small value r = 0.07
decreases the probability of successfully expelling malicious peers. The lack of
successful detection is due to that a specific malicious peer is unlikely to rank
lowest in the routing table of the majority of its neighbors, as these might have
multiple malicious peers. However, at r = 0.1, the ratio of successfully detected
malicious peers increases to 70% as a result of including more malicious peers
in Lw,r.
Note that at higher values r = 0.15, r = 0.2, honest peers are also included
in Lw,r by some of their neighbors. Nevertheless, the overall eviction rate of
honest peers only increases slightly because honest peers are unlikely to be
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(a) Proactive: varying l
(b) Reactive: varying r
Figure 5.5: Evaluating parameters for detection mechanism
declared untrustworthy by all peers. To that end, we highlight the effectiveness
of our detection mechanism for a wide range of parameters.
5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we highlight the severity of launching OEAs against super-P2P
unstructured overlays. Consequently, we propose a two-fold detection mecha-
nism that constitutes of a proactive and reactive mechanisms.
Through an analytical and simulation-based evaluation, the proposed mech-
anism restores the overlay’s reliability up to 100%, achieves 99% successful ma-
licious detections, and entails a low network overhead (4%-5%). Moreover, we
note that an interesting carry on to this work is to combine the proposed algo-
rithms with resilient online streaming P2P networks. Next, a general conclusion
to the whole thesis is described in Chapter 7 which emphasizes the highlights
and the results in each research question along with the corresponding contri-
bution(s).

Chapter 6
Streaming Overlay:
Defending Against Cheating
Attacks
This chapter address Research Question 3 and the subsequent Contribution 4
published in [IRS18b]. We address the resiliency of online streaming overlays
to a DoS attack variant. Specifically, Internal Buffer-Map BM cheating attacks
are being investigated, where internal refers to the capability of the attacker
to actually insert malicious peers in the system, rather than only being able to
externally shut down resources. Accordingly, a detection mechanism that guar-
antees peers satisfaction are rapidly restored is presented and evaluated theo-
retically and through simulations, while the proposed cheating attack severity
is assessed as well.
The work is presented as follows: Section 6.2, the concepts underlying the
attacker model internal attack and the conducted adversarial behaviors are de-
fined. The detection mechanism is described in details in Section 6.3, with the
theoretical analysis is discussed in Section 6.4. The internal attack’s impact,
along with the detection mechanism performance and efficiency, are evaluated
in Section 6.5. Section 6.6 discusses the related work and the background. Fi-
nally, we conclude our work and discuss the future work in Section 6.7.
6.1 Motivation: Streaming & Cheating Attacks
Nowadays, streaming content is an essential component of data-driven infras-
tructures [Tha13]. Most streaming applications rely on (monopolistic) central
providers that have significant computing and communication resources to dis-
tribute high quality of service content to a large audience in a fast and reliable
manner. For the providers, this entails the use of dedicated resources, involves
performance and scalability issues along with considerations of handling single
point of failures. Distributing content via a P2P network significantly lowers the
load that the provider experiences as the participants relay the downloaded con-
tent to other participants. This eliminates the need that all participants receive
their content directly from the source, i.e., the provider. Consequentially, P2P
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streaming becomes an attractive option for alternative distributed providers and
user-generated content to help reduce data delivery costs and results in lower
rates for customers.
However, achieving high reliability in a P2P overlay and across a dynamic
and heterogeneous group of content distributors is challenging. In addition to
the inherent operational unreliability of benign participants, attackers such as
competitors can infiltrate the set of peers and conduct denial-of-service attacks.
In this manner, malicious participants can interrupt or delay the distribution of
the content with the goal of degrading the quality of service.
In general, nodes in a P2P streaming system connect to a small set of other
nodes, called the neighbor set. The publisher or the source of the content di-
vides the stream into chunks, each contains an equal-sized part of the encoded
data, and forwards these chunks to its neighbors. Nodes in the system receive
chunks from neighbors and forward them to neighbors that have not previously
received the respective chunks. The selection of neighbors and the choice of
neighbors to receive-from or forward-to differs across protocols [LGL08]. Yet,
pull-based mesh networks are the predominant method in P2P streaming sys-
tems [ZXW+14]. In a mesh overlay, peers maintain a buffer-map indicating
which chunks they possess. Neighbors periodically exchange their buffer-maps
and request chunks from neighbors whose buffer-maps indicate possession of the
respective chunk. Peers then forward chunks based on the received requests.
In pull-based systems, there exist several denial-of-service attacks, known
as buffer-map or BM cheating attacks [CLW07]. In such an attack, malicious
nodes might drop or delay chunks. Alternatively, they might advertise chunks
that they do not have. As detection of the latter is locally possible and the
effect of delaying chunks is at most as severe as entirely dropping the respective
chunks, we focus on a denial-of-service attack through dropping chunks without
advertising them, called Drop-chunk in the following.
In the past, multiple countermeasures aimed to reduce the severity of the
Drop-chunk attack. However, the majority of these defences [ZLL+05; HC04;
SR12] assume that the attacker is unaware of the topology of the streaming net-
work and specifically does not know the headnodes, i.e., the peers connected to
the source. However, previous work indicates that it is relatively easy to infer the
identity of benign headnodes and then target those important nodes [NRS+16].
While countermeasures to these inference attacks exist, they assume an external
adversary that can shut-down or replace certain nodes [NRS+16; NF15; NFS14].
Hence, the existing work evaluates neither the impact of internal attacks nor
defending against internal attackers, i.e., attackers that insert nodes under their
control into the system pretending to be regular participants.
6.1.1 Contributions:
In this chapter, we first illustrate the effectiveness of internal attacks based
on malicious headnodes. Consequently, we propose a mechanism for detecting
Drop-chunk by keeping track of peer satisfaction. If the cumulative satisfaction
level of a group of peers drops below a certain threshold, the source replaces all
headnodes associated with the group with randomly chosen peers. Hence, our
detection and mitigation mechanism efficiently reacts to a detected low quality of
service rather than explicitly identifying the misbehavior of one or more specific
nodes. Note that we focus on attackers that control a low fraction of nodes,
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as attackers controlling the majority of nodes can trivially control most of the
communication, even without gaining strategic positions such as headnodes.
Using a simulation study, we show that the proposed detection mechanism
effectively restores peers satisfaction, even in a scenario where the attacker con-
trols all headnodes. Our mechanism introduces only a small signaling overhead
of approximately 8% supporting the claim of being efficient.
A theoretical analysis complements our practical results, focusing on the op-
portunities to abuse the detection mechanism. Indeed, the detection algorithm
prevents malicious nodes from replacing benign headnodes with malicious nodes
unless they control a large fraction of the total number of nodes. Furthermore,
maintaining malicious headnodes despite generally low satisfaction levels is not
possible for the considered attacker.
6.2 Internal Attack Model
In this section, we introduce the concept of internal attacks in streaming P2P
overlays. Our focus is on attacks on availability that aim to intercept data
chunks from the source. We start by introducing the attack characteristics
such as target, budget, and malicious nodes placement. Subsequently, our main
discussion outlines the Drop-chunk adversarial behavior.
6.2.1 Target, budget and placement
The target of the internal attack is to severely degrade the user’s satisfaction
by interrupting the stream close to the source, thus preventing dissemination
between benign peers. The budget x of the attacker corresponds to the number
of nodes controlled by the malicious party. In accordance with the attack goal of
maximizing impact, the attacker aims to use its budget to occupy the source’s
neighbor list. Note that in a real streaming system, the typical size of the
source’s neighbor list is 20-30 entries [HFC+08; VGL+07], which highlights the
feasibility of conducting an internal attack using a very small budget.
We assume an attacker to (a) have a budget x, and (b) be capable of assigning
malicious peers as headnodes. Potential ways of assigning headnodes include
(1) joining the overlay as early as possible in case of a pre-announced time for
a streamline, (2) taking down the source’s benign headnodes, or (3) abusing
peers’ replacement mechanisms [NRS+16]. Hence, the attacker initially assigns
xh ≤ x of its resources as headnodes. As the attacker’s main objective is to fully
occupy the source’s neighbor list, the optimum value of xh for the attacker, is
xh = |NeighborList|. If full exploitation of the source’s neighbor list is not
feasible when the attack is being initiated, the attacker continuously tries to
increase the value of xh.
The rest of malicious peers x − xh are connected as neighbors to the xh
headnodes. Such a placement is the best strategy for the attacker since the
impact caused by the x − xh peers is maximized due to their relative close-
ness to the source, i.e., a larger fraction of benign peers experience a longer
service degradation till a sufficient amount of benign peers receive and start
disseminating the stream. Given the fact that inferring the overlay’s topology
is indeed feasible [NRS+16; NF15], the attacker is capable of inferring the ex-
isting headnodes to optimally place malicious peers as headnodes. Knowing the
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headnodes allows the attacker to place malicious nodes in their neighborhood,
which also results in an effective disruption of the stream dissemination if the
budget is sufficiently high.
6.2.2 Drop-chunk adversarial behavior
We now discuss the main adversarial behavior that gets executed based on
the attacker’s target and budget. Let M be the set of malicious peers that
collaboratively execute Drop-chunk . When m ∈ M receives a chunk from a
neighbor, m drops the chunk. In particular, m never advertises chunks in its
BM , except to the neighbor it received the chunk from. Indeed, it keeps on
requesting the dropped chunks from other benign peers b ∈ B, where B is the
set of benign peers. This scenario guarantees that: (a) malicious peers are less
susceptible to being suspected as the requesting benign peers are not aware that
m indeed received those chunks, and (b) detectingm’s direct or close connection
to the source, inferring the overlay’s topology, is not possible, which lowers the
probability of m being suspected.
Note that this behavior minimizes the detection susceptibility of malicious
peers. The reason is that other BM cheating strategies result in eventually
declaring a certain suspect, e.g, if m keeps on sending correct BM updates but
never sends the actual chunk, honest nodes will eventually suspect m.
6.3 Detection Mechanism
In this section, we explain our detection mechanism, starting with an overview
of the different steps followed by a detailed description of each step. The goal of
the detection algorithm is to restore the user’s satisfaction in the face of a Drop-
chunk attack. The key idea of our method is to replace headnodes associated
with peer groups of low satisfaction levels.
Throughout the section, we assume that nodes authenticate their messages
using digital signatures. The source keeps track of participants’ verification keys
and can hence establish the authenticity of messages. In particular, malicious
nodes cannot forge responses of honest peers to influence the mechanism. We
assume that neighboring nodes periodically exchange messages stating that they
are neighbors. These proofs of neighborhood are signed and contain a time
stamp. In this manner, u can proof if v is (or has recently been) its neighbor.
6.3.1 Mechanism Overview
We illustrate the underlying ideas of the detection mechanism in Figure 6.1.
When a malicious peer m performs a Drop-chunk attack, benign peers b are
unable to immediately identify the malicious behavior. Specifically, m never
sends the actual BM that represents the chunks it currently possesses, i.e., m
is only requesting chunks it already has. Thus, detecting a violation in this case
is not straight-forward. In particular, nodes are generally unable to identify a
suspected attacker based only on local information. In the remainder of the
section, we present a mechanism that allows nodes to collaboratively identify
suspects that are subsequently removed as headnodes.
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b
Detection Trigger1
b
Detection Request and Replies 2
b
3 Filing a complaint and source response
S
4 Execute decision and forwarding
b
Yes
𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑏 < 𝜎
Complaint
𝐻𝑛, 𝑃𝑛
Figure 6.1: Detection process for Drop-chunk . S denotes the source.
The detection consists of four steps, starting with an initial trigger of dis-
satisfaction at one peer and potentially terminating in replacing one or several
headnodes. First, when a peer b suspects a Drop-chunk attack based on its local
observations, b sends a detection request to all peers in its neighbor list. Second,
each peer receiving a detection request prepares a response. Third, the initiator
b decides based on the received responses if they should file a complaint to the
source. If b decides to file the complaint, b sends it on behalf of the participat-
ing peers in the request. Afterwards, the source verifies the complaint, reacts
accordingly, and responds to b, detailing the steps taken. The reaction of the
source is either the replacement of one or several headnodes or the rejection
of the removal request. Finally, b reacts based on the received response from
the source and then forwards the source’s reply to the other participants in the
complaint, who in turn execute the same procedure.
The node b bases its decision on whether to initiate a request or forward
a complaint on a number of threshold parameters, which we summarize in Ta-
ble 6.1 together with various system parameters governing the attack.
Table 6.1: Detecting cheating attacks: acronyms description
Var. Description Var. Description
Hn headnodes in a complaint Pn potential candidates
x no. of malicious peers xh mal. headnodes
BM buffer-map x− xh mal. non-headnodes
sat peer satisfaction level σ satisfaction threshold
tdrop min. drop responses κ no. allowed det.
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6.3.2 Detection Trigger
In order to start a detection request, the node b has to experience a low satisfac-
tion level. The satisfaction of a peer is defined as the fraction of missed chunks,
i.e., the continuity of the stream according to the Hit/Hit+miss chunk ratio.
In a nutshell, b starts a detection request if its satisfaction is below a satisfac-
tion threshold σ. However, to limit the ability of malicious peers to incorrectly
accuse benign peers and increase the load through false detection requests, the
concrete conditions that result in a detection request from b are:
1. b’s current satisfaction level satb is less than the predefined threshold, i.e.,
satb < σ.
2. The number of drop detection requests sent by b in the time interval tdet
is less than κ.
3. b has not initiated or replied to any other Drop-chunk detection request
that the source has not decided on yet.
The second and third condition guarantee that peers cannot abuse the mech-
anism via triggering or participating in multiple detection requests in parallel.
Moreover, restricting concurrent requests for benign peers is sensible as their
low satisfaction level is already noted in their reply to previous requests.
6.3.3 Processing a Detection Request
Let D denote the set of queried peers, i.e., the neighbors of the initiator b if
b executes the protocol honestly. When receiving a detection request, a peer
d ∈ D hence first checks if it can participate in any more requests. If so, d replies
with its satd and a time stamp, both signed by its private signature key. The
time stamp prevents the attacker from replaying benign peers’ previous (low)
satisfaction levels, as only recent satisfaction levels are valid.
6.3.4 Filing and Processing a Complaint
Upon receiving a feedback from its neighbors, b decides whether to file a com-
plaint or not. If so, the source verifies the complaint and potentially removes
some of its headnodes.
Filing a complaint
b will start processing the replies once all nodes in D have replied or a time-out
treplies occurs. We assume that the source’s address is publicly known and b
can send a complaint to the source directly.
b sends a complaint if the average satisfaction level indicated in the responses
is below a threshold σ and at least tdrop peers replied to the request. More
specifically, let sat1, . . . , satz be the satisfaction levels expressed in the replies
and satb be b’s satisfaction level. Assuming a sufficient number of replies, b files
a complaint to the source if:
1
z + 1
(
satb +
z∑
i=1
sati
)
< σ. (6.1)
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Otherwise, b either starts another detection request depending on κ or waits
until allowed to send another detection request.
Once b decides on filing a complaint according to the aforementioned con-
ditions, b generates a complaint message to the source containing the IDs of all
nodes in D, recent proofs of neighborhood, and the received satisfaction levels
including signatures and time stamps.
The reason for requesting at least tdrop replies is to prevent a few malicious
nodes from accusing benign headnodes. By imposing a lower bound on the
requested number of replies, a considerable number of malicious nodes has to
use one of their κ requests. We present an in-depth analysis on how these
constraints prevent misuse in Section 6.4.
Processing a Complaint at the Source
The source s first verifies the content of the complaint. First, the source rejects
any complaint from a node b that has already participated in κ requests. If
s does not reject the complaint, s then removes any satisfaction levels without
valid signatures from the complaint. Furthermore, s removes any responses from
nodes that have exceeded their participation limit or are participating in two
complaints at the same time.
If the remaining valid responses still indicate an average satisfaction level of
less than σ, the source:
1. divides the set of peers in D into two sets Hn and Pn, where Hn is the set
of headnodes peers that exist in the complaint.
2. removes all peers in Hn from its neighbor set.
3. randomly connects to another |Hn| peers.
4. adds peers (excluding peers in Hn) from its neighbor list to Pn, where
Pn = NeighborList \Hn (NeighborList is the set of peers in a neighbor
list).
5. sends a Complaint Reply to b containing Hn and Pn.
The reason for choosing random new headnodes rather than nodes participating
in the complaint is to lower the incentive for complaints by malicious peers. Even
if such a complaint is successful, the new headnodes are likely benign, meaning
that the malicious nodes did not gain anything from initiating the request apart
from slightly increasing the load.
Processing a Complaint Reply & Forwarding
Finally, when b receives the complaint Reply from the source, b
1. Disconnects from all peers in Hn. Note that b does not blacklist peers in
Hn from its neighbor list due to the fact that those peers are not proven
malicious.
2. Connects to |Hn| peers from Pn, in case |Hn|> |Pn|, peers connect to
|Pn|+(|Hn|−|Pn|) random peers.
Subsequently, b forwards the complaint to the other participants, i.e., D \Hn,
who in turn execute steps 1 and 2.
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6.3.5 General Notes
The detection mechanism does not aim at expelling peers from the system. Sim-
ply removing headnodes remarkably benefit the system. Indeed, the only peers
that get blacklisted are those who violate the detection mechanism constraints,
i.e., participating in more than a single request at a time or initiating more than
κ requests. The reason for this leniency lies in the potentially high chance of
removing headnodes that are benign but exhibit a low performance. In general,
the main target of the detection mechanism is to enhance peers’ satisfaction
level while keeping peer replacements and signaling overhead low.
6.4 Analysis
We focus on characterizing the behavior of malicious nodes aiming to subvert
the detection mechanism to remove honest headnodes and retain malicious ones.
More precisely, we show that successfully accusing a benign headnode of cheating
requires that the malicious peer issuing a complaint presents a neighbor list that
is either dominated by malicious peers or by benign peers with unusually low
satisfaction levels. Similarly, preventing the removal of a malicious headnode
requires that a high number of the neighbors are malicious.
6.4.1 Falsely Accusing Benign Headnodes
We start by considering the case that malicious nodes want to misuse the de-
tection mechanism to remove a benign headnode. Note that there are reliable
methods to identify headnodes [NRS+16], so malicious peers are likely to know
if one of their neighbors is a headnode. The malicious node m initiating a re-
quest with the goal of removing one benign headnode can manipulate the set
D of nodes m forwards to the source. In other words, after querying all nodes
in its actual neighbor list, m might send only subset of the responses as well
as responses from additional nodes to the source. If possible, m chooses these
responses in such a manner that the source will remove the benign headnode.
There are restrictions guiding the construction of D that m has to take into
consideration:
• m should include the benign headnode it aims to remove.
• m cannot include benign nodes that are not in its actual neighbor list, as
m has no valid proofs of neighborhood.
• m does not have to include all peers that are in its actual neighbor list,
as there is no possibility to detect excluded neighbors short of asking all
peers in the system if they are neighbors of m.
• m can include malicious peers that are not in its actual neighbor list, as
these peers are willing to generate false proofs of neighborhood. Only the
inclusion of malicious nodes that can participate in a Drop-chunk request,
i.e., those that have not yet reached their limit of Drop-chunk request
participation, is beneficial for the success of the request. Malicious peers
contained in D claim that their satisfaction level is 0 to maximize the
chance of removal.
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When deciding on a set D, m tries to minimize the number of malicious
nodes in D in order to use as few of the κ requests per node as possible. Prepo-
sition 6.4.1 gives a lower bound on the number of required malicious nodes.
Preposition 6.4.1. Let m be a malicious neighbor of a benign headnode h with
satisfaction level sath. Assume that m has k benign neighbors v1, . . . , vk sorted
by their satisfaction levels sat1 ≤ sat2 ≤ . . . ≤ satk. Then, to successfully
remove h, m has to include at least c responses of malicious nodes, including m
itself, in the set D of forwarded responses such that:
c = max
(
1, (6.2)
argminc′inN
 1tdrop
sath + tdrop−c′−1∑
i=1
sati
 < σ
)
Proof. To remove a headnode h, there has to be a detection request containing
the responses of h and n ≥ tdrop − 1 nodes with satisfaction levels s1, . . . , sn
and 1n+1 (sh +
∑n
i=1 si) < σ. The node m aims to minimize the number of
involved malicious nodes c because each malicious node can only participate
in κ detection requests per interval. At the same time, m has to ensure that
the average satisfaction level of the involved nodes is below σ and that the
request includes at least tdrop nodes in total. As m files the request, at least one
malicious node has to be included. In other words, m solves the optimization
problem of finding a minimal c and a set of integers I ⊂ {1, . . . , k} such that i)
c + |I|+1 ≥ tdrop, ii) 1c+|I|+1
(
sath +
∑
i∈I sati
)
< σ, and iii) c ≥ 1. Choosing
the lowest satisfaction levels indeed solves the optimization problem and results
in Eq. 6.2.
For simplicity, Preposition 6.4.1 considers the case that only one headnode
is contained in m’s neighbor list. In the presence of several headnodes, m has to
slightly adapt its attack strategy. If additional malicious headnodes are neigh-
bors of m, m does not include the respective nodes in D to avoid accidentally
causing the removal of malicious headnodes. In contrast, if additional benign
headnodes are neighbors of m, m will include all of them in D if the detection
request can be successful. If success is not possible due to the high satisfaction
level of the included headnodes, m successively removes each headnode using
the strategy outlined in Preposition 6.4.1.
6.4.2 Retaining Malicious Headnodes
Now, we consider the case that malicious nodes collude to retain one or several
malicious headnodes when a benign peer initiates a detection request. All mali-
cious nodes in the respective neighbor list will provide a satisfaction level of 1 to
prevent the removal of a malicious node. We assume that malicious neighbors
will try to prevent the removal of malicious headnodes even if the request can
additionally result in the removal of benign headnodes. This assumption seems
reasonable as the removal of a benign headnode is unlikely to lead to additional
malicious headnodes, indicating that retaining existing malicious headnodes is
of higher importance than removing benign headnodes. Preposition 6.4.2 pro-
vides the condition governing the success or failure of the Drop-chunk request
in the face of the proposed adversarial behavior.
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Preposition 6.4.2. Letm be a malicious headnode and b be a benign neighbor of
m that initiates a detection request due to its low satisfaction level satb. Assume
that b has k benign neighbors v1, . . . , vk with satisfaction levels sat1, sat2, . . . , satk.
In addition, b has y malicious neighbors, which includes the malicious headnode,
and k ≥ tdrop. Then the removal of m fails if and only if:
1
k + y + 1
(
y + satb +
k∑
i=1
sati
)
≥ σ. (6.3)
Proof. The claim follows directly as all y malicious peers will set their satisfac-
tion level to 1 and Drop-chunk requests with an average satisfaction of at least
σ are not successful.
6.5 Evaluation
The goal of this section is to address two research questions: First, we quan-
tify the severity of Drop-chunk . Second, we evaluate the proposed detection
mechanism’s performance in terms of effectiveness and efficiency. We start by
describing the simulation model and set-up before detailing the simulation re-
sults and their interpretation for both research questions.
6.5.1 Simulation Framework, Parameters and Metrics
Our simulation framework builds on OSSim [NFS13]. OSSim is a packet level
simulator for DONet [ZLL+05], a pull-based online streaming overlay. All our
overlays use the network topology generator GT-ITM [ZCB96] with 1000 peers
connected to 400 edge router. Furthermore, our simulation time is 500s and the
presented results are averaged over 10 runs.
We differentiate between malicious and benign peers when considering their
online times. We assume that malicious peers join the overlay early and do
not leave before the content dissemination ends in order to maximize their im-
pact. In contrast, benign peers join based on Pareto distribution and leave
according to Lognormal distributions, as motivated by real-world measure-
ments [VAM+06]. Benign peers can rejoin the overlay in a uniform distribution
around 10s. For both case studies, the streaming rate is 400kbps, the chunk size
2500B and the buffer size 30s.
The following metrics characterize the performance.
Satisfaction sat
The satisfaction is the fraction Hit/Hit+miss of chunks peers receive in time,
averaged over all peers.
Avg. Loss lo
Indicates the average number of chunks that peers do not receive in time, aver-
aged over all peers.
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Detection Overhead DO
The detection overhead describes the communication overhead created by the
detection mechanism. More formally, it is the ratio of messages exchanged in
the system due to the detection mechanism and all signaling messages: (1) BM
requests, (2) BM updates, and (3) neighboring requests, accepts and rejects.
Benign Ratio per Neighbor List BRNL
The benign ratio per neighbor list measures the fraction of benign peers in the
source’s neighbor list.
6.5.2 Case 1: Drop-chunk Severity
In this case study, we evaluate the impact of Drop-chunk on two different net-
work scenarios: (1) DONet, and (2) DONet+SWAP [NRS+16]. We consider
SWAP to check how replacement mechanisms of headnodes affects the attack.
We use the same total number of peers but vary the attacker’s budget. As ma-
licious peers aim to occupy the closest peers to the source, the remaining size
of the overlay is not a factor on the impact of the Drop-chunk attack.
Given the source’s neighbor list size LS = 10, we choose the following com-
binations for the attackers budget (xh, x − xh): (10, 0), (5, 15), (7, 49), (8, 24).
Here, x−xh = 49 denotes that 7 malicious peers are connected to each of the 7
malicious headnodes. First, we analyze the attack’s impact on DONet and then
we evaluate the resilience of SWAP to the attack.
Figure 6.2a displays the average chunk loss ratio. Unsurprisingly, the average
loss is 100% when xh = LS = 10, which means that the source’s LS is utterly
saturated with malicious headnodes, i.e., no chunks are transmitted to the rest
of the overlay. Thus, the average peer satisfaction is always 0%.
If xh < 10, the average loss initially reaches up to 82% for (xh, x − xh) =
(7, 49), for (xh, x − xh) = (5, 15), the loss ratio is 54% and 73% for (xh, x −
xh) = (8, 24), as shown in Figure 6.2a. If xh or x − xh increases, benign peers
experience severe service degradation for a longer time period. Benign peers
close to the source suffer from overload, leading to a high ratio of missed chunks.
Nevertheless, the loss ratio decreases once a fraction of benign peers are able to
serve the rest of the overlay.
Figure 6.2b presents the average peer satisfaction level sat. As a consequence
of experiencing high chunk loss rate, higher values of xh and x − xh result in
lower peer satisfaction over time, where benign peers at (xh, x − xh) = (5, 15)
restore their satisfaction level at approximately 340s, which is earlier than at
(xh, x− xh) = (7, 49) and (xh, x− xh) = (8, 24).
Now, we analyze the attack’s impact while SWAP is operating. During
SWAP, peers nominate new headnodes and forward these nominations to the
source. Malicious peers abuse the mechanism by nominating other malicious
peers at each nomination round. Moreover, malicious peers connected to benign
headnodes are eventually nominated to the source and thus can occupy the
source’s neighbor list LS.
As shown in Figure 6.2a, comparing the same values at (xh, x − xh) =
(5, 15) for both DONet and SWAP show that the impact of the attack is more
significant if SWAP is active. Before the source’s LS is saturated with malicious
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peers at t = 80s, the average loss is in fact decreasing, However, as soon as
malicious peers control the neighbor list, the average loss increases up to 97%.
For the same reason, the satisfaction level of benign peers eventually decreases
to 6%, which highlights the unsuitability of SWAP against our proposed attack.
(a) Avg. loss
(b) Avg. peer satisfaction
Figure 6.2: Attack’s impact on DONet
6.5.3 Case 2: Detection Mechanism Performance
We now evaluate the performance of the detection mechanism. Benign peers
execute the detection mechanism as described in Section 6.3 whereas malicious
peers aim to misuse the mechanism. More precisely, malicious peers reply with
a satisfaction level of 0 if the complaint might remove a benign peer and 1 if it
might remove a malicious peer.
In order to do so, we chose (xh, x− xh) ∈ {(5, 40), (8, 40), (10, 30)} to assess
the performance of the mechanism in severe attack conditions. The satisfaction
threshold σ is set to 0.95 to measure if peers are able to fully restore their
satisfaction level when the detection mechanism is operating. The detection
mechanism is effective starting t = 250s to allow for a reasonable amount of
peers to join the overlay to adequately assess the efficiency of the mechanism.
In this scenario, every peer is allowed to initiate κ = 10 detection requests for
tdet = 500s, and the minimum number of responses to generate a complaint is
tdrop = 3. We discuss the effect of varying those parameters later on.
As depicted in Figure 6.3a, we observe an increase in the benign headnodes
ratio in the source’s neighbor list after the detection mechanism starts operating
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(a) Average BRNL
(b) Average peer satisfaction
(c) Detection overhead
Figure 6.3: Detection mechanism performance
at t = 250s. For instance, if (xh, x−xh) = (5, 40), the source successfully attains
80% benign headnodes due to the detection mechanism. For (xh, x − xh) =
(8, 40), the BRNL ratio increases up to 90-100%, which reflects the efficiency
of the detection mechanism in replacing malicious headnodes to restore peers’
satisfaction levels. Even if the source is initially only connected to malicious
headnodes, i.e., xh = 10, the detection mechanism is capable of restoring a
BRNL to approximately 80%.
Figure 6.3b illustrates the average restored peer satisfaction level when the
detection mechanism is active. For all considered attack budgets, the average
satisfaction level quickly increases to 95-100% for (xh, x− xh) = (5, 40), (8, 40).
For xh = 10, the average satisfaction increase from 0% to almost 60% in a
time span of 250s. The reason of the quick increase is that the number of
initial detection requests sent to the source results in replacing a high fraction
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of the source’s headnodes. Moreover, malicious peers are unable to misuse the
mechanism, as indicated by the absence of degradation in satisfaction levels.
Figure 6.3c depicts the average detection overhead induced by our mecha-
nism. The maximum overhead due to the detection mechanism is 8% for all
scenarios. As peers are eventually satisfied, the number of detection requests
initiated decreases and the overhead decreases to 4% at t = 500s, i.e., peers
stop invoking the mechanism. Moreover, the maximum number of detection
requests that can be initiated is dependent on κ, which is set to 10 in this sce-
nario. Thus, smaller values of κ result in lower overhead. In fact, varying tdrop
between 3, 4 and 5 has little impact on the detection performance, indicating
that nodes receive sufficient replies.
In summary, our simulation study highlights the effectiveness efficiency of
the detection mechanism against Drop-chunk attacks, even in the presence of
an attacker that initially controls the majority of nodes close to the source.
6.6 Related Work
We overview the prominent existing work on attacks and their detection in the
context of P2P streaming systems. Most prior work has considered three attack
types: (i) pollution attacks, i.e., flooding the overlay with arbitrary content
and claiming it to be relevant chunks, (ii) free riding, i.e., participating in the
overlay without contributing, and iii) cheating attacks, i.e., maliciously dropping
packets or manipulating buffer-maps.
Pollution attacks are considered one of the most common attacks [GD16].
Various mitigation and detection strategies exist a such as network coding [FGG15]
and [KW14] that can effectively mitigate these attacks.
In contrast, the main approach to counter free riding are incentives [LWC09;
HC04], i.e., rewarding peers that distribute the stream to others. However,
these strategies are only effective for peers that aim to minimize their level of
participating.
Cheating attacks are severe DoS attacks, performed to maximize the damage
to the overlay and preventing peers from downloading the stream. Antiliar is a
general defense mechanism against a diverse set of attacks, including dropping
and buffer map manipulation [SR12]. Mainly, Antiliar tracks peers behaviors
in a secure progress log and thus, detecting misbehaving peers by identifying
irregularities in the log. While highly effective, Antiliar relies on expensive cryp-
tographic operations that are unsuitable for devices with low CPU resources.
Moreover, Antiliar uses a central entity to review the logs, creating additional
security and privacy problems.
An alternative decentralized approach [NFS14] relies on redundancy by en-
forcing diversity when requesting chunks. In this manner, the attacker has to
control a higher fraction of nodes to achieve any severe damage by cheating. The
work focuses on attacks on headnodes yet assumes an external attacker that can
take over arbitrary nodes at will. In this context, the idea of swapping headnodes
frequently to mitigate the impact of the attacker’s control significantly decrease
the attack severity [NRS+16]. As shown in Section 6.5, internal attackers can
undermine the swapping protocol and gain the position of headnodes.
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6.7 Conclusion & Future Work
In this work, we focus on the class of internal inference attacks for pull-based
overlays. The attacker conducts a BM cheating attack after placing malicious
peers as headnodes. We show that the attack severity significantly increases the
chunk loss ratio, accompanied by low satisfaction level experienced by benign
peers. As a countermeasure, we propose a detection mechanism where peers
are able to collaboratively file a complaint to the source when their average
aggregated satisfaction drops below a certain threshold so the source can replace
suspicious headnodes.
Our simulations show that the detection mechanism is capable of restor-
ing 95-100% of peers satisfaction level while removing 80-90% of malicious
headnodes from its neighbor list while inducing a low overhead of approximately
8%. As an ongoing work, we focus on evaluating the resilience of our approach
against various BM cheating strategies and integrating anonymous monitoring
for proactive defense. We note that we provide the main conclusion of the the-
sis, w.r.t. the research questions and contributions discussed in each chapter in
the thesis in Chapter 7.

Chapter 7
Summary and Conclusions
Throughout the work conducted in this thesis, we investigated a critical ques-
tion: “how secure are P2P systems?” . Our primary focus was:
(1) Evaluating the feasibility and severity of conducting progressive
attacks on different P2P overlays when a specific overlay-based vul-
nerability is exploited.
(2) Designing an effective, accurate and lightweight distributed de-
tection and mitigation scheme that is suitable to the constraints of
each investigated overlay.
As aforementioned in Section 1.1, in this thesis, we comprehensively investi-
gate the security threats of structured, unstructured and streaming overlays. We
targeted existing and progressive attacks, i.e., mutating attacks via exploring
the feasibility of conducting advanced, more severe and combined adversarial
behaviors when considering an attack form on a designated overlay.
In more details, through the rest of this chapter, we start by providing a
high-level conclusion to the work conducted in this thesis. Afterwards, a detailed
summary covering the main concepts and results of each research question with
the corresponding contribution(s) is provided.
7.1 Attacks on P2P Systems
In order to cover different security exploitations that threaten P2P overlays, we
focused on varied threat models throughout the thesis. More specifically, the
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attacks investigated in the thesis are diversified to profile variant aspects. More
specifically, the proposed attacks are designed to be:
(1) generalized: every attack is conducted using various attacker’s profiles
to have a full view of the attack’s impact on the designated overlay.
(2) internally conducted: i.e., the attack is launched internally from the
overlay to cause a maximum damage to the overlay rather than externally shut-
ting down other peers in the overlay.
(3) localized: a specific set of peers (victims) is targeted, i.e., the attacker’s
malicious resources are only directed towards attacking selective peers.
(4) unlocalized: complementing localized, in this scenario the attacker does
not target a specific peer, i.e., the target of the attacker is to generally propagate
disruptions to maximize the attacks impact on the overlay.
In the following sections the application of the proposed attacks with respect
to the different P2P overlays is explained
7.1.1 Structured Overlays
For structured overlays, two main attack types were assessed, referred to as
Localized Attacks (LA) and Routing Table Poisoning Attacks (RTP). We now
discuss the main aspects concluded in the work presented in the thesis.
7.1.1.1 Localized Attacks (LA)
Structured overlays are mainly characterized by the closeness feature, where
peers can relate to the locations of other peers, which in turn enhances the
lookup forwarding procedure. However, progressive forms of localized attacks
are shown to successfully exploit this feature even when divergent lookup mech-
anisms are in-operation, as we evaluated in Section 2.7.
Figure 7.1: Structured overlays: LA
As depicted in Figure 7.1, after assessing the impact of LAs, firstly, we
designed a dynamic-based-voting detection mechanism to enhance divergent
lookups which yielded successful detection rates close to 100%. Afterwards, a
distributive eviction mechanism was proposed to restore the overlay’s reliability,
with a key feature of accurately propagating the information about malicious
peers to the rest of the overlay. The proposed eviction mechanism was capable
of accurately evict up to 90% of the malicious peers from the overlay while the
attack is being conducted.
7.1.1.2 Routing Table Poisoning (RTP)
The second form of attacks conducted on structured overlays was the RTP
attacks. RTP attacks serve as an inherent part of various existing attacks on
structured overlays and consequently have a higher significance. In fact, the
attacks main target is to contaminate honest peers routing tables with malicious
peers propagating fake information. Notably, throughout the work presented in
7.1 Attacks on P2P Systems
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Section 4.6, we emphasized the severity of RTP attacks on structured overlays,
which reflects the likelihood of experiencing a similar drastic impact from related
attacks such as sybil, flooding or eclipse attacks.
Figure 7.2: Structured overlays: RTP
Contemporary, we designed a distributive eviction mechanism where peers
form a quorum once the detection mechanism, presented in Chapter 2, suspects
a peer. Accordingly, peers are allowed to reach a collaborative decision on the
suspected peer, which remarkably allows for a rapid sanitizing of the overlay via
fully-partitioning of malicious peers from the rest of the overlay with success
rates of up to 90%.
7.1.2 Unstructured Overlays
Unstructured overlays are inherently easy to maintain given the less constraints
available when peers join or leave the overlay, i.e., peers are randomly assigned
IDs which denotes that, unlike structured overlays, there are no notions of close-
ness or calculations required to determine next hops for forwarding a message
from the sender to the receiver. In fact, the exhaustive searching is performed
to determine the next hop leading to the destination peer. Hence, for large-scale
applications, maintenance becomes more complex and resources/time consum-
ing. To alleviate this, super peers are usually coupled with the unstructured
overlays to form a super-unstructured overlay that allows for better organization
of the messages forwarding procedure.
While integrating super peers is effective and efficient, however, this incen-
tives attackers to attack super peers due to their higher impact on system.
Therefore, we proposed an intuitive form of eclipse attacks, namely Outgoing
Eclipse Attacks (OEA), where malicious peers aim at delaying, forging or drop-
ping outgoing messages from super peers. The attack were conducted using a
localized and an unlocalized attack instances, which showed a significant impact
as successfully delivered messages decreased in certain scenarios to around 5%.
Figure 7.3: Unstructured overlays: OEA
On the other hand, to limit and counter OEAs, we designed a compos-
ite mechanism that pro-actively overcomes routing table infiltration through a
monitoring technique that bounds the number of connections per peer. Simulta-
neously, a complementary reactive mechanism was proposed that distributively
expels malicious peers from the honest peers routing tables with an accuracy
rate of up to 99%.
7.2 Summary: Research Questions & Contributions
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7.1.3 Streaming Overlays
P2P streaming overlays fundamentally rely on the fact that peers participate in
data dissemination process. This feature notably became a critical characteris-
tic for a wide area of streaming applications due to the reduced costs derived
by the robust dissemination techniques. Consequently, attackers are continu-
ously trying to exploit this feature via manipulating buffer-maps BM to inform
neighboring peers about the (existing versus desired) data chunks.
In that context, in Chapter 6, we presented a severe, yet feasible, form of
cheating attacks we refer to as drop-chunk attack. In this attack, malicious peers
stop informing peers about the recent available chunks in their own buffer.
More importantly, as evaluated and proved in [NRS+16] peers are capable
of inferring the overlay’s topology. Adversely, we show that malicious peers
can successfully place themselves in the closest positions to the stream source
to receive chunks earlier than the rest of the overlay and thus, restrict further
propagation of the chunks which in turn leads to a drastic degradation in the
streaming quality. We showed that conducting such a composite internal-drop
attack yielded a significant impact on the overlay where peers satisfaction level
dropped to around 100% using a small fraction of malicious peers.
Figure 7.4: Streaming overlays: BM data dissemination cheating attacks
To restore peers satisfaction from the overlay, in a short time interval, we
proposed in Section 6.3 a collaborative complaint system where neighboring
peers agree on filing a complaint to the source when the average satisfaction
level drops to a lower value than a predefined application specific threshold.
Subsequently, the source validates the complaint and accordingly removes sus-
picious headnodes connections. Through a theoretical and a simulation study,
we showed that our approach managed to effectively restore peers satisfaction
up to 80-90% in severe attack conditions.
7.2 Summary: Research Questions & Contribu-
tions
Breaking down the work done in this thesis into three main research questions,
with each research question addressing a certain P2P overlay, we show how
attacks develop and evolve to significantly degrade the service provisioning. Ac-
cordingly, through the four contributions presented in the thesis, we designed
and evaluated varied mitigation and detection techniques. In more details, we
summarize and conclude the results of each research question and the corre-
sponding contribution(s) in the following section.
7.2 Summary: Research Questions & Contributions
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Research Question (RQ1): How resilient are structured P2P overlays
to attacks?
In this work, we address the severity of Localized EAs (LEAs) on structured
P2P overlays. Through the rigorous evaluation detailed in Section 2.7, we high-
lighted that the decentralized design of P2P networks also exposes it to a variety
of distributed threats with Eclipse Attacks (EAs) being a prominent attack im-
pacting P2P functionalities.
On the other hand, although the basic technique of divergent lookups has
been demonstrated as a countermeasure to mitigate EA, it can only (effectively)
address limited variants of EAs, i.e., topology aware LEA (taLEA). As depicted
in the results, the Lookup Success Ratio (LSR) drops down to 63% when mali-
cious peers ratio is 25% of the network size. For more progressive and generic
Localized Attack (LA) behaviors, as we showed in [IGS16], the LSR dramati-
cally decreased to negligible values of around 1%, which remarkably highlights
the severity of localized attacks on structured overlays.
Furthermore, in [IGS17], we emphasized that while distributiveness and scal-
ability are attractive features, these facets also increase exposure to malicious
peers which can propagate malicious routing information in structured overlays.
Accordingly, a diverse set of continuously evolving attacks can be mounted that
can cause severe service impairments over the entire overlay network.
We discussed in the related work in Section 4.2 that existing countermeasures
focus on providing diversity or redundancy to overcome malicious routing in-
formation with their emphasis on periodic detection/removal mechanisms done
locally within a peer as continuous monitoring or global sharing of peer status
entails high costs. However, a local approach naturally also limits the global
effectiveness prompting the need for distributed solutions. To tackle the afore-
mentioned challenges, we presented two contributions, to counter LA and RTP
attacks, respectively. First, to address LAs, we proposed a two-fold contribution
as follows:
Contribution (C1):
(C1.1) Developing a highly accurate mechanism to detect malicious
peers targeting a specific peer to attack.
(C1.2) Developing an eviction mechanism that is generally applicable
to various LA types while effectively evict malicious peers from
the overlay.
Next, we conclude the work done towards each of the aforementioned sub-
contributions.
Contribution C1.1: In this first sub-contribution, we investigated both the
detection and mitigation potential of enhanced divergent lookups for han-
dling complex EA scenarios. In addition, we proposed an approach that
can identify malicious peers with a high degree of accuracy.
In a nutshell, our simulations have shown EA mitigation rates of up to
96% in case 25% of the peers are malicious. Also, our approach allows
for anonymity-fostering, fully decentralized usage, and facilitating down-
stream mechanisms such as malicious peer removal.
7.2 Summary: Research Questions & Contributions
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Contribution C1.2: The necessity of designing an eviction mechanism stems
from the fact that:
despite using a relatively small amount of attacking malicious
peers, LAs severely impair the overall network’s reliability due
to the continuous evolving and mutating of the adversarial be-
haviors conducted by malicious peers.
Hence, as a countermeasure, we proposed a new two-fold LA countermea-
sure to evict malicious peers based on the detection mechanism proposed
in [IGS15].
Our countermeasure has been evaluated in a comprehensive simulation
experiment study using a generic LA model that covers a wide range of
known LAs such as sybil, eclipse or poisoning attacks. The study showed
reliability improvements of up to 97% in the presence of LAs, as well as
successful evictions for up to 99% of the cases.
Next, In the context of RTP attacks, after emphasizing its impact on struc-
tured overlays, we successfully developed a sanitizing light-weight distributive
sanitizing mechanism, as presented in the following contribution.
Contribution (C2): Sanitizing benign peers RT from malicious peers
conducting RTP attack
To design a countermeasure against RTP attacks, we built upon contemporary
distributed solutions (that developed specific attack detection and mitigation
techniques for specific overlay types and specific attacks), to propose a general-
ized attack detection and mitigation approach applicable to varied overlay and
attack models.
To that end, we proposed in [IGS17] a novel and efficient routing table
sanitizing approach that (a) is independent of a specific attack variant, lookup
approach or a specific victim set, (b) continuously detects and subsequently
removes malicious routing information based on distributed quorum decisions,
and (c) efficiently forwards malicious information findings to other peers which
allows for progressive global sanitizing. The generalized mechanism showed a
high sanitizing accuracy of up to 90% when evaluated against a generalized
attack scenario with various adversarial behaviors.
Research Question (RQ2): How to defend against Outgoing Eclipse
Attacks (OEAs) on unstructured super-P2P systems?
In this work, which is published in TrustCom 2018 [IRS18a], we highlighted
the critical role of ‘super peers’ in unstructured overlays specially in large-scale
applications which host millions of users. Given the criticality and impact of su-
per peers, attackers in turn targeted super peers due to the resultant significant
damage on the corresponding service offered through the unstructured overlay
based application.
We considered the prominent class of Outgoing Eclipse Attacks (OEAs)
where an attacker aims at blocking the communication by controlling all the
outgoing connections of honest super peers. Our interest on OEA stems from
the fact that our simulation studies reveal that OEAs can cause up to 90% of
all service requests to fail.
7.2 Summary: Research Questions & Contributions
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Contribution (C3): An effective detection and peer eviction mecha-
nism to mitigate OEAs in super-P2P systems.
In order to diminish the severity of OEAs on super peers, we proposed a detec-
tion mechanism that relies upon a novel (a) monitoring and (b) malicious peer
eviction scheme based on a composite proactive and reactive mechanism. Our
proactive mechanism enforced an upper bound on the number of connections
an attacker can establish, whereas our reactive mechanism expelled malicious
peers from the overlay using a distributed consensus protocol.
We showed that our protection mechanism is highly effective and exhibits a
low false-positive rate. Our extensive simulation study validated the analytical
results over a large range of parameters with observed detection accuracies of
99% and throughput enhancements of up to 100% while entailing an overhead
of less than 5%.
Research Question (RQ3): For on-line data streaming overlays, what
is the impact of internal Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks on the stream-
ing quality and how to mitigate cheating attacks in such a tightly QoS
constrained environment?
In this research question, we investigated the resiliency of online streaming P2P
overlays, which provide a popular service for data-intensive applications such
as video streaming. First, we showed that, although the attractive features ac-
quired when involving users with data dissemination, they entailed security risks
including a variety of denial-of-service attacks. In other words, we demonstrated
(a) the feasibility of conducting such attacks, and (b) that while extensive re-
search exists on mitigating varied attack types, their effectiveness is limited if
the attacker can infer information about the topology such as the identity of
nodes that have direct connections to the source.
Through simulations, we illustrated how the attacker can leverage the gained
insights, such as the inference techniques described in [NRS+16], to place ma-
licious participants in prominent positions. Consequently, by dropping chunks
that should be forwarded, the malicious peers degraded the performance in a
stealthy way that does not raise suspicion causing average chunk loss rates up
to 100%. To that end, we proposed a detection technique aiming at restoring
the users satisfaction levels from the streaming service, as discussed in the last
contribution of the thesis, as concluded below.
Contribution (C4): Designing a detection mechanism to counter the
impact of data dissemination (BM) cheating attacks.
Tackling research question 3, we proposed in [IRS18b] a detection mechanism
that identifies DoS cheating attacks attacks, more specifically to online stream-
ing overlays is the BM cheating attack. Thus, the detection mechanism’s role
was to accurately remove potential malicious peers from their disruptive posi-
tions.
We ascertained, theoretically and through simulations, that malicious peers
cannot misuse the detection mechanism to gain influence. Our simulation-based
study indicated that the proposed detection mechanism is able to detect ma-
licious peers with up to 80-90% accuracy while inducing a small overhead of
approximately 8%.
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